


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Near East

Problems OF THE *Middle East*



Proceedings of a Conference
held at the
SCHOOL of EDUCATION,
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

June 5th - 6th, 1947

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Economic Development

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB EAST

By Jamil M. Baroody

*Economist, Formerly Lebanese Commissioner at the
New York World's Fair and Adviser to the
Syrian Delegation at the International Business Conference, 1944*

THE Arab East consists of the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the fertile Crescent and Egypt. This region is the Gateway of Asia. Two of the three major Asiatic routes run through the Arab East. They are the shortest, cheapest and safest routes: Suez and the Syrian Seaboard. The third route is through Turkey. The Arab East is, in fact, the bridge between three continents, the crossways of the world. It is cheaper and faster to send a car from Detroit to India through the Arab East than to send it by any other route. Hence the Arab East provides one of the world's most important routes.

On account of its peculiar geographical position, the strategic or military aspects of the Arab East come into mind. The impact of power politics on the economic development or retrogression of the Arab East stems from its strategic position. This has been seen time and again, as during the wars between the powers of ancient civilizations: Egyptians against the Hittites; Egyptians against Babylonians, Assyrians and other powers; Greeks against Persians; and in recent times French under Napoleon against British. Nor can we ignore today's rivalry between the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet bloc. Whatever great power or bloc of powers controls the Arab East would stand a good chance of controlling the whole of Asia. In the final analysis, it is the control of Asia that will determine the eventual control of the whole world.

THE chief economic resources of the Arab East are in the fields of agriculture and pasture (cereals, cotton, fruits and vegetables, particularly citrus fruits, cattle and their by-products, tobacco, liquorice); transit revenue (from the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, the Iraq Petroleum and trans-Arabian pipelines); minerals (oil, gold, Dead Sea salts, other still unexploited minerals, and, preeminently, oil, the revenue of which is derived chiefly from royalties).

What are the problems and obstacles standing in the way of genuine political, economic and social union? They are the interstate customs barriers; lack of unified currency; lack of economic planning everywhere;

monopoly of trade and industry by a few rich men; very cheap labor whose purchasing power is low, and whose newly awakened class consciousness may be abused by agitators for their own political ends. Inadequate oil royalties must be mentioned as a special problem. The Iraq Petroleum Company pays practically no transit dues, to Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan or Palestine. The American oil companies, however, are more progressive. Further difficulties are caused by the high cost of living left over from the War.

The remedy lies in the removal of these obstacles and in effecting reforms. The chief needs are for a more equitable distribution of wealth through legislation; the education of the rich in social responsibilities; raising the standard of living by launching national economic projects, increasing exports and rendering more services which will be paid for from foreign funds. It is particularly important that the purchasing power of the masses be increased, since otherwise economic development will benefit only cliques inside the Arab countries and foreign powers in association with whom those cliques would exploit the people. Benefit, incidentally, can be derived from the immediate development of the following light industries; textiles; canning; standardization or grading of exportable products, especially fruits, vegetables or cereals; refrigerated ships.

FOR all that the Arab East, like the whole of Asia, is continuously adopting modern Western methods in trade and acquiring western technological skills in production, it does not follow that it has been culturally transformed. The peoples of the Arab East can still call their souls their own.

The Arab and Asiatic intelligentsia, on the whole, understand the West far better than Western intelligentsia understand the East. They have made it their business to do so because they have had no choice but to adopt Western techniques in trade and industry. We are still living under the aegis of Western civilization, the survival of which depends on how well it can free itself from economic, political and social ills. The Arab East is on the watch. It is trying to assimilate what is best in the Western system, though an increasing number of people are also turning their eyes towards the Soviet experiment.

The Arab East may yet become the cradle of a new civilization, but in the event of a global conflict, it may become one of the major battlegrounds and graveyards of the clashing modern civilizations. Hence, more than any other region in the world, the Arab East will within the next decade or two find itself standing on one of two thresholds—that of intensive economic development or that leading to economic destruction.

The Arab East should be what its geographical position meant it to be, a highway of world commerce. Its chief resources, especially oil, should not be used as war fuel or a political weapon. As long as there is tension among the big powers, it is futile to talk about any durable economic development. International amity and goodwill alone are conducive to that internal stability without which neither the Arab East nor any region can hope to prosper.

If there is no international harmony the Arab East, more than any other critical region, may again fall into the arena of power politics. The danger then, is not that its economic development would be arrested, but that the old blind belligerent forces may plunge the world into a ghastly global conflict.

Let us pray that educational institutions in this country and elsewhere will bring up a new enlightened generation that will avert such a catastrophe and tip the scales towards world peace.

HOPE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

By Walter Clay Lowdermilk

Formerly Assistant Chief of the United States Soil Conservation Service

MY approach to the problems of the Middle East is not through its politics, but through its lands. I have sought to read the record as it is written deeply in the land for all to see who have eyes to see. I follow the lead of the great British engineer, Sir William Willcocks, who, in speaking of Mesopotamia said "I have no interest in politics but in making ten blades of grass grow where one grew before." No policy can long endure that does not provide food enough for all the people. A sound and enduring social structure can only be built on the conservation and improved production of useful things from the land. For land is the silent partner in the rise and fall of civilizations.

The Middle East is a vast area of land of many sorts, lying in a semi-humid desert climate. In it a few mountain ranges rise high enough to condense waters out of moisture-laden winds, to water forests and fields and nourish rivers irrigating low-lying alluvial plains of great fertility but scant rainfall. The full advantage of soils of arid climate full of mineral plant foods may thus be utilized in the zones of grasslands and deserts. These features and conditions fitted the Middle East to become the cradle of Western civilization. For food in abundance could be grown in comparatively small areas with relatively high efficiency of farmer manpower.

The genius of native peoples early made use of the peculiar features of this historic region. Out of their genius has come down to us many of the commonplaces in our life today and more particularly in our philosophy, science and religion. These people working in favourable lands gave mankind the concept of division of labour and organization of society, and spiritual insights which have molded western civilization. These are the Holy Lands dear to peoples of the western world.

In my study of land use in North Africa and the Middle East, involving 18,000 miles of travel in 1938 and 1939 through North Africa, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, I found, with the exception of the oasis of Damascus and Egypt, this vast region in a state of decline, under-used, misused and under-populated. Nowadays, wretched villages of a few hundred people stand in the place of great and prosperous cities of ancient times. Ruins of magnificent public buildings beautifully designed and decorated as those at Palmyra, Balbeck, Jerash, Amman, Petra, Caesarea and Samaria, with homes of refinement, culture and prosperity, have lately been excavated from out of the accumulations

of erosion by wind and water. These great centers are forsaken and in their places are villages whose people live in houses and hovels no match for those of the ruined cities. Great works of dams for reservoirs and aqueducts are broken down. The people of to-day show neither the genius nor the culture that gave rise to the ancient civilization of this historic region.

Farm terraces that once covered vast areas of hill lands and reached high states of refinement in conservation of soils and waters have generally been abandoned and overrun by goat herds of nomads and semi-nomads. Lack of maintenance of these remarkable works of conservation has let soil erosion do its work for a thousand years and more to this region that once was the center of the power and culture of the ancient world.

Modern Iraq includes Mesopotamia, lying between the twin rivers of Euphrates and Tigris. As I stood on the ruins of Babylon in the midst of salty desolation, the only living thing I saw was a wolf, shaking his head as if he might have a tick in his ear, as he loped along to his lair in the ruins of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, where air conditioning was in use 2,600 years ago. Baghdad of to-day is the descendant of the queen city of Babylon, but is very far from equalling it in power, population, or civilization.

Archaeologists estimate from the ruins of villages and cities and from ancient records that the population of ancient Babylonia may have been as high as thirty million, whereas to-day the population of Iraq, including nomads, is less than four million. The condition of the land is the key to this striking decline. Hundreds of abandoned canals lie across dry plains. Little mountain ranges of silt, or "spoil banks," are piled high on each side of abandoned canals, one beside another, showing that, as cleaning a canal of silt became more work than digging a new canal, old canals were abandoned and new ones were dug. According to the log of our car, we crossed 98 such abandoned canals on the road from Baghdad to Mosul. At one point, I found eleven abandoned canals beside a partially choked canal now in use. Flying over Mesopotamia in 1942, I had a good aerial view of great areas of abandoned land marked with silted up canals and drifting soil dunes. Irrigated lands of to-day are only a small part of those once irrigated.

THE decline of population, mode of life and prosperity of this "Garden of Eden" land cannot be ascribed to adverse change in climate. For Mesopotamia has always required irrigation water for growing crops, because of its low rainfall, averaging less than 10 inches per annum and falling in some years to less than 5 inches. The physiography is that of

an arid land for a long time, geologically speaking. Soils of ancient times are fertile calcareous loams and are still in place. The great Tigris and Euphrates rivers run full of life-giving waters, ready to be diverted and spread over this vast area of fertile alluvial lands.

Thus, devastation in Iraq is solely the handiwork of man, and the land can be restored to even more than its former state of production if modern methods are used. This has been proved by experiments out of Baghdad which I examined in 1939 and by the construction of modern diversion dams such as the Kut Barrage for diversion of waters of the Tigris River to some 500,000 acres of land. On the basis of the present density of population in the Shatt-Al-Arab and the land that was under irrigation in times past, it would be possible to support some 25 million of people. Yet with modern engineering structures, with up-to-date powered construction machines and with reinforced concrete, it will be possible to put in permanent diversion dams higher up river to give higher heads, and with power-driven excavation machines for digging canals to deliver waters to a greater area of land than was under cultivation in ancient times. Likewise, with power machines, canals may be kept clean of silt with safety. According to these estimates and according to the great British engineer, Sir William Willcocks, it appears that this vast land of fertile alluvium, the Mesopotamia of old, may be made to support at least tenfold the present population of four million people.

Iraq, in fact, presents one of the great reclamation projects of modern times, where two score millions of people may be supported and great supplies of goods grown to exchange for useful goods from other countries and to support local industries. The chief shortcoming in Iraq is lack of vision among officials in recognizing the possibilities of the country and the need of farmers to cultivate reclaimed land. At the opening of the Kut Barrage, in April 1939, where I was present as a guest of the Iraqi Government, I commented to the Minister of Agriculture, that I presumed other projects would soon be started. He replied: "No, we do not have enough farmers to make use of the water that can be had from this one diversion dam." A large increase in population in Iraq is needed to improve the land and the prosperity of the people, but immigration is not encouraged. A very high Iraqi official recently told me: "We do not want immigration, even of outside Arabs—we want to 'born' our own population." This attitude greatly handicaps development of the land.

ANOTHER area of the Middle East showing in its land a long decline from its former state of intensive agriculture and prosperity, is the Christian Lebanese Republic. Lebanon is a mountainous land whose highest ridges reach about 10,000 feet altitude. The flanks of its picturesque slopes are strewn with ruins of thousands upon thousands of

rock-walled terraces that once held soils in place for intensive cultivation. I credit the ancient Phoenicians, a Semitic people, with having first encountered the problem of soil erosion on these slopes under rain farming and having worked out an effective solution for conserving water and soil by level bench terracing. At Beit-Eddine I found terraces still in good repair that may well have been farmed for three to four thousand years.

Forests of cedar were the object of a special study of mine in mountainous Lebanon. The destruction of these ancient forests and the denuded, erosion-ruined slopes once covered with mighty cedars are a tragic example of how mankind has exploited the region.

According to the record (Bible, I Kings v. 6-18) Hiram, King of Tyre, agreed with Solomon to furnish him with cypress and cedars out of the forests of Lebanon for construction of the temple at Jerusalem; 60,000 wood cutters or lumberjacks were put to work in the woods and 80,000 men were bearers of burdens to skid the timbers to the sea and to load them on ships to be unloaded at Joppa for Jerusalem. This famous ancient forest of about 1,000 square miles is now gone and only four small groves are left. The Tripoli grove of 400 trees in a 20 acre enclosure, standing at 6,000 feet altitude, is the most important. Up to 300 years ago, the ancient cedar forest had been reduced to scattered veterans of which 44 "wolf trees" remain. Then a church was built that made the grove sacred, and a stone wall built to keep out the goats. Protection from the ubiquitous goats let seedlings from seed spread from the gnarled old trees, grow up close together to form dense stands of young cedars, growing tall and straight. This young stand is judged to be about 250 to 300 years old from stump count of 272 annual rings that I made on a stump of a windfall of one of the second generation of trees.

Here again, this grove of trees, that spread when given protection against goats, is evidence that the ancient forest was not necessarily destroyed by reason of a change in climate. It has been demonstrated that if given a fair chance, the forest of cedars would grow again in its old site. Here is evidence of a hope of reforesting slopes unsuited to farming or grazing, where sufficient soils remain in place.

PALESTINE is the third Middle East area full of instruction. It is, indeed, in my view, the most significant corner of that entire part of the world, for it is already serving as a concrete example showing how modern and scientific principles can be put to work to rejuvenate the entire Middle East and provide a better way of life and higher standards of living for the long exploited and down-trodden peasant. My studies of the Palestine area were facilitated by the British Mandate Government. Armored cars were made available so that I could get about over

the country in spite of Arab terrorists who were dangerously active in 1939, and an airplane was supplied with special permission to take pictures from the air. In this way I was able to examine the land in its state of decline and deterioration and, by contrast, to study many Jewish agricultural settlements with their examples of reclamation of the malarial swamps, restoration of terraces, and tree crops, and the replanting of forests on forbidding rocky slopes. I found the land of Palestine, except the areas reclaimed in recent times, to be generally in a state of decline as is Trans-Jordan.

When Moses stood on Mt. Nebo some 3,000 years ago, Palestine, the promised land, was according to the Bible record "a good land, a land of fountains and depths that spring out of valleys, a land of wheat and barley, of vines, fig trees and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey, a land wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness. Thou shalt not lack anything in it." This description of Palestine in the time of Moses would be fanciful except for two facts. First, the similarity of Southern California and Palestine is so great in climate, topography, soils and vegetation that the present condition of similarly placed areas in California is a reliable index to the early condition of the land of Palestine. Vegetation varied from desert scrub on the lower slopes of the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea, to the luxuriant forests of the Cedars of Lebanon on the flanks of Mount Hermon; the range in California is from the desert vegetation in Coachella Valley below sea level in Southern California to the pine and fir forests on the lower slopes of Mt. Baldy (10,000 feet) in the San Gabriel Range. Rainfall favors Palestine, for Tel Aviv gets more rain (21.5 inches) per annum than Los Angeles (15.2 inches) and the Mt. Hermon mountain land mass gets up to 70 inches of rain while Mt. Baldy only 50 inches. Other comparisons, too, are striking.

The second fact is that the restoration and reclamation work of the Jewish settlements shows in samples throughout the mandated area what the whole land must have looked like in its pristine condition. The same crops grow today, where there is soil enough, as grew in ancient times. The climate has not changed as to temperature as shown by the growth of the date-palm, a plant very sensitive to temperature ranges, throughout the period.

The most telling evidence that present climatic conditions in Palestine permit of restoration of the land to a far greater state of production and prosperity is found in the 300-odd Jewish agricultural settlements. They serve as a series of demonstration projects covering about 6½ per cent of the total area of Palestine and 14 per cent of the cultivated area, ranging from coastal plain malarial marshes to the rocky highland slopes of upper Galilee, and down to the salty soils of the lower Jordan Valley.

These agricultural colonies have demonstrated and are demonstrating in the most realistic way a number of facts of highest importance as to the future of land conservation in the entire Middle East. The Jews are in fact doing the finest reclamation of old lands that I have seen in four continents, indeed the finest reclamation work of modern times. I am convinced, after studying the relation of peoples to their lands in twenty-six different countries, that these colonists have done something new under the sun; they are working out a lasting adjustment of a people to their land in which all peoples of the world should be interested. By a balanced combination of scientific agriculture and industry, and a voluntary cooperative social system, they have managed to achieve a European standard of living in the midst of the backward, depressed subsistence economy of the Middle East. Their approach to the problem of industrializing subsistence agrarian economics promises a new day not only for Palestine and for the Middle East, but for the world at large.

Palestine in ancient times played a vital role in providing the ethics and ideals that have guided our western civilization toward democratic goals. Palestine, rejuvenated by the technical and creative ability of its Jewish inhabitants and their highly developed social consciousness, may now be the demonstration which will succeed in bringing this backward and depressed area on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean to a more abundant life. In no other place in the world is there the setting, the drive, and the possibility of demonstrating how the decline of misused and damaged lands may be reversed by the production of abundance through devotion and love of the land and full and scientific use of the resources of land and water, power and minerals. Such full and scientific use of resources is made particularly feasible by the fact that the valley of the Jordan River and the maritime plain of Palestine offer a combination and concentration of natural features that set the stage for one of the most unique and far-reaching reclamation projects on earth, comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority of the United States in scope and function.

IT was while making an airplane survey of Palestine in 1939 that I was struck by the possibility of a great power project based upon the extraordinary difference in altitudes between the deep rift of the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean Sea only a few tens of miles away. Palestine's two chief economic needs are supplies of water for irrigated agriculture and power for industrial development. The JVA would supply both. It would divert the sweet waters of the Upper Jordan and its tributaries into a network of irrigation canals, while, in order to com-

pensate the Dead Sea for the loss of these waters, it would introduce sea water from the Mediterranean starting at a point near Haifa and conduct it through a tunnel and open canals down the Jordan depression to the Dead Sea. As this sea water dropped into the Jordan rift, there would be almost 1,200 feet of effective fall for the development of hydro-electric power.

The original sketch of the Jordan Valley Authority appeared in 1944 in my little book, *Palestine, Land of Promise*. The idea was not allowed to remain a mere sketch, nor—though the war was still raging—were the many practical problems involved in so important an engineering project, allowed to remain unanswered. While the book was still in manuscript form, I sent the first draft of the chapter on the JVA to Dr. Emanuel Neumann, and proposed the formation of a commission of experts to study the project, to engineer and to prepare a detailed scheme. With the aid of David Lilienthal, then head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and with the expert advice of the late Colonel Theodore B. Parker, Chief Engineer of TVA, the necessary engineering studies for the projected JVA were outlined and technical personnel recommended for the work. A Commission on Palestine Surveys was set up under Dr. Neumann's direction to gather a body of experts, engage the necessary technicians, and organize the engineering investigations both in America and Palestine.

James B. Hays, formerly Project Manager of the TVA at Bristol, Tennessee, and an irrigation and power engineer of over thirty years experience, became the Commission's Chief Engineer, and was assisted by a distinguished volunteer Engineering Consulting Board. Some of America's foremost engineers have served on this Consulting Board: Dr. Abel Wolman of Johns Hopkins University, the chairman, who had served for years as Chairman of the National Water Resources Board of the U.S.; Harry A. Bashore, former U. S. Commissioner of Reclamation; Col. Theodore B. Parker, who upon his death was succeeded by C. E. Blee, now Chief Engineer of the TVA; John L. Savage, for many years Chief Designing Engineer of the Bureau of Reclamation and one of the world's greatest power and irrigation engineers.

Mr. Hays and his staff worked over eighteen months in the United States and then spent six months investigating conditions in Palestine at first hand. Returning from Palestine in April 1945, Mr. Hays was able to state his general conclusions with a high degree of certainty: A Jordan Valley Authority scheme of irrigation and hydro-electric power development was designed to be carried out in eight successive stages; it would provide irrigation for at least 750,000 acres (the area now under

irrigation is only 100,000 acres) ; it would furnish eventually, more than 800 million kilowatt hours of hydro-electric energy per annum; it would make possible the absorption of up to three million additional population; it would cost \$250,000,000—a reasonable investment, particularly since the project would be self-liquidating in a fifty-year period, at a 3 per cent rate of interest, which is regarded as quite satisfactory in the case of American reclamation projects.

After the preliminary report of April 1945, Mr. Hays continued his studies. His large report dated January 1946, and presented to the members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, contains new data on duty of water, power requirements, capital costs, annual operation and maintenance costs of the various stages. In the considered and expert opinion of the Board of Consulting Engineers, the Jordan Valley Authority scheme has been proved to be an engineering project which is in no way unusual or peculiar but which is paralleled by extensive undertakings in the American west and southwest and in other arid countries. Mr. Savage, answering the (British) Palestine Administration's criticism in 1946, wrote: "*The proposed irrigation and hydro-electric project is not unique or exceptional in any respect. Such a project located in a similar area and climate in the United States, as for example, in Southern California, would have been developed more than a generation ago. These major construction features, such as dams, tunnels, canals, power plants and pumping plants would be considered ordinary features in the United States, and in other countries, where such works have been developed.*"

Like California, Palestine has more land suitable to irrigation than it has water for irrigation; hence no marginal lands need be considered in the JVA's plans. As in the case of California, too, Palestine's power and irrigation projects could adequately be protected from possible earthquake effects by use of standard techniques in designing. It is interesting to note that water use and costs per unit in Palestine to farmers would be comparable to conditions in California's Imperial and Central Valleys.

The Jordan Valley Authority would not aid Palestine alone, or its Jews or Arabs alone. It might well stimulate other and greater valley projects in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. It would serve as a training ground for engineers and specialists in agriculture, grazing management, conservation and forestry, equipping them to carry out other projects that are possible in the Middle East. These might well restore this region to a condition worthy of its past, to the benefit of Arab, Christian and Jew.

The Straits and Strategy

THE DARDANELLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Clyde Egleton

Professor of International Law, New York University

THE waterways of the world have long been bones of contention among nations, and the Dardanelles furnish one of the best illustrations in history of this struggle. I shall use the term Dardanelles in a general sense, to cover not only the narrow straits at the entrance to the Mediterranean, but the wider sea of Marmora in the middle and the narrow strait of the Bosphorus at Constantinople or Istanbul, the Hellespont which Leander swam in order to see his Hero. This is part of what MacKidner called the "heartland," the strategic center, of the world. The Black Sea is a closed sea, providing access only to the few states upon its shores; in this respect, it differs from the other seas of the world. We should note, however, that the Danube empties into the Black Sea, adding its traffic and its troubles to that of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles.

For a long period, both sides of the strait were controlled by one power, which claimed sovereignty over all the land and therefore over the water between. The constant pressure for freedom of navigation, however, here as elsewhere, led to use of these waters for peaceful purposes, by permission of the Ottoman Empire. By 1815 freedom of fluvial navigation—for rivers which flow through more than one state—was recognized as a principle of international law at the Congress of Vienna. The law with regard to straits was not so clearly established.

By 1840, the European Powers were beginning to take a collective interest in this area, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 began the seesawing which continues even until now. By this treaty, the Black Sea was neutralized and fortifications were forbidden. Its waters were opened to all merchant marine and excluded to all warships, even to those of the states on its coasts. This provision, however, was revoked by the Treaty of 1871. In the Treaty of San Stefano, of 1878, Turkey was required to keep the straits open in time even of war, but in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin

returned control to Turkey. The above is not intended as a historical sketch, but merely to illustrate the diplomatic jockeying which took place. In general, the straits remained under Turkish control in time of war; and in time of peace the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus" was steadily maintained through practically all of the treaties made.

At the end of World War I, an effort was made to internationalize the Straits in the Treaty of Sèvres which, however, never came into force. It was not until 1923, by the Treaty of Lausanne, that the post-war settlement was actually effected, and this treaty contained some of the provisions of the inoperative Treaty of Sèvres. Merchant vessels had free passage in time of peace and in time of war, except for enemy vessels if Turkey were a belligerent. Warships also had a right of passage both in war and peace, except for enemy warships when Turkey was a belligerent. However, if Turkey were threatened by war, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan agreed to protect her, as directed by the Council of the League of Nations. The region of the Straits was demilitarized and no fortifications or bases were permitted, and a Commission of the Straits was established with jurisdiction over the area.

THIS international administration of the Straits continued until collective security and the League of Nations began to weaken under the revival of German and Italian strength. In the light of this situation, Turkey demanded revision of the Treaty of Lausanne, and after a conference of the powers concerned, this demand was heeded in the Treaty of Montreux, of November 9, 1936, which is still in effect. This treaty reaffirmed Article 23 of the Treaty of Lausanne: "the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war"; but a great deal of discussion was necessary to decide what should be done about warships. Great Britain wished the Black Sea to be open water, while the Soviet Union sought to exclude all warships but her own.

As a result, very complicated provisions were included, in which warships were classified and permission given to so many of each class to enter at a given time. The Black Sea states were allowed to have larger warships than other states in the Black Sea. The same rules as to warships were to apply in time of war except when Turkey was a belligerent, but nothing was to be permitted to stand in the way of measures of collective security undertaken by the League of Nations. But when Turkey was at war, or even when threatened with war, the passage of

warships was to be entirely at the discretion of the Turkish Government; the Council of the League might express its disapproval if it could get a two-thirds vote plus a majority of the signatories of the Treaty of Montreux. Aircraft must follow routes prescribed by Turkey. Detailed provisions established a relative ratio of the number and kind of warships which could be maintained in the Black Sea by Black Sea powers and by non-Black Sea powers. The Commission of the Straits was abolished and its functions transferred to Turkey, with permission to remilitarize; thus, international administration of the Straits was ended, though there was a provision to the effect that rights of Members of the League under the Covenant should not be prejudiced.

The Treaty of Montreux was clearly a victory for Turkey, for nationalism over internationalism. It was to be good for twenty years, and was reaffirmed by Great Britain and the Soviet Union on August 10, 1941—Turkey had meanwhile (October 19, 1939) become an ally of Britain and France. President Roosevelt, on November 7, 1941, declared that the defense of Turkey was essential to the defense of the United States.

I HAVE been talking in terms of treaties; now let me pause for a moment to consider the application of international law to this situation. In general, international waterways have through long usage been regarded as free to the peaceful commerce of all nations. This is true for the high seas; it has been accepted for international rivers; and it has been claimed in international law texts as applicable also to straits. Straits, however, present a difficult problem, for they are found in such varying circumstances that it is difficult to apply one rule to all of them. For example, a strait which connects at both ends with the same sea, which is entirely within the territory of one state, and which is not the only passageway, can hardly be claimed as free to all. An example is Long Island Sound. And where a strait, in similar circumstances, lies between two states, it is probable that arrangements concerning it will be made by those two states.

On the other hand, where a strait connects two open seas, and there is no other channel between them, there is agreement on the general principle that it should be free. It is a general principle, however, which is necessarily subject to conditions. Such straits as Dover, Gibraltar, or Magellan, though states have at times attempted to exert control over them, have been left free and require no international administrative machinery. The United States asserted in 1879 that she would not tolerate any attempt to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the Straits of Magellan.

In other cases, however, other elements enter into the picture. The

strait may be an important element in the defense of some state, as Long Island Sound would be, and as the Dardanelles would be. It may be necessary to provide for navigation, pilotage, sanitation, et cetera. The only way in which free navigation upon international rivers can be conducted is through the assistance of an administrative body such as the Rhine River Commission, or the European Danube Commission. The Suez and Panama Canals could not be used except through an administrative management. While canals are artificial straits, it seems to me that they should fall under the same international principles as may be applied to natural straits. If dredging, pilotage, sanitation, fees, settlement of disputes and such matters have to be cared for, it is obvious that there must be some sort of an administrative body to take care of the situation.

International law may be found either in custom or in treaty. Customary law can go a certain distance in laying down general principles, but there are cases in which the law is helpless without administrative assistance. To provide this administration, in international affairs, a treaty is necessary; and that is why treaties have been necessary with regard to international rivers, and with regard to some straits. Limitations have been set by treaties upon the use even of nationally owned straits, such as the Suez and Panama Canals.

APPLYING the above discussion to the Dardanelles and its area, various questions and difficulties arise, which make it a unique problem. The strategic situation of the Straits makes it a vital matter of defense for Turkey and the Soviet Union, and of almost as much interest to Greece, Great Britain, and others—even to the United States, according to President Roosevelt and now President Truman. It has always been conceded that the necessities of national defense set some limitations upon the principles of international law. The conflict of interests in this case produces a particularly difficult situation, for which I can find no answer except an international administration.

Does the Dardanelles connect two high seas? or is the Black Sea a closed sea? The Soviet Union takes the latter position. Mr. Litvinov, at the Montreux Conference emphasized that

. . . there exists no other sea which is in the same geographical situation as the Black Sea. . . . The Mediterranean is not a closed sea, you can penetrate it through its two extremities, and that is also the case for the other seas. If, on the contrary, you wish to penetrate the Black Sea, it is for a definite end. This may be either to pay a visit or to offer your assistance to a state in difficulty, in application of a decision of the League of Nations. For my part, I cannot imagine another legitimate aim for which foreign vessels

would enter into the Black Sea. The situation is quite different when it is a question of seas which have to be crossed to reach further regions....

While there is some basis for this differentiation, it does not seem to me that Mr. Litvinov's distinction is sound. Four states are on the coast of the Black Sea, and other states are brought into the picture through traffic on the Danube, which must pass through the Black Sea—aside from the general interest of the community of nations. With such an argument, the United States could close the Gulf of Mexico, which has only two states upon it; or the Adriatic Sea or perhaps the Indian Ocean could be closed.

The Soviet Union was not asking for exclusive control, but that control be vested in the riparian states. This, of course, would be equally obnoxious to those who wish to maintain as a principle of international law freedom for all nations to use international waterways. It would also mean disturbance of the peace, for the riparian states would quarrel and the other states would take sides, as they always have; indeed, the situation would be especially dangerous now because of the overwhelming strength of Russia as compared to the other riparian states, and the fears of other Great Powers that Russian domination in this area might upset the balance of power. The Charter of the United Nations guards not only against breaches of the peace, but also against threats to the peace; it would be a retrogression to return to nationalistic solution of such disputes.

It is only when there is war that the Dardanelles constitute a serious problem. It is the possibility of war which makes Turkey and the USSR desire control of the Straits and which keeps other powers concerned as to what is going to happen there. If there were no war, there would be little to quarrel over. It would therefore seem better to leave the area under international control, provided that control is strong enough to prevent war. Whether the UN can be so strong depends not merely on those states but on all states.

In this connection, however, there is a further point to be noted. The character of war has changed to such an extent as to reduce almost to nothing the military value of the Straits—no matter who controls them. The Soviet Union would not dare to send warships through the Straits today, even if she had forts all along the banks, for they could be destroyed from a thousand miles away; on the other hand, she could protect the Dardanelles against invasion from Odessa or Moscow or perhaps the Urals—if not today, before long! Immediate control of the area is not of the same importance as it once was.

I CAN occasionally find a justification for Soviet policy—but not in this case. Russia does have as vital an interest as any state could have; but that interest would be better served through international administration and responsibility than through control by herself. Disputes of this nature should be settled by the organized community of nations, and not left to nationalistic action.

At this point, however, another factor of importance must enter into our considerations. I have no doubt, and possibly the Soviet Union would agree, that it would be more sensible to put the Dardanelles under UN administration, if the UN were strong enough to take care of the situation. Whether it can be made strong enough depends upon other nations, and particularly upon the American people. The circumstances of today are such that the UN could not be made stronger unless the United States should take the lead in making it stronger; and the circumstances are such that if we should take such a lead, we might well succeed in making it strong. The Soviet Union must therefore ask: what is going to be the attitude of the United States? will it be nationalistic or internationalistic? will she support the United Nations to such an extent that we, the Russians, can rely upon it, or is the United States going her own nationalistic way?

If I were a Soviet statesman, I think I should have to take a rather gloomy view of the situation. The United States demands that the Dardanelles be put under international administration, but would not consent to do the same with the Panama Canal. Does that sound nationalistic or internationalistic? We talk trusteeship, but offer none of our colonies and try hard to take over new territories in the Pacific in full sovereignty; when that effort failed, we grudgingly put them under strategic area trusteeship, which gives us their use for security purposes. We seek bases all over the world, but oppose Russian bases at the Dardanelles and elsewhere. We offer aid to Greece and Turkey on a strictly nationalistic basis of power politics, disregarding the UN entirely, and offering a direct challenge to the Soviets. If I were a Soviet statesman, I think I should have to conclude that the policy of the United States is nationalistic, and that Soviet policy must be the same; that the United States is building up her national strength and not relying for security upon the UN, and that the Soviet Union must do the same. And, I would cling to my vote in the UN as long as this situation continues! The solution to the problem of the Dardanelles depends as much upon the American people as it does upon Soviet ambitions.

TURKEY AND RUSSIA

By Professor Emil Lengyel

Author of TURKEY

I SHALL dispense with the "background material" about the Straits and come to grips with today's realities. I assume that we know that it is the oldest controversial international issue on record which must have been very old when Helen of Troy was still very young. It has been the cause of the Eastern Problem for over two centuries, and, with the exception of a score of years after the First World War, was the source of conflicts between Russia and Turkey.

Behind the aggressive policy of Russia there was the dynamic energy of an expansive country situated in a region where it impinged on some of the largest political vacuums in the world, areas not occupied by forces that could hold their own.

Behind the resistance of Turkey there was the aggressive defense of Great Britain which feared Russian dynamism. Turkey was employed by Great Britain as a shock absorber. The two major antagonists, Britain and Russia, came to grips physically only once in the long history of their conflict: in the Crimean War. During the rest of the time, Russia was compelled to engage in shadow boxing with an enemy she could never see but could always suspect in the background.

The question of the Straits contains some unique characteristics; hence the answer is extremely hard. The Straits constitute the only access to the Black Sea, and the Black Sea contains the only Russian all-year round ports close to important European trade routes. The only other all-year round Russian ports are at the Far Eastern end of Eurasia and in the Far North, way beyond the Arctic Circle, where they are at a great distance from Russia's economic and population centers.

This situation is unique, too, because Russia is the only major power which, try as she did, was never able to break the bottleneck. This in spite of the fact that she has by far the largest continental area, almost three times the size of the continental United States, and about ninety times the size of the United Kingdom.

The situation is unique, in comparison with the United States and the United Kingdom in that both of these nations have cleared tougher obstacles. We know how the United States filled out the North American temperate zone from coast to coast in a burst of energy which swept away all European opposition—British, Spanish and French. The relation of the Straits to Russia may be compared with the relation of the Mississippi Delta to the United States. We know with what irresist-

ible energy the United States smashed its way to New Orleans in the early days of its history.

More than that, the momentum which the United States acquired in this transcontinental dash carried her far beyond what even the most sanguine Great Power politics advocates could have considered as her natural boundaries. The United States assumed a dominating influence in what has been described as the Western Hemisphere-Mediterranean, the Caribbean Sea, and along the Panama Canal.

We know what happened to the Republic of Colombia when her legislature showed signs of wanting to haggle about the conditions of ceding the isthmus to the United States. The American Consul in that region knew well in advance when "a spontaneous eruption" of popular will would occur there and the Government of the United States recognized the Government of Panama when that Government existed merely on paper.

We also know that the policy of manifest destiny carried our country not merely to our natural frontiers on the Pacific but far beyond that, to the Philippine Islands, and even beyond that, to the Asiatic mainland. Long before the airplane and the atomic bomb, we were thinking of our national security in global terms.

And what about the only other country comparable to Russia in terms of Great Power politics? That other country is Great Britain. True, London did not at first realize the significance of the Suez Canal as part of her imperial lifeline. But when she did begin to realize it, she took Egypt, across which the Canal had been cut, under her protective wings. Nominally a Franco-Egyptian undertaking, the Canal became an integral part of British imperial defense, and the nodal point of the Empire.

THE Straits are unique in that they are being held by a weak power, the hold of which—in spite of the weakness—the huge Russian empire, Czarist or Communist, has never been able to break. Those narrow Straits, in the hands of the moribund Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, have defied the momentum of the monster of the North.

The Straits are unique in comparison with Suez and Panama also because they form a natural waterway, while the two others are artificial. From a practical point of view this makes a difference. Since the Panama Canal was built mostly on American enterprise and American money, the United States could lay a claim to it which otherwise would lack urgency. In the case of the Suez Canal, neither the initiative of its building nor most of its capital was British, but the British do have a strong financial hold on it as the largest and most compact minority stock holders of the Canal Company. That hold was reinforced by the

British navy. England was thus able to rule the waves of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the inert waters of Suez. True, she was under international obligation to keep the Canal open in times of peace and war, but she did not find it possible to adhere to that obligation at all times. History teaches us that Britain not merely ruled the waves but occasionally waived the rules.

In the past, it was British policy that kept the Russians from satisfying their warm-water thirst. I may be forgiven for suggesting that every time Russia wanted to get to the Mediterranean warm waters, she got into hot water. For a long time, keeping Russia contained within her frigid frontiers was the quintessence of British imperial policy. Then, early in this century Britain executed an about-face, settled her problems with Russia because she realized that in spying danger she was looking in the wrong direction. Danger threatened not so much from the great Eurasian steppes as from the picturebook villages of the Reich. Historians should find their richest documentation in this about-face, to show that rational action is not the only motive of power politics.

The lesson the world had learned from Britain was clear for all to see: Russia must not be permitted to come anywhere near the Dardanelles, because beyond it stretches the lifeline of the British Empire, past Gibraltar and Suez, all the way to Calcutta, and Singapore.

If that was the lesson man had learned, he was bound to be rudely jolted. We learn from F. Seymour Cocks' book, *The Secret Treaties*, published in London, in 1918, that on March 7 (March 20 Western style) 1915, Sergius Dmitrievitch Sazanoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a confidential telegram to the Russian Ambassador at London, as follows: "Referring to the Memorandum of the British Government (Embassy?) here of March 12, will you please express to Grey (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) the profound gratitude of the Imperial Government for the complete and final assent of Great Britain to the solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople in accordance with Russian desires."

In this secret pact the Russians received Constantinople and the adjoining territory facing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on the European and Asiatic sides, the islands in the Sea of Marmora and the islands of Imbros. The special rights of France and England in these territories were to remain inviolate. The French and British governments expressed their readiness to agree to the Russian wishes, provided the war was won, and provided a number of claims made by France and England were satisfied. The most important claim was Russia's assent for free passage of French and British goods through the Straits.

Of course, this was an agreement made under the duress of war. But it is important to recall this compact in order to place the problem in its proper historic perspective.

It is also part of the historical perspective that the Russians and Turks were good friends during most of the inter-bellum period. Both of them occupied the peripheries of respectability from the point of view of the victorious West and both of them were rebels against the established order, the Russians against the politico-economic system of the capitalistic-democratic West and the Turks against political domination by the West.

We have heard from Professor Eagleton much of the intervening story and I shall pick up the threads at Potsdam—the story of today.

In his August 9, 1945 report about the Potsdam Conference, President Truman declared: "One of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways in Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more States.

"The United States proposed at Berlin (Potsdam) that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future peace and security of the world. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities."

The Montreux Convention was subject to revision in 1946 and the Potsdam Conference agreed that the first steps should be taken in that direction. The British stated through Mr. Bevin's report to the House of Commons on Oct. 22, 1946, what he thought Potsdam had decided upon, and the Soviets stated their interpretation in their note to Turkey on August 7, 1946. In one essential word the two versions differed. Both countries agreed that the Montreux Pact should be revised as it did not meet the conditions of the present time, but Mr. Bevin stated that direct "*conversations*" between each of the three governments (USSR, USA and UK) and the Turkish Government should take place, while the Soviets employed the words "*direct negotiations*." Obviously, conversations in diplomatic terminology are far more preliminary than negotiations.

The United States was the first Government to act by presenting a note to Turkey on this problem. You will observe that the first official step was neither official conversation nor negotiation but a diplomatic note. Washington came out with a definite plan. It suggested an international conference. It set forth four principles as a basis for a solution of the Straits question.

First: merchant vessels are free to use the Straits at all times. Second: warships of the Black Sea powers can also use the Straits at all times. Third: Non-Black Sea Powers cannot use the Straits at all times, except under three conditions: United Nations authority, specific consent of the Black Sea Powers, and an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace. Fourth: The Montreux Convention is to be modernized. The United Nations is to replace the League of Nations and Japan is to be eliminated as a signatory.

On November 21, the British Government accepted the American proposals as a basis of discussion, and just a few days later the Turkish government did likewise. Then, there was a long wait for the Soviet reaction. Was the Kremlin so slow in reacting because the other two of the Big Three had sent a note to Turkey instead of engaging the Soviets in conversations or negotiations as envisaged at Potsdam?

When the Soviet note was issued on August 7, 1946, it was found to be far more detailed and, above all, far more explosive than the other notes. The Soviet note contained an indictment of the wartime activities of Turkey.

On July 9, 1941, the German patrol boat *Seefalke* was sent through the Straits into the Black Sea, the Soviets charged. In August, 1941 the Italian auxiliary warship *Tarvisio* was permitted by the Turkish authorities to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea. On November 4, 1942, the Soviet government warned Ankara of Germany's intention to send 140,000 tons of auxiliary ships through the Straits into the Black Sea as merchant vessels.

The Soviet government protested against a series of passages of German warships and auxiliary warships of the *Ems* and *Kriegstransport* types (13 vessels of varying tonnage) in May and June. These vessels were said by the Soviets to have taken part in Black Sea naval operations.

The Soviet government made proposals about modifications of the regime of the Straits. The first three of these proposals were substantially identical with the American and British proposals regarding merchant vessels and warships of Black Sea and other powers. The dynamite was packed into the last two proposals which I quote literally:

"4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.

"5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for

the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other powers for aims hostile to the Black Sea countries.”

The fourth proposal thus wanted to eliminate the United States, Great Britain and other powers from the modified Straits regime, placing it under Turkey and the Black Sea Powers. The fifth proposal was in favor of establishing a joint Turkish-Soviet system of defense. Obviously, the word “joint” was out of place in the relations of countries of such unequal strength.

The United States was far prompter than the Soviets and a few days later, on August 19, 1946, Washington gave its answer to the Kremlin notes. It said that the regime of the Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Black Sea Powers, that it should be brought into relationship with the United Nations and that Turkey alone should be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits.

The Turkish reply denied the Soviet allegations regarding Axis warships in the Black Sea and where it did not deny them it stated that the ships in question were merchant vessels—at least officially. Ankara expressed its willingness to modify the definition of merchant ships. But the Turkish government rejected the crucial fourth and fifth points of the Soviet proposals. The Turkish note was dated August 22.

This was the beginning of a diplomatic tug of war. This time the Soviet government was prompt in sending another note, on September 24, reiterating its charge against Turkey, quoting old-time agreements with Turkey on Black Sea Powers-Turkish regimes and saying that the Soviet Union had a 1,100 miles shoreline along the Black Sea, giving access to important regions of the USSR and justifying Soviet participation in the defense of the Straits.

WE have seen that in the past it was always England that took up the cudgel against Russia's warm water policy—the historic struggle. In this post-Potsdam controversy the most significant modification of history seems to be the changed position of the United States and Great Britain.

In the past the United States played only a small part in the diplomatic conflicts about the Straits. The name of the United States does not figure as that of a signatory on any of the important pre-First World War Straits documents. True, the United States concluded pacts with the Ottoman Empire in 1830 and 1862, but they were routine treaties of commerce and navigation. The United States was not a signatory even of the inter-bellum treaties in regard to the Straits. It was not a signatory of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920, which was to end the First World War with Turkey and which never entered into force. The

United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which terminated the war, and the United States did not participate in the Montreux Convention of July 1936, the modification of which is the cause of this diplomatic tempest. It is interesting to note that the signatories of that convention are the following countries: Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, USSR, and Yugoslavia. In that period the United States concluded merely a routine commerce and navigation treaty with Turkey in 1929, and a reciprocal trade agreement with Turkey on April 1, 1939.

The change from the past in the post-Potsdam period is truly remarkable. I should like to draw your attention to the following facts: It was the United States that took the initiative in its note of November 2, 1945, regarding the Straits, and a few days later its proposals were endorsed by Great Britain. Again it was the U. S. that answered the Soviets, in the American note of August 19, 1946, and two days later it was endorsed by Great Britain.

In another round of the diplomatic battle it was again the United States that rebutted Russia, and Britain endorsed its rebuttal in a note of the same day October 9, 1946. It may not have been the intention of Washington and London thus to demonstrate the changed roles of the two English-speaking countries. But if it was not their intention, the change is all the more revealing. The Truman Doctrine was the culmination of a process which had been fore-shadowed by these antecedents. The United States is today in the vanguard of the fight against Russian designs to break the Straits blockade. She has taken over that historic role from the British. This seems to be the most notable development in the perennial history of the Straits.

The Russian and Turkish arguments have been discussed pro and con. Turkey has had uninterrupted possession of Constantinople for about five centuries and an even longer period for parts of the Straits. Hers is the land on both sides of that historic waterway. While under Ottoman Imperial rule that region was exposed to decay, the new Turkish republic is a virile, fiercely patriotic country.

On the other hand, Russia has been pointing to the wounds she received in the fight for the common cause in two World Wars. Had the Straits not been interposed between her and victory, her victory may have taken a different turn. A perfect solution of this problem is out of the question. It is true that Russia will feel frustrated, as she has felt frustrated, with that bottleneck in hands not so much, perhaps, of Turkey, as of Turkey's Great Power backers. The fact has been long established that Turkey is merely nominal ruler of the Straits.

What is the solution of the Straits question? There is much merit

to the Anglo-American proposal outlined before. But there is merit to it only if the relationship between Turkey and Russia is friendly. It was friendly during most of the inter-bellum period. There is little merit to it if Turkey is an American satellite. In that case the Russians will feel the same frustration that characterized their attitude under the Czars in the past. In that case they will feel that the noble intent of the treaty will be carried into effect only if it suits the interests of the United States and her friends. In that case they *may* and no doubt *will* feel that the only implementation of the defense policy is physical defense in conjunction with Turkey—and that would be defense by Russia and Russia alone. Only by permitting the Turks and Russians to work out their destiny within the framework of the modified—and from the Russian point of view, much more advantageous—Montreux Convention can we hope to find the way to peace in that part of the world. It was possible for Russians and Turks to reverse a historic trend after the First World War. Instead of impeding their fraternization, why can we not help them find the way to peace, remembering that there will be no peace unless the crossroads of the world, Constantinople and the Straits, are fitted not into an aggressive policy but into a policy of mutual understanding and interdependence.

The Palestine Problem

THE BASIC REALITIES*

By Frank W. Buxton

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IT is not only a thrice-blessed but a thrice-and-again vexed land which we are considering this afternoon; and acceptance of the theory that Palestine is *sui generis* is essential to an understanding of the Palestine problem. Many political principles which seem axiomatic are no more than maxims when applied there. Formulae which have worked out more or less satisfactorily elsewhere, as in Ireland, Switzerland and Canada, are of questionable value in relation to Palestine. Arrangements which may suffice for anomalous, unique Palestine may not be sufficient in other lands. The obvious often fails there. The impossible may become commonplace. It has been for centuries the epicenter of a quivering world, and modern stresses have aggravated the forces which have been present there during the ages. To dogmatize about the future of this incalculable region is to disregard a great mass of facts, ranging from instinctive human emotions, religious attachments, social considerations and conflicting cultures to oil and airways.

Palestine has taken on a third dimension in the last few years. Only the length and breadth and area were significant when armies crossed and recrossed and battled there, on the bridgehead of three continents at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Now the subterranean oil of the Near East and the super-Palestine air routes for the planes of peace and war have further intensified its uniqueness. It can no more be bypassed than Chicago can as the crossroads of the American continent, or New York as the great clearing house of the United States.

That it is thrice-blessed is one of the few characterizations on which Jews, Arabs and Christians agree. That "small notch," to use the apt words of Lord Balfour in 1920 when he voiced the hope that the Arabs, "a great, an interesting and an attractive race," would not begrudge Palestine "being given to the people who for all these hundreds of years have been separated from it"—that "small notch" is sanctified by un-

* Though so many historic changes have occurred in the Palestine situation since Mr. Buxton made this address, his treatment of the underlying issues remains pertinent and enlightening.

broken and unbreakable links with three great monotheistic religions. Moslems, Jews and Christians all regard it reverently. Most of them have never seen it, but it is always in the mind's eye. This instinctive attitude toward the Holy Land is one of the mighty intangibles which cannot be disregarded. It is partly because of the deep-rooted affection of Christians, Arabs and Jews that the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry declared:

- I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.
- II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State.
- III. That the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christians and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths. Thus Palestine must ultimately become a State which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike, and accord to the inhabitants as a whole the fullest measure of self-government consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above.

The many disadvantages under which Palestine has existed immemorably are: (1) internal strains, more serious than those in most countries; (2) neighborhood pressure, due not only to contiguity but to religion, culture, economics and politics; (3) far-distant influences which seem even more potent than previously; and (4) the geographical site to which I have referred already.

Palestine has not been an independent, sovereign nation since the Emperor Pompey stormed Jerusalem in 63 B. C., and to designate it, in the manner of various persons, as a "nation" is to distort the meaning of the word. Always in the intervening centuries, the people of Palestine have failed to be masters in their own house. The land is thick with the dust of non-Palestinian empires which have risen and fallen, and it has been scarred by Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Syria, Rome, Arabia, Turkey and England. It has been the ward, the stepchild, the problem child of ancient, medieval and modern rulers. It has been an international no man's land, a bloody arena as well as a sanctified cradle of religions. Jewish and Arab arguments based on the restoration to Islam or Israel of the ancestral State are, historically, unsubstantial. I am not referring to the emotional contents of the controversial claims or to the religious, racial and cultural premises which are implicit in the appeals. I am not condemning but merely commenting.

ONE consequence of this semi-vassalage is that the voice of Palestinians, as Palestinians, whether Arabs, Christians or Jews, has seldom been lifted effectively. That condition was noticeable at the recent

sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee meetings in New York. The Jewish Agency which derives its main support from the United States and has an Executive Committee which is only fifty per cent Palestinian, was the authorized spokesman for the Jews of Palestine, as it has been from the first, by international action. The individual Arab States, as well as the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, expounded the cause of the Palestinian Arabs.

Now, the Jewish Agency is the most highly qualified, most competent governmental or quasi-governmental group which has ever been active in the Near East, not excepting any of the British cadres which have directed the affairs of Palestine since the Mandate became effective in 1923. I do not charge that the Jewish Agency, validly representing the Jews of the world, and the Arab Higher Committee, the Arab States and the Arab League are unrepresentative of the communities for which they speak. My point is merely that the Palestinians, as Palestinians, are submerged, and voluntarily. Perhaps the time is coming when each community will speak more directly for itself, not vicariously, and when the Jewish or the Arab policy in Palestine will clash with that of any agency which is not purely Palestinian.

Unless the Palestine Committee of the United Nations is more resourceful than the Anglo-American Committee, it may be hard put to it to appraise accurately the opinions of the rank and file of Palestine Arabs. Arab spokesmen, if a boycott is not imposed, will appear in large numbers, eloquent and persuasive. They will testify, as if by previous agreement, against immediate large-scale Jewish immigration; against future immigration of any extent; against the principle as well as the practice of any immigration; against reform of land-transfer regulations; against the validity of the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and the White Paper; against a Jewish State; against bi-nationalism; against partition; against the presence of the British or of any other foreigners in the administration of Palestine.

Whether these Arab spokesmen truly represent the great mass of Palestinian Arabs is another matter. The Anglo-American Committee had no proof that the Arab witnesses were unrepresentative or misrepresentative, but we were unable to check up adequately, to verify or disprove the accuracy of their testimony. For one thing, the Arab press in general is unreliable or mercenary. For another, none of us spoke Arabic. But we reflected that Jews and Arabs do live peacefully in adjoining communities and in Arab-Jewish centers, work side by side in minor Government positions, and have gone on strike together against the Government. Jewish witnesses of unimpeachable integrity and wide experience testified that Jews and Arabs could abide together harmoniously and that the worst friction was at the high levels. An impressive

Christian witness, a Catholic, thoroughly familiar with Arab and Jewish outlooks, felt sure that there was no inherent antipathy of Jews for Arabs or of Arabs for Jews. I feel that most of the members of the Anglo-American Committee accepted the statements of the Arab witnesses with reservations and wondered whether their intransigence, from Ibn Saud down, was shared by the majority of their followers.

THE violence in Palestine during the last twenty-five years has been of different kinds. First of all came the aggression of Arabs against Jews. That was followed by Arab attacks on the Government as well as further depredations against non-resisting Jews, in a form which has been described as "revolt," "uprising," "rebellion" and "revolution." The attacks were said to have been due to the fear of the Arabs that the Jews would soon constitute a majority of the inhabitants. Finally the Jews struck back, and most of the outrages have been perpetrated by Jews in the last few months. Their attacks have been directed against the Government, not the Arabs.

It is all an unholy page in the annals of the Holy Land, but perhaps a *caveat* is in order. There is an essential distinction between bloody incidents, even a series of them, for which a small minority of the people can be held responsible, and the policy of the people as a whole. Self-seeking, reckless Arabs many of them non-Palestinians, aided at times by Nazi and Fascist under-cover agents, directed many of the Arab activities; whether the rank and file of the Palestinian Arabs would have gone on the loose so often except for this stimulant may be doubted. As to the Jewish outlawry, the bombing of the King David hotel and the Acre prison, the kidnappings, holdups, blackmail, assassinations and mass gangsterisms, they, too, are the work of a small minority of Jews. The recognized leaders of the Jews in Palestine and elsewhere have condemned these acts—in contrast, it may be said, to the silence of Arab leaders against Arab terrorists in the past. The blame for the Jewish violence cannot fairly be ascribed to the Yishuv or the Jewish Agency.

In comment on the disorders of 1936, the following extract from the Peel report is pertinent: "The manifesto issued by the Arab Higher Committee under the Grand Mufti's chairmanship, endorsing the 1936 strike and then urging the Arabs to continue it until certain political aims had been achieved, were clearly prejudicial to law and order. Nor, as far as we are aware, did the Arab Higher Committee at any time condemn the acts of sabotage and terrorism which became more frequent as the strike continued; and the Grand Mufti, in our view, must bear his full responsibility for these disorders."

But what of the Haganah, the so-called Jewish army? The Haganah is not an army, if by that is meant a mobilized, uniformed force, with

headquarters, ammunition dumps, artillery, trucks, tanks, planes, barracks and a general staff. "Army" is plainly the wrong word. Perhaps Burgoyne's expression, "rabble in arms," applied to the American patriots, is more appropriate. There is no doubt that the total enrollment is large. Funds are ample and operations are extensive in and out of Palestine.

The Haganah, existing with the acquiescence if not the support of the whole Jewish population of Palestine, has confined itself mainly in the past to facilitating the arrival of Jewish immigrants and protecting, dispersing and settling them. Should it be condemned for this disregard of the prevailing laws? Should the Jewish Agency also be held liable because of its participation, active or passive, in the strategy and the tactics of the Haganah? Uncertified immigration, the argument runs, is contrary to the provisions of the White Paper, which is de facto the governing document of the Mandate Authority. Now, the Authority has legalized 1,500 arrivals a month, and the Haganah disregards the quota. This is plainly a challenge to the Government, an outright defiance of it, the substitution of an unauthorized organization's policy for that of the Government.

YOUR opinion as to whether the Haganah should be tolerated must depend on your judgment regarding the White Paper. The British declare that, good or bad, permanent or transitory, it is the law of the land. The Arabs deny its validity, although they have been its beneficiaries. The Jews insist that the British enacted it arbitrarily, and thereby nullified, without warrant, two documents which are an integral part of the body of international law, the Declaration and the Mandate.

Further, the argument continues, no department of the League of Nations, which entrusted the Mandate, with strict qualifications, to England as Trustee, has ever assented to the departure from it. Indeed, four members of the Mandates Commission of the League declared formally that they could not say that the White Paper was in conformity with the Mandate; and the other three members added that "existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided that the Council did not oppose it." But war events intervened. The Council and the League had no opportunity to disavow it outright. The White Paper seems, therefore, an illegal expunging of the Mandate and the embodied Balfour Declaration. The Jewish advocates point out that the Mandate provides specifically for the facilitation of immigration and "close settlement by the Jews on the land, including state lands and waste lands not needed for public purposes." Further, it is set forth, the Peel Commission, which certainly was not loaded in favor of the Jews,

wrote that "unquestionably the primary purpose of the Mandate * * * * is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National Home."

If then, you regard the White Paper as illegal, you have difficulty in disapproving altogether of the efforts of the Haganah and the Jewish Agency to promote immigration. If you think that the White Paper is a valid authorization of British measures against large-scale immigration, you must fail to agree with the Jewish spokesmen. The Anglo-American Committee considered the Mandate still unimpaired and effective *de jure*, and the White Paper unauthorized and *ultra vires*; and the Committee's report includes the full text of the Mandate.

I would not imply that large-scale immigration within reasonable limits and liberalization of the land-transfer regulations are all that is sought by the Jews. Zionism has an inescapable intellectual, cultural, religious and historical content which transcends the digits of immigrants and dunams. But immigration and restrictive land regulations do go to the very heart of things. They furnish a common ground for all Jews, Zionists, non-Zionists and anti-Zionists. Each group is as insistent as the others that the gates of Palestine shall be opened wider and kept open, and that Jews shall be allowed to purchase land fairly in the open market. It is immigration and land transfers to Jews which, the Arab leaders declare, underlie their objections to the present status of the Jews and to an improved status.

The Anglo-American Committee was forced to the conclusion that widespread restiveness, deep-seated dissatisfaction and uncontrollable violence will mar Palestine until the Jewish demands for immigration and more land are satisfied. It was only after long discussions that the members decided not to heed the objections of the Arabs to the immediate issue of 100,000 immigration certificates and to reform of the land laws. Rejecting this part of the Jewish program, the United Nations Committee will emerge with a serious self-inflicted wound. Partition, bi-nationalism, federalization, cantonization, control of Palestine by England or a trustee group, large or small, of small or large nations—no plan whatsoever will be workable unless it includes as a preliminary the admittance of a large number of Jewish D. P.'s without delay. Otherwise, the Irgun and the Stern gang will continue their murderous courses. The Haganah will run in immigrants by the thousands. The hand of practically every Jew in Palestine will be against the government. The shekels will pour in from all over the world. These two measures are the very least which the United Nations Committee can prudently recommend, the General Assembly re-endorse and England put into effect if the Holy Land is to enjoy even a temporary respite.

Arab officials, from Ibn Saud down and the Grand Mufti up, will vigorously dissent. The permanent officials of the British Colonial and

Foreign Offices, those smug, self-sufficient gentlemen who are relics of the days which Kipling celebrated imperially and vaingloriously, may strike hands again with their Arab enemies of the war years. But it is to be hoped that these obtuse bureaucrats will at least study the pronouncements of their Government since the Anglo-American Committee made its report. The British Cabinet has admitted its willingness to admit 100,000 Jewish immigrants if certain conditions are complied with—the consent of the Arabs and the disarming of Arabs and Jews. Those are impossible conditions, of course, and the Anglo-American Committee rejected each of them. But at least the Cabinet has conceded that there is room in Palestine now for 100,000 newcomers. There is a similar implication in that shoddy bill of second-hand goods which the British Cabinet committee—and I regret to say that three Americans were accessories—tendered to President Truman.

HAS the immigration issue been over-emphasized by the Jews? I submit that it has not. The development of the Jewish National Home, which the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were clearly designed to promote, will be checked or undone if the present restrictions are retained—and there is no assurance that they will not be made more drastic. The Jews cannot forget, nor should any disinterested person, that, in the words of Churchill, they were to be in Palestine “as of right and not on sufferance.” The statement of Lloyd George has also remained in the memory of Jews: “The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered the heads of anyone engaged in framing the policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing.”

The Arab opposition to any immigration whatsoever is manifestly without merit. But what of the Arab protests against large-scale immigration now, and continuation of it up to the absorptive capacity of the country? Is that attitude indefensible? Is Arab fear that Jews will become a majority in Palestine, dominate the land, politically and otherwise, and endanger the whole Arab world solidly based? The opinion is stated by Ibn Saud in his letter to President Truman eight months ago. “The Jews,” the King wrote, “are only aggressors, seeking to perpetuate a monstrous injustice, at the beginning speaking in the name of humanitarianism but later openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence * * * Moreover, the designs of the Jews are not limited to Palestine only but include the neighboring Arab countries within their scope, not even excluding the Holy Cities.”

The latter part of this statement deserves little attention, as Palestine has about one per cent of the area of the Arab countries, not including

Egypt, which gained their freedom as a consequence of the Allied victory in the first World War. The Jewish population of Palestine at present is perhaps four per cent that of the Arab states, not including Egypt. It is inconceivable that such a relatively small number of Jews in a country no larger than Vermont is a present or a future threat to the Arab nations—even if Palestine became a Jewish Sparta.

Now, some final words on this most vital of subjects. The question is not whether extensive immigration is to take place but whether it is to be open, authorized and orderly, or furtive, unauthorized and disorderly. Large-scale immigration cannot be prevented. Nobody who has visited the D. P. camps or talked with Jews in Palestine can fail to detect an irresistible determination of Jews to get to their ancestral homeland, even at the risk of their lives. Human emotions are surging up against which naval blockades, detection, deportation, imprisonment and temporary frustration are ineffective. The movement can no more be stopped than the American underground railway of American Civil War days could be regulated by government. The world is confronted by a social, political and economic phenomenon which has some aspects of a holy crusade and some of a mass flight from potential ghettos and persecution. Even if the immigration quotas of the United States were increased, as they should be, the passionate longing of displaced Jews for Palestine would persist unabated.

There was a forecast of all this between the two World Wars and during the Second World War especially. Throughout the inter-war years, the Jews in Palestine worked as if they had sprung from the soil. The earnestness of their efforts was a plain intimation that they would go to almost any extreme to fortify their position and to bring in their kinsmen. In the Second World War, when the Jews were less than half the total population of Palestine, almost three times as many Jews as Arabs enlisted in the British forces. The industrial contribution of the Jews was proportionately even greater. They know that it is due largely to their efforts that Palestine has become the most prosperous and progressive section of the Near East, and they cannot be persuaded or dragged into abandonment of their great venture or into half-way development of the country.

It can safely be assumed that Palestine as a whole will become neither a Jewish nor an Arab State. To set up an Arab state would be to set back western civilization; to betray the Jews who have settled there in reliance on British character and international good faith; to check midway one of the finest experiments of modern times. An influence would be removed which can leaven the whole Near East and establish an outpost of western civilization, of which the Jews in Palestine are the champions and the symbol.

To establish a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine would be to depart from the fundamentals of democracy; to subordinate a majority to a minority; to arouse wideworld protests; to cool the ardor of Christians who have made common cause with the Jews.

The essence of the Arab case, as Professor E. A. Speiser, has said in his admirable book, *The United States and the Near East*, published by Harvard University, is as follows :

In the last analysis, there is only one sound reason which the Arabs can bring to bear against the Jewish case in Palestine, namely, that they have a majority in the country which is unalterably opposed to Zionist political aims. However strong the other case may be, this one hurdle in its path cannot be readily by-passed or ignored. Short of a voluntary acceptance by the Arabs of a Jewish commonwealth within the present boundaries of the country—short of a miracle, in other words—the Zionist demand cannot, therefore, enjoy the unqualified support of world opinion unless it is modified in scope or curtailed as to territorial extent. By the same token, the maximal demand of the opposition for an independent Arab Palestine is even less likely to carry absolute persuasion.

Illiteracy and Education

THE NEW EDUCATION

By Edgar J. Fisher

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THE subject of this conference is given as "The Middle East in The Post-War World." The geographical connotation of Near and Middle East varies according to different scholars. Judging from the titles of the subjects to be discussed and the areas involved, the theme might more properly be called "The Moslem Near East and the Middle East." For the purposes of this discussion of Illiteracy and Education, I wish to consider Turkey and the Arab States, with very brief comment on India and Iran.

That the percentage of illiteracy in this area has been unusually high is questioned by few persons. That all of the nations under consideration have sought in the last two decades or more to develop educational institutions and techniques to reduce the proportion of illiterates among their peoples is a matter of common knowledge. Indeed, in some quarters there has been a feeling that the increase in literacy among the population would work as a sort of automatic charm to produce national betterment. Without minimizing in the least the desirability of stamping out illiteracy among any people as far as possible, it is necessary to observe that literacy and virtue are not synonymous, any more than are illiteracy and vice. Two of the peoples, the Germans and the Japanese, that have given themselves over to the most unrestrained aggression and ruthless trampling on the rights and honor of others, may be counted among the most literate of people. Surely we in the United States are not less literate now than in the years gone by, but there has never been a time in the life of this nation when we have witnessed a greater deterioration of manners and morals than at this very present. A young student recently observed that we need a new education for "man's mind has soared, but his nature wallows too often."

The very character of Islam has developed certain common characteristics of education in the Near and Middle East. Their influence is even still felt to some extent in the Balkan Christian Near East, which was

for so long under domination of the Moslem Turks. There are many rules of personal conduct and public life common to Moslems regardless of national affiliations. At least in the past this has developed a common attitude that has influenced education. Nationalism for example has been upheld faithfully by the educational institutions of these peoples. They gave ready heed to the magic slogan and siren call of "self-determination." They all had definite grievances against the imperialism of the Western Powers. There was no difficulty in teaching the youth of the Arab lands, of India, of Iran and of Turkey to vent their nationalist feeling against the Great Powers, which were accused of having restrained and treated them unjustly for long years. Anti-Western to the extent that they wished to throw off the political yoke of the West, they nevertheless strove to become as much like Europe as possible. These Near and Middle Eastern states, it is important to observe, did not slavishly copy the West but sought to adopt Western methods and techniques to suit their needs. And here there was definite educational refinement. The social and religious advances in the West, worthy as they may have been, were not so acceptable to these Asiatic peoples as those technical advances which appeared to contribute to the material power and prestige of Western civilization and the evidences of organizational and scientific progress.

To suit these new purposes, practically every new Near and Middle Eastern State has sought to build a modern school system. These efforts have met with varying success in the different nations under consideration. In some situations there was undue haste in instituting reforms, with the result that they were only on the books and became reality too slowly. In these countries foreign schools had often been a distinct asset in the training of the young people, and were especially helpful in furnishing comparative methods for the indigenous institutions. Nationalist legislation, however, restricted and limited the foreign schools and colleges in certain departments, so that they could not make as significant a contribution to the educational life of the country as formerly. These changes are of course understandable, but they did throw greater responsibilities upon the new national school systems too suddenly, and at a time when they were not sufficiently prepared. There was a temptation to build schools faster than it was possible to train teachers to occupy the classrooms, or secure equipment with which students could carry on their work.

The problems affecting educational reform in these Moslem lands were particularly great, inasmuch as efforts were made to extend the new education to the masses. The ages between which pupils must attend school were increased in some countries, although in some elementary education was made free, but not compulsory. With the increase in the number of elementary students, pressures began to be felt throughout

the educational systems. This resulted in an increase in the number of lycées and gymnasia, the secondary schools, and a modest beginning of specialized or differentiated courses in some of them. Several new universities were founded. One should not underestimate the significance of these activities, or the difficulties in making definite progress, in lands in which changes had come only infrequently, where the dead weight of foreign control had stifled or discouraged initiative for generations, and where large illiterate sections of the population constituted drawbacks that needed patiently to be overcome.

AS an example of a state bent upon thoroughgoing educational change, let us consider the Turkish Republic. When Kemal Ataturk embarked upon his career of complete reformation of the Turkish nation, it was inevitable that he should use education as a vital tool. The long series of leaders of the Ottoman Empire were suspicious of the education of the people. In such a state it was difficult enough to keep a few educated persons in line, and there was governmental fear of any general education, except the theological education of the *medreses*. Of course there were a certain number of ordinary schools, but practically no free, compulsory education for the youth of the land above the lowest grades. The policy of Ataturk was quite the contrary in his modernization of Turkey. The *medreses* were abolished as centers of theological education as early as 1925, and these establishments were turned over to the Ministry of Education for such cultural purposes as they saw fit to make of them.

The secular schools, the *mektebs*, were centralized under the Ministry of Education. Furthermore all the foreign schools in the land, regardless of academic level or auspices were brought under the control of the Turkish educational authorities, a situation which had never existed before, except for a brief period during World War I. The foreign schools continued to be frequented by the children of families who could afford the higher fees, but the curricula of these institutions were under the rigid authority of the Turkish educational officials, and many restrictions and limitations were imposed with respect to courses of study and personnel, which would not have been introduced voluntarily. Examples are that courses in history, geography and civics could be given in Turkish only, and only Moslem Turks could give instruction in these fields of study.

Indeed in unifying Turkish loyalties around the modernist ideal, there was no more effective tool used by Kemal Ataturk than the New History Thesis of Turkish backgrounds and beginnings, that he was happy to have scholars develop. In a word, the new theory, insistentlly proclaimed, was to the effect that the cradle of mankind was in Central Asia, that the original inhabitants there were Turks, and that it was from there that

Turkish civilization spread through Asia and Europe by the historical migrations of these peoples. To a nation that under the Ottomans had not been accustomed to regarding its past as one of cultural and intellectual greatness, the opposite could now be preached, for were not the historical roots of modern civilization fundamentally Turkish? This not only gave the youth of Turkey occasion for pride and an appreciation of their past, but also furnished logical ground for the great religious and social reforms introduced by Ataturk. All educational institutions in the Turkish Republic, whether public or private, were required to use for their students a new history text in four volumes, prepared under the authority of the head of the Turkish State.

Kemal Ataturk had no fear of education for all the people. Education was made compulsory, free and secular for all persons between the ages of 7 and 16. Important attention was given to the primary, intermediate and secondary schools, with a new development in vocational instruction. More funds were diverted to educational purposes, so that the number of school buildings, as well as the personnel, could be increased. Attention was paid to the improvement of the departments of Istanbul University, and the new University of Ankara. But Ataturk inaugurated a mass education movement for his people. In 1928, a Turkish alphabet based upon the Latin alphabet displaced the old Arabic letters, and an effort was begun to teach the new alphabet to all persons. The literate Turks were charged to learn the new alphabet, and the illiterate Turks were enjoined to become literate in the new alphabet. The schools gave instruction only in the new alphabet. The adults who had never learned to read and write were required to attend special classes arranged for them out of their regular work hours. By this type of mass education movement it was expected that literacy would soon become general throughout the land. As happens frequently, the first enthusiastic efforts were relaxed after a time. However, it may be roughly estimated that in the two decades between 1927 and 1947 illiteracy in the Turkish Republic declined from 80% to 40% of the population.

THIS eagerness for new education and more of it in a modern world has been one of the most insistent urges of nationalism in all of the Near and Middle Eastern States. It has by no means been the same everywhere, for the conditions have varied greatly. The extensive changes in all phases of life of the Turkish nation have made the educational developments in that country more dramatic than elsewhere. However, marked progress has been made in the other lands. In Egypt with its predominantly Moslem population, constituting about 91% of the people, the very high percentage of illiteracy which has persisted until recently, is being definitely lessened. Indeed, Egypt is now spending a

larger proportion of its budget on education than does either England or France. The Egyptians have long been handicapped by an excess of poverty and ignorance. An era of popular education has set in, and all children are required to attend school between 7 and 12 years of age. Great pride is still felt in the famous Moslem University of Al-Azhar at Cairo, but two other universities have been established, one the Fouad University at Giza, and the other, the Farouk I University in Alexandria. First attention is being paid to the development of social work, and experimentation in many villages is being carried on to improve the hard lot of the peasants. Foreign institutions, especially the American University of Cairo, are making noteworthy contributions in the development of the new Egypt.

The same general situation obtains in the other countries, and time does not permit even brief statements concerning each. In Syria, which is predominantly Moslem, and in the Lebanon which has a large Christian population, there is a public educational system. Private schools also flourish in the land. There are three universities under different cultural leadership: the Syrian University in Damascus, the French University in Beirut, and the American University in Beirut. In Iraq there is a predominantly Moslem population. Educational reforms have not yet made comparable advances to those in other countries. Elementary education, though free, is not compulsory and hence advance must necessarily be slow. Palestine, caught in an orgy of violence, is a special problem. There is a dual system of education for Arabs and for Hebrews. Education is not compulsory. The Arabs with a larger population have fewer schools and students than the Jews. The Hebrew University on Mount Scopus is a distinguished institution with an able faculty and an eager student body. Because of the sacred character of the country, there are a number of special religious schools and foundations. The turmoil into which Palestine has been so unhappily thrown during the past year or more by the Jewish terrorist organizations has limited the educational advances that had marked the situation in the Holy Land due largely to the development of different Jewish colonies with their helpful repercussions upon the Arabs themselves.

In Iran far-reaching educational changes have been attempted by the Shah, Riza Pahlevi, in method somewhat reminiscent of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Modern institutions have been established and supported by substantial government funds. Coeducation has been introduced in the elementary schools, and women have been admitted to the University of Teheran which was founded in 1934. With an attitude more farsighted in this respect than that of the Turkish leaders in Ankara in their reforming zeal, Iran's rather adequate provision has been made for a number of theological schools for the preparation of spiritual leaders and

the services of the mosques. Physical education is stressed, and adult education as well. In connection with these developments, new school buildings were required and equipment as well.

The briefest mention can be made of vast India. It has been estimated that almost 90 per cent of the people of India are illiterate. The country is so large and the people so numerous, that with an inadequate number of teachers, instances are noted where children once literate have reverted to illiteracy. It is generally understood, however, that conditions are improving. A modernized program of education for the villages is highly significant. Far greater emphasis than ever before is put upon health and recreational activities. There have been great advances in the education of women. These are among the modern influences which are affecting deeply the life of great India. There are organizational changes also which are expected to increase the effectiveness of the educational system, including the universities which now number sixteen.

ANOTHER influencing phase of this subject should at least be mentioned. At the present time large numbers of their ablest students are coming from these countries of the Near and Middle East to study in the universities and colleges of the United States. Most of them are here on educational programs financed by their governments, although much is furnished by our academic institutions through fellowship grants generously given, and through private assistance. The largest of the government-financed projects are those of India and Turkey. In comparison with their population and resources, those of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, as projected or in actual operation, are also extensive. There are, in addition, many more young men and women from these historic lands of the East studying in this country on their own resources. They total several thousand potential leaders of whose importance we are not sufficiently aware. The United States has become an educational Mecca for them. The influence of this academic migration, when these young scholars return to their countries, will inevitably be of great importance. Indeed the evidence is already apparent in certain of the countries, and in various aspects of their life. The influence of this cultural interchange cannot be measured; it can only be imagined.

The great emphasis in education during and since World War II has been upon science and technology in all their phases, to the great neglect of the humanities. There are now evidences of the realization both here and abroad of changed attitudes in this respect. In the United States we have gone to an extreme in seeking to divorce religion and culture in our educational systems. The recent report of the Committee of the American Council on Education on *The Relation of Religion to Public Education* is a pointed indication of growing concern in this matter. The effects of

certain of the secularization reforms of the last years in the lands under discussion are now giving those peoples some cause for concern. Despite the fact that the Western World may not at the present moment be the best example in manners, morals and consistency toward its finest ideals, still it is important that education in the lands of our Eastern friends should feel the touch and influence of our democratic thought and of our practices of freedom. This is recognized by some of the most thoughtful among them. It is highly important that, at least for comparative purposes, the peoples of the Near and Middle East should come to know something more than the material bases of our life and culture.

A full generation of educational activity among the peoples of the Near and Middle East, spent in their own lands and in the United States, has strengthened in me the conviction that the fundamental feeling of friendliness and respect which the peoples of the Near and Middle East have for the people of the United States springs predominantly from the influence of our educators in the important American colleges and schools of those countries. It is greatly to be desired that those feelings should be further confirmed and deepened as a result of the presence in our academic centers of increasing numbers of nationals from those countries. Then the difficulties that inevitably arise in the assertion of young and developing nationalisms can without undue dangers be settled in a spirit of understanding and good-will. Through the wise development of their educational systems and ours, so that they come really to know us and we come really to know them, we will have the key to mutual peace and prosperity with one of the most crucial areas in the modern world.

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

By S. Ralph Harlow

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FOR more than a century American educational institutions have been open throughout the Near East to the young men and women, boys and girls of that area. Today the outstanding colleges in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece are universities established and largely supported by American effort in friendly cooperation with the governments and educational leaders of these rising nations. These are peoples who for centuries have been denied education but are today eager and tireless in their efforts to build an educational system, which shall meet the needs of thousands of young people.

It has been my privilege to teach in several of these higher educational institutions and to lecture in the others. The story of American schools and colleges in the Near East is a dramatic and challenging part of history. The first schools were started by missionaries, as early as 1820, in Izmir and Beirut, and soon after this in other parts of Turkey, Greece and Egypt. The first schools were elementary schools open to both boys and girls. This was at a time when not ten men in a hundred and not one woman in a hundred could read and write their own name, in Turkey.

At first scores and later thousands of boys and girls came to these schools, most of them from the Christian populations. After half a century these schools had become well established and higher schools and colleges were coming into existence. Increasingly, Moslem families sent their sons and, later, daughters to these schools.

Outstanding in their influence on the life of the Near East are such colleges as Robert College in Istanbul, the American University at Beirut, the American University at Cairo, the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, the American College at Athens, and the American College at Sofia. A dozen other higher educational institutions fostered by Americans might be mentioned but time does not permit.

Thousands of graduates of these institutions have gone out and become political, educational, economic, social and religious leaders throughout the Near East. Several leaders in the reform movements in Turkey and in the movement to build the Republic on the ruins of the old Empire have told me that the American colleges in Turkey played an important part in awakening throughout the youth of Turkey aspirations and hopes for the establishment of a Republic. Equally sympathetic

with this educational work, the Greek Government gave our American college for women in Athens a beautiful campus, on which to build the college. No college in the world has a more beautiful location. At the American University in Cairo, too, one always sees high government officials present at the commencement and other college exercises.

Robert College, the oldest of this group of American institutions, is located on a point of land overlooking the Bosphorus, near Istanbul. Founded by Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, a missionary of the American Board, Robert College came into existence in 1872. Into its halls crowded students from many lands then under Turkish domination. Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, Albanians, Persians, and Turks. W. T. Stead wrote, "Robert College made Bulgaria," and Sir Edwin Pears, a distinguished lawyer in the Near East, and for many years correspondent of the *London Daily News*, said, "I know of no other instance in history where a single institution has so powerfully affected the life of a nation as Robert College has affected the life of Bulgaria." Two of its presidents have been decorated by the Bulgarian Government. It is to be hoped that the influences which have streamed from this American institution into the life of Bulgaria may yet bear fruit in a more democratic future for that country. Even in the midst of war, the Bulgarian Department of Education asked the Americans to continue their work in the American college in Sofia.

THE greatest contribution to the Near East which these colleges and schools have made has been to bring together young men of many nations and religions, from groups antagonistic and often hostile, and helped them to become friends in the class room and on the athletic field. In politics and in morals, the so-called Great Powers have done little to help make for justice and righteousness in the Near East. Economic expediency and moral deficiency have dominated foreign policy in that part of the world. The chief influence at work for righteousness has been this adventure on the college campuses of these institutions.

During the war, all of these colleges were at work, with the exception of those in Greece, which were under German control and being used as hospitals by the German army and the Italian military forces. Now, however, they are back in American hands and although stripped of much of their material, are carrying on with as much, if not more, vigor.

The American College for Girls in Istanbul is the finest institution of college standing for young women in the Near East. The graduates of this college during the past quarter of a century have held important posts in Turkey and some of them, such as Halide Hanum, have won world recognition. There is an increasing demand for English in the

economic, political and intellectual life of Turkey which these colleges will help meet.

Last year there were nearly a thousand students attending Robert College. The presence on the campus of a large number of military officers and cadets constitutes an obvious contribution to Turkey's defense and to American prestige. These officers and cadets are students in the excellent Engineering Department of the College which for years has sent out some of the best trained men in this field in Turkey, many of them taking graduate work in the United States.

A recent report from the College states, "The College has now been accepted as a fixture in the educational system of the country. The press reports with gratifying thoroughness such public occasions as take place on our campus. The unremitting pressure of the prospective students for admission is the best indication of our standing with the public."

At the American University of Beirut, of which the International College, formerly at Izmir, is an integral part, 2377 students from 25 different nations and 17 religious groups were enrolled last year. Students from the University come from all over the Near East, and from other lands as well. One can add that a large number of the high officials in the Near East countries have been students at the American University at Beirut. The increase in women students is indicative of the trend in the Near East. In 1921-1922 there were 5 women students at the University. Last year there were 113. The first Moslem woman student came in 1924. Last year there were 14 Moslem women students in the University.

THE contribution which all of these colleges have made to the bettering of health conditions in the Near East cannot be overstressed. In the medical laboratories at Beirut and at the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, serums were made for the war emergency. When I first went to the Near East the only X-Ray machine in that section of the world was at the Medical School at Beirut.

The laboratories at Beirut have been supplying insulin and manufacturing serums against typhoid, typhus, diphtheria, anthrax, whooping cough, cholera and other diseases. They are now ready to provide vitamin K, pituitrine and adrenalin. At the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, founded largely by American funds and presided over by an American president, a steady stream of cultural influence has gone out into Palestine and surrounding countries. Its medical faculty has done more than any other group to stamp out the dreaded malaria, as well as manufacture serums to combat other diseases.

At Cairo, the American University is beyond doubt the finest cultural influence in all of Egypt. Its great auditorium brings together crowds of people to listen to health talks, symphony concerts, and all sorts of stimu-

lating programs. Its various departments train young men and women for the whole future life of Egypt. One of its young women graduates took her M.A. at Smith College and is now editor for the leading magazine for women in Egypt. The University brings together Arab and Greek, Armenian and Jew, Moslem and Christian. Its influence throughout Egypt is toward democracy and justice.

This very inadequate presentation of the influence of American educational institutions in the Near East is offered with an apology for the vast omissions which any one acquainted with these institutions will recognize. Here is offered a brief and cursory interpretation of this great and splendid service, a service rendered unselfishly and in the spirit of that democracy out of which we hope the better world of tomorrow is to be built. For as Dr. Bayard Dodge of Beirut has said in the closing lines of a splendid report on the work of that University over which he has presided with such distinction: "The Arab world cannot fulfill its destiny if it depends too much upon technical skill and political activity. Something more is needed to overcome the corruption and turmoil of our present age and to stimulate an interest in unselfish public service. The same spiritual fervor which stirred the prophets of old and rang through the Sermon on the Mount must form the basis of a new and better national life."

National and Religious Minorities

THE URGE TO FREEDOM

By Dr. W. J. R. Thorbecke

Former Netherlands Minister to China

THE Middle East has always been a problem area. Situated from time immemorial at the crossroads of opposed strategic interests, the Middle East has forever served as springboard for conquests in all directions. The Egyptians needed it for their attack against Babylon, the Babylonians and Assyrians for theirs against Egypt. A strong foothold in the Middle East was imperative for the Persians for their assault on Greece, and Alexander the Great could not have won his victories against Persia and Egypt without the conquest of Syria, just as two thousand years later Napoleon the First was moved by similar considerations when he tried to realize his grandiose dream of conquering India. The Middle East became a cornerstone of the Roman Empire; the first center of Arabian hegemony; and a focal point of the Ottoman Empire.

In the wake of successive conquerors a great diversity of races entered the Middle East, bringing their different religions. Sumerian, Babylonian, and Syrian deities, Egyptian, Greek and Roman religious influences left their traces everywhere. In the end the Moslem and Christian creeds became dominant but they were divided into such numerous ramifications that at present the Middle East counts more different Moslem and Christian sects than any other region of the world.

These religious divisions and racial divergencies have created as many minorities, each of them sources of troubles and difficulties, and of endless suffering, renascent hope and renewed frustration. Among the minorities are the Jews in Palestine, the Druzes and Alawites, the Armenians and the Kurds, the Assyrians and the Shiites and many others. Along with these we must count one group which is a majority in its own land, the Christians of the Lebanon: for in the turbulent sea of resurging Arab nationalism, which can so easily be whipped up to frenzied fanaticism, this Christian majority shares, with the minorities of the Middle East, the fate of being like a small island that can any day be engulfed.

The most active, constructive and militant minority are the Jews in the Holy Land. Others will speak about them and their magnificent

achievements. So I will first of all speak about two minorities which are more numerous than the Jews, but less known and with a fate as tragic; the Armenians and the Kurds.

THE Armenians have lived from time immemorial on the land around Mount Ararat, where according to the Bible, Noah first set foot on dry land after the deluge. Towering on an altitude of 17,000 feet, it stands apart on a flat plain and strangely reminds one of the Fujijama, the sacred mountain of Japan.

Armenia's position between the Caucasus and Asia Minor has placed her in the path of endless invasions. Her story is one long tragedy, and stretches back into prehistoric obscurity. Like the whole of the Middle East, Armenia has scarcely a history of her own, so closely is she associated with the tide of conquests which has swept over her and it is with a race rather than with a nation that one has to reckon.

The Armenians became Christians in the fourth century, and Christianity has been the essential thread that has knit the scattered parts of the Armenian people throughout the ages.

But they had to pay heavily for their adherence to Christianity. All persecutors of Oriental Christians, from antiquity until the most recent times, directed their wrath against the Armenians, and from the Middle Ages onward the Armenians were driven from their homes, forced to seek refuge elsewhere, disowned, uprooted, murdered — always in danger.

Their most cruel sufferings, however, were meted out by the Turks who gave part of Armenia to the nomad Kurds who turned arable land into pastures to feed their flocks. In the seventeenth century the Persians transformed Armenia into a desert, and carried away 25,000 families in the hope that their own commerce and trade would increase by the elimination of the prosperous and dexterous Armenian competitors.

In the nineteenth century the greater part of Armenia fell to Russia, and the Armenians gladly joined their Christian northern neighbors in the hope of thus escaping the persecution of the Moslems. The Turks never forgave the Armenians their adhesion to Russia, and their hostile attitude towards the Ottoman Empire.

Russia, who considered herself the protector of all Orthodox Christians, gave the Armenians a helping hand because the Turkish persecutions of the Christians had become the horror of the entire civilized world. The Turkish method of maintaining their declining power was to eliminate minorities by mass deportations and massacres at the slightest provocation.

When in 1854 the Crimean war broke out, England who looked with misgivings upon the growing power of Russia, aided Turkey against

Russia. Russia was beaten and Turkey won an undeserved victory. "We have backed the wrong horse" . . . said Lord Salisbury.

And the Christians suffered.

The climax of the Armenian sufferings came with the atrocities of 1915-16 when Turkey decided to exterminate all Armenians.

The outbreak of the First World War which ended Western intervention in favor of Christian minorities, gave the Turks a free hand to crush the Armenians ruthlessly. The entire population was rounded up, most of the men were killed and women and children were driven into the desert to die there unless they were massacred on the road.

Nobody knows exactly how many perished, some say one million, others think it was twice that number . . .

After the war the Allies undertook various steps to assist the several hundred thousand Armenian survivors, and the boundaries of an independent Armenian Republic were drawn. But the clauses of the Treaty of Sevres were never executed. Most of the Armenians who had remained in the Middle East found refuge in French-mandated Syria. They arrived destitute and beggars, living in sheds and huts. And they began to work. Within a few years, practically all skilled labor and small handicraft enterprises were in the hands of Armenians. Some of them became rich. They started social work, built hospitals and orphanages and taught their children in their own schools.

No work was too humble for the Armenians — they would do it better and cheaper than the Syrians and Lebanese. And once more they began to prosper and to increase.

Both Moslems and Christians, not prepared to compete with the Armenians in their stubborn fight for existence and their sober way of living, began to hate the Armenians and a new tragic chapter in their history was opened.

FOR the minorities in the Middle East, it is often not only a question of defending their freedom of thought and of religion and their cultural existence, but of defending their means of livelihood, nay their life itself.

What can they do to help themselves? And what can the world do to help them? There are two answers: organization and unity.

When a minority is not organized, when it has no organ to voice its desires and demands or to undertake common action, it remains at the mercy of its surroundings.

For centuries the Armenians took their lot fatalistically. Chased from their homesteads, their main concern was for each individual to find some occupation in order to survive and to care for his family. The very fact that the Armenians put all their energy into their work formed a double handicap for them: they forgot to combine their efforts and by

their hard work amidst the traditional Oriental laziness they stimulated jealousy and hatred.

Today, however, they have reached a keener insight: last month seven hundred Armenians belonging to twenty-six different nations convened to New York in a World Armenian Congress to press their claims for justice.

Other minorities like the Kurds who have reached some measure of active cooperation, have seen their efforts wrecked upon the cliffs of internal disagreement, of feuds and sectarianism. Their chieftains, jealous of their local autonomy and of their local traditions, refuse to submit to that discipline which alone can achieve results. Who does not remember the Kurds in Azerbaidjan who last year broke off their campaign on account of a religious holiday?

Even the Jews who form the most militant, the best organized and the best politically schooled minority, and who all serve their one aim, the national Jewish State, are divided as to the means and methods to achieve their independence. The Jewish Agency has followed the road of patient cooperation and persuasion of the Powers, the Extremists have chosen direct action as the only means of rousing world opinion, while the Haganah, the civic guard, takes the middle road. But even the highly organized Jewish minority has not yet been able to reach its goal.

Assuming that a minority achieves the necessary political organization and unity, what can it do?

It can try to obtain a majority in a given country by immigration, such as the Jews are attempting in Palestine. There are at present 600,000 Jews there against 1,200,000 Arabs. The Jews estimate that Palestine can easily absorb another million Jews, and if the Jordan Valley irrigation scheme is adopted the newly won fertility can give ample means of subsistence to many more Jews. Incidentally, the Arab contention that such a large Jewish immigration would upset the existing balance is not correct. The present Jewish population is exactly as large as the Arab population in 1918. From that year until today 600,000 Arabs immigrated into Palestine, which is certainly a result of the much better living conditions created by the Jews.

The possibility of changing a minority into a majority is a particular case. Ordinarily minorities can only hope to win the majority to their views by legal democratic means, or to impose their will by revolutionary methods and the use of force. Both methods are not to be realized in the Middle East where democracy is only a word and where the masses, living in feudal backwardness, have no political consciousness. An endeavor to win over a majority by popular support is a purely theoretic concept in the Middle East where politics are made only on the highest level by rulers whose vested interests and religious outlook form their

sole consideration. Because these rulers wield all the power, use of force against them is unthinkable in normal times.

THE League of Nations had a Minority Commission where the European minorities could vent their grievances. The most they could expect, however, was an academic and platonic appeal to the Government under which they resided to respect their fundamental rights. This applied only to European minorities; the minorities of the Middle East did not even have that resort. The United Nations has no Minority Commission. They have a Council for Human Rights which in its articles 78-80 has the task to safeguard the rights of the "People." This provides at least the possibility of an appeal for minorities if . . . they can prove that they possess the attributes of a people.

As long as the UN is still in its infancy and the organization of a world government is a far-off goal, the minorities cannot expect much from this quarter, certainly not the granting of autonomy or independence. If the UN succeeds in solving the Palestine problem this will be because the Jewish question is based on two facts which have nothing to do with minorities: 1—the Balfour Declaration promising a Jewish Home, and 2—the fact that the Mandate was entrusted to Britain by the League of Nations, that Britain was responsible to the League and that this responsibility has now devolved upon the UN.

Outside assistance to minorities can, therefore, be given only by a decision of the Powers overriding the will of the majority and arrived at for reasons of international peace and order or based on a general principle.

After World War I, one such principle was the right of self-determination embodied in the fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson. It was then that the Armenians and Kurds were promised their independence. Such decisions of the Great Powers, however, are subjected to the often changing balance of power and the resulting shifts in power politics. Turkey's reappearance on the world scene made the Powers retract their promise and bow to the accrued might of Attaturk. International strategic and political reasons have during the past decade led to a continual postponement of the solemn promises given to the Jews.

As long as the world is ruled by power politics, the plight of the Middle East minorities will remain sad. In the present political state of the world they are danger spots and will not lightly or easily be dealt with. When in the years to come the UN grows and a world government is gradually built, it is to be expected that new principles of international law will be accepted and put into practice. Deep down in our consciousness a new conception — or at the present stage I should rather say a mere direction of thought — is already groping its way to the surface.

It is this: that only those have a right to property who make it useful to the community; that only those are entitled to the benefits of ownership of land or houses or enterprises who assume the related social responsibilities and liabilities towards the community.

As a pioneer example of this new approach, in England nowadays a farmer receives facilities and subsidies and all possible help from the Government, but if he does not live up to minimum requirements of efficiency, he can be dispossessed from his land. This is not a socialistic experiment, but rather an innovation in public law that can be applied to the minority problem. Such a conception may one day form the basis for an intervention of the Powers, who could rule that under certain conditions the will of an efficient, socially responsible minority, working in the general interest, can override the will of a passive, inefficient majority if the latter is merely concerned with maintaining its individual rights and privileges for its own selfish sake and without the necessary regard for the general interest of the nation.

All this is still hypothetical; in the meantime, the minorities suffer and wait. But men live by faith and hope, and it is our duty all over the world to keep this faith and this hope alive. Peace depends on freedom. As long as there is no freedom, there will be no peace, because men will fight for their freedom. That is why we will have to respect the urge towards freedom of the Middle East minorities. Changes, however, take time and political adjustments need careful preparation. That the minorities must understand, but never must their freedom be the price of peace.

A NOTE ON MIDDLE EAST MINORITIES

By Taraknath Das

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IT is not very easy to give an accurate statistical abstract of the national and religious minorities of the Middle East — the region which covers the area of Syria, Palestine, Turkey, Arabia proper, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Persia. However, we know that the total area of Syria and Lebanon may be estimated at 57,900 square miles; and according to the 1935 census the total population was 3,630,000. The Moslem population has been estimated as 1,514,755. The majority of them (1,075,816) are Sunnis. The Druzes number about 86,125; the Alawiyya 227,930; and Islamians 14,882. There have been Christians in Syria since the earliest times. They number at present 505,419, of whom 186,676 are Maronites; 66,762 Greek-Catholics; 7,305 Armenian-Catholics; 32,859 Armenians; 8,887 Protestants; 28,885 Melkites; and 151,326 belong to the Orthodox Church. There are also 16,526 Jews.

In Iraq with an area of 116,600 square miles, according to the census of 1935, the estimated population of the country was 3,560,450. Of these 3,136,630 Moslems; 101,375 Christians (Orthodox 20,668; Catholics 33,098; Protestants 7,740; others 39,869); 90,970 Jews; and 41,134 other religions (Mandacans, Yazidis, Bahais, etc.).

In Persia, the area of which is 628,000 square miles, the population of the country, according to the census of 1935, was estimated to be about 15,000,000. The vast majority of the population are Moslems of the Shia sect, while about 850,000 belong to the Sunni sect. There are about three million Nomads in Persia and 10,000 Parsis (Garbs); 40,000 Jews; 50,000 Armenians; 30,000 Nestorians, and some other Christians and Bahais, whose number cannot, however, be estimated.

The area of Turkey today is a little over 300,000 square miles with a population of some 17,000,000 people (1940 estimate). According to the census of 1935 there were 15,838,673 Moslems; 125,046 Orthodox; 78,730 Jews; 44,526 Gregorians; 32,155 Roman Catholics; 11,229 Armenians; 8,486 Protestants, while the rest belong to other religions.

The total area of Arabia comprising Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Muscat and Oman, the State of Kuwait and the Bahrein Islands is about 1,000,000 square miles, mostly desert with a population of nearly 4,000,000 people, of whom about 3,000,000—mostly Nomadic—are in Saudi Arabia. In the countries of Arabia almost the entire population is Moslem.

Palestine has an area of about 10,429 square miles with an estimated population of more than one million Moslems, nearly 600,000 Jews and

about 125,000 Christians. Transjordan has an area of 34,740 square miles with a population of some 300,000. Of these 260,000 are Moslems; 30,000 Christians; and most of the remaining 10,000, Circassians.

WITH the rise of Arab nationalism, the Pan-Arab movement has taken the form of Pan-Islamism—not merely for religious reasons, but primarily for political reasons. Thus, it is a fact that only those minorities which are willing to associate themselves with the Arab League in the furtherance of its political objectives are tolerated.

The treatment of a minority community in a majority-dominated State is the true index of the civilization and the character of the state. Whenever a State legislates to deprive minorities of their *human rights*, that state is not only the worst form of tyranny but it sows the seed of its own destruction, because no state founded on tyranny can flourish.

There is a distinct tendency among Moslems leading them to believe that wherever they are in the majority they must dominate over the minority, and whenever they are in the minority they should partition the country to become a majority to dominate in a partition area; and thence march further to expand their political power on the basis of Pan-Islamism. This is amply demonstrated in what has happened in India during the recent years; and lest it may not be fully realized, I wish to emphasize that behind the movement for Pakistan was Pan-Islamism, while the recent murder, arson, and civil war in Bengal and Punjab was furthered by the Moslem League to gain its political ends. What has happened in India is nothing but a large-scale development of what happened in Palestine when the Arabs massacred the Jews and attacked their settlements and the British did not check the reign of terror. Jews deprived of the power of "self-defense" in Arab lands will be oppressed as they are oppressed in Yemen or Syria.

Minorities enjoying full human rights have always contributed more than their share to the general welfare of the countries in which they live. In the contribution of the Jews in all lands where they have been allowed to function with freedom, one has the best example of this fundamental thesis. The Parsees, the Armenians, and other groups in India also prove this case.

Whenever one discusses the question of religions and national minorities in the Middle East, the question of the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine comes to the forefront. As things stand today it is my view that the creation of a Jewish State will not interfere with minority rights in that state, but the Jewish people will be saved from tyranny and be a factor towards co-operation between Jews and Moslems in the Middle East and towards the promotion of the general welfare of all the peoples in that region.

THE CHRISTIANS OF LEBANON

By Dr. Habib J. Awad

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LEBANON, the Phoenician Libanus, is bounded by Alexandretta on the north; the Mediterranean Sea on the west; Palestine on the south; and Syria on the east. In Lebanon the culture of the Northern Hittites met with the cultures of Egypt, Babylon and Syria, and the cultures of Greece and Rome encountered various oriental influences and traditions. Here East and West merge.

From ancient times until the present, the social and political character of the inhabitants of the Lebanon has been preserved thanks to its mountain terrain. Not only has the Lebanon enabled various communities and sects to escape the dangers of assimilation and preserve their traditional and spiritual qualities for generations, but in periods of emergency it has also served as a refuge for various population groups coming from elsewhere. The desire of the Sunnite majority in the Middle East to assimilate all minorities, encouraged the latter to migrate from the valleys and lowlands to mountain areas which might lend themselves to convenient defense. It is only as the result of a combination of natural, social and political factors that the history of the Lebanon and its past and future problems can be understood.

As descendants of the Phoenicians and of the Arameans, the ancestors of the Middle East Christians lived in the Lebanon and in Syria long before Christianity. At the time of Christ they spoke Aramaic, Greek and Latin. This went on until the seventh century, when the Arabic invasion swept over the land. After that time the Arabic language penetrated slowly into Syria and still more slowly into Lebanon, where it did not take root till the eighteenth century. The mother tongue of the population of these countries was basically Aramaic. This language is still preserved in the Syro-Aramaic churches — Maronites, Syriacs, Chaldeans — and it has left obvious traces which are to be found in most of the place names and in the various pronunciations of colloquial Arabic. In a hollow in Syria there are even today certain villages; Maalula, Ain El-Tineh, and others, where the Syro-Aramaic language is still spoken both by Christians and Moslems.

Lebanon, honored by Christ with several visits, was, with Syria, the first country to receive the teaching of the Apostles. It was at Baniyas, (Caesarea Philippi) on the outskirts of three countries—Lebanon, Syria, Palestine—that Christ said to Simon: "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church." Those words were uttered in Aramaic, the

mother tongue of the Eastern Christians, which Christ, God and Man, used throughout His earthly life and in which the first Gospel (St. Matthew) was written.

It was at Damascus that the Apostle Paul was initiated into Christianity, and at Antioch that the first Bishopric of Christianity was founded by St. Peter.

The shores of Lebanon do not keep as clear a remembrance of the Phoenician triremes, as of the humble boats which sailed westward with the first Apostles who conveyed the good news which transformed the world.

The Moslem storm which swept from the center of Arabia to the very gates of Vienna and Poitiers, submerging whole countries, was unable to put out the flame of Christianity in that hearth where its founder had kindled it.

Lebanon, whose Bishops go back in an uninterrupted line to the first Apostles, lived on as a Christian country in an ocean of Mohammedanism and paganism. With the disappearance of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Edessa, Lebanon remains the only center of Christian culture that links Christianity through the centuries to its origin.

Today, the Lebanon is the only remaining country of Christian character in Asia.

THE population of the Lebanon today consists of different communities. The Maronites, the Druzes, the Shiite Moslems, the Sunnite Moslems, the Melkites, the Jacobites, the Syriacs, the Chaldeans, the Greek Orthodox, the Armenians, the Protestants, the Kurds, the Assyrians, the Jews and other minorities live today in complete harmony among each other and they are all equally interested in preserving the independence of Lebanon. For them an independent Lebanon provides a useful and positive system of checks and balances which prevents any domination of one community by the other under the present ratio of forces dependent upon each other.

In contradistinction to this concern for an independent Lebanon, the most authoritative voices of the Arab World never miss an opportunity to proclaim that the ultimate purpose of the Arab movement throughout the Middle East is the supremacy of Mohammedanism. The present state of affairs shows that Arab countries preserve Mohammedanism as the official State Religion. Such is the case with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc. In the Moslem countries (that is to say in all the self-styled "Arab countries" with the exception of the Lebanon), the treatment of citizens is even today based on discrimination between Moslems and non-Moslems. There is no prospect of any fundamental change in this regard in the foreseeable future.

The constitution of the Arab League is taken from the constitution of the Germanic States union. The protocol of the Arab League prohibits each Arab State member from making foreign, economic or political treaties with other nations unless it gets the consent of the Arab League. Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt are tied by treaties with England. These treaties clearly state that none of the parties should take a stand in its foreign relations which will create difficulties for another party. This means that Lebanon, which is still free from treaties with England, by the fact that it became a member of the Arab League, is already tied, indirectly, by the Anglo-Iraqi-Egyptian and Transjordanian treaties.

The Arab League recommends economic unity. German history teaches us that German unity began first with economic unity between Prussia and the other Germanic states. This economic unity led finally to a complete Germanic union. Unfortunately, economic union took place between Syria and Lebanon by an act of the Lebanese Parliament, February 3, 1944, to the detriment of the economic life of Lebanon.

Sadallah Bey Al-Jabri, Prime Minister of Syria, declared in the Syrian Parliament upon his return from the Arab League convention that the psychological aim of the Arab League is Arab unity. The first step is to unite Greater Syria, namely Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Palestine (the newspaper *Al-Akhbar*, Damascus, October 16, 1944).

The Lebanese delegates have agreed to such a step by agreeing to sign the protocol of Alexandria (See the *Study of The Protocol of The Arab League at Alexandria, 1944*, by His Excellency, Joseph Assouda, Lebanese Minister of Brazil). It is a matter of record, too, that the Maronite Patriarch has repeatedly protested to the present Lebanese Government against its present policy of aid to Pan-Arabism to the detriment of Lebanese interests.

The Maronite Patriarchate, it must be emphasized, is the heart and brain of Lebanon. For the last thirteen centuries the Lebanese placed their confidence in it. The Maronite Patriarch is the spokesman of the Lebanese people. Not only a religious leader, he is also the protector of Christianity and of the independence of Lebanon. All the oppressed minorities of the Middle East sought protection and refuge under his flag.

The immortal Cedars of Lebanon in their tenacity and magnitude symbolize the Maronite Patriarchate.

LEBANON is now an independent republic. Its independence has been recognized by the United Nations. However, there are many forces which threaten it.

1. The British are thought to be encouraging the Arabs to form a

Greater Syria including Lebanon under a British sphere of influence. (I may note that I am in possession of a copy of a memorandum addressed by Sadallah Bey Al-Jabri to General Spears in which the Syrian Premier promises the British General assistance on account of the aid rendered by the British to the fulfillment of Syrian aspirations.)

2. The Russians are trying to offset British control of the Middle East by inserting themselves there and by forming their own sphere of influence and control.

3. We read in the *Weekly Egyptian Magazine* and other Arabic newspapers continuous declarations by Syrian leaders combined with those of the Arab League, always calling for formation of a Greater Syria and thus threatening the independence of Lebanon.

4. King Abdullah of Transjordan has repeatedly declared his wish to sit on the throne of Greater Syria comprising Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan.

5. In his *Study of the Protocol of the Arab League*, His Excellency Joseph Assouda, tells us that the Middle East Physicians Convention at Beirut discussed Arab unity more than it discussed medicine. And the Lawyers Convention at Damascus was simply an Arab propaganda for unity.

6. There are forces within Lebanon now working to unite it to Syria, as the Syrian National Party of Lebanon whose leader is Antoun Saadi.

The Lebanese would certainly like to cooperate with neighboring states. But independence is essential to them; and cooperation, a consequence of good will and government neighborliness.

By asking for guaranteed independence, the Lebanese show no antipathy either to western or eastern powers. They simply want their independence made safe. A guarantee does not lessen independence; it is not a mandate or a protectorate. It consists of formal treaties with major powers which will never permit Lebanon to lose its independence despite the inside and outside forces working against it. It makes of the Lebanon a national home and a safe refuge and shelter for the Christians and all minorities of the Middle East.

The Lebanon has always been a center of Christianity in the Middle East. As far back as the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth centuries, A.D., the Christians were persecuted successively by the Moslem-Arabs, the Omayyads, the Abbasids and the Fatimites. This persecution ceased for a time during the Crusades. It was subsequently resumed with greater violence under the Ayyubites and the Mamelukes. Following the massacre of Christians in the Lebanon in 1860, the great powers found it necessary to guarantee the autonomy of the Lebanon in order to safeguard the rights of its Christian inhabitants. It is the view of Christian leaders in the Lebanon as well as the chiefs of the non-Christian minori-

ties there, that a guarantee is still necessary today. They, the sovereign people of Lebanon, are asking for a guaranteed independence and free elections.

From the reports of the recently concluded election in Lebanon, it is apparent that fifty per cent of the people did not go to the polls. They did not vote because of fear—fear of the very forces I have cited earlier. According to the New York Arabic newspaper, *Al-Hoda*, of May 28 and June 2, 1947, the students at Beirut's Universities and Schools organized a demonstration against the present government before the Parliamentary elections and asked the Lebanese President to appoint a provisional Government to supervise free and fair elections. Their demonstration was crushed and several were wounded.

After the election many Lebanese demonstrated against the way the present Government had treated them. The leader of the Druzes, Kamal Bey Janblat resigned his post as Minister in protest against the unjust elections. London broadcasting in Arabic said that the Lebanese Government requested Archbishop Ignatius Mubarak of Beirut to leave the country because of his protest against the election. The Maronite Patriarch promised the demonstrators that he would demand new elections.

Al-Hoda further reports the Paris *Figaro* as writing that: "In many Lebanese districts the registered voters were two thousand and the counted votes were twenty thousand. This certainly will not aid Lebanon much in its independence especially while there is a movement within Lebanon whose aim is to annex it to Greater Syria."

The editors of all the leading dailies except the President's own organ, *Le Jour*, in a joint letter to President Bechara el Khoury, said the present National Assembly "discredits the State," announced they would no longer cover its sessions and urged its dissolution.

In view of all these circumstances—historical and current—unless the independence of the Lebanon is guaranteed, there is a very strong fear that in the near future it may lose its independence, be forced into a merger with Syria and thus lose its Christian character.

The United Nations have acknowledged the independence of Lebanon but they could never stop a Lebanese Government or Parliament forced or enticed by threats or promises, from uniting the country to Syria and thus exposing its inhabitants to age-old distress and sufferings. Something very like this happened after World War I, when some members of the Lebanese Parliament went over to Syria to give Lebanon to the late King Feisal, then King of Syria, but were stopped in time by General Gouraud and sent into exile.

The post-World War II threat to the Lebanon has reached such a stage that the various Christian communities and also some of the

Moslems of the minority groups found it necessary to get together in order to oppose a Pan-Arabic line of policy.

On May 19, 1945, the Christian Ecclesiastical leaders of the Lebanon, Armenians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Melkites and Maronites, met under the leadership of the Maronite Patriarch, Antoine Peter Arida, at his residence at Bekerke, Lebanon, and adopted the following statement of goals:

1. The independence of Lebanon in complete sovereignty.
2. True cooperation with the neighboring states.
3. Friendly relations with the Allied countries which acknowledged the independence of Lebanon and its sovereignty, and a request for France's guarantee of the independence of Lebanon together with the other United Nations.
4. The keeping of peace among all the various national sects of Lebanon.
5. Cooperation with the Lebanese Government in all affairs which further the development of Lebanon.
6. Formation of a treaty with France for the mutual benefit of both countries.

This document was signed by Cardinals and Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, and Superior Generals of all the Catholics of the Lebanon and the Middle East.

Left to their own resources, the inhabitants of the Lebanon are in no position to defend their independence and successfully to oppose the manipulations of the Arab League and the various Arab States, who are determined to swallow the Lebanon in a Pan-Arabic Middle East. Consequently, the leaders of Christian Lebanon have time and again attempted to convey to the Western world the true state of affairs in Lebanon. The Maronite Patriarch sent several delegates to Europe and the United States on such missions.

I should like to stress to my listeners that though I have spoken calmly and perhaps with academic detachment, the threats to Lebanese independence are very real; that a tragedy affecting not only the Christians and other minorities of the Middle East, but free people everywhere, may be in the making, if those of us who support freedom and independence do not awake to the importance of the problems before us. An independent Lebanon serves as an anchor of freedom in the Middle East. To maintain its independence is a duty for Christians everywhere.

THE ASSYRIANS

By David B. Perley

Executive Secretary, Assyrian National Federation

IT IS difficult, in these difficult days, to be an Assyrian. Sometimes people seem to know nothing about him, although he is a very aged gentleman who has seen nearly ten thousand years roll over his head, and still presses on. However, one must acknowledge that the Editor of *Near East and India*, who has crusaded against the Assyrian cause for years, as the instrument of the Colonial Office, has admitted that "there is no finer human material in the whole of the Middle East than the Assyrians."¹

Be that as it may, no cause is so symbolic of the state of national and religious minorities in the Middle East as the Assyrian. That cause will show how solemn promises have been cynically broken and will illustrate why British prestige is close to its nadir at this moment by reason of the pursuit of the game of Power Politics; at the same time, it may serve as a pointer or a warning to our country that has just come into the scene of the Middle East.

The present Assyrians are the descendants of the ancient Assyrian Empire, the oldest hearth from which emanated the fire of civilization. They are Christians, who claim an unbroken spiritual descent from the early Apostolic Church. Speaking Aramaic, in which the Gospel was originally written, they were the first, as a people, to adhere to the new Faith and the first to convey it to non-Aramaic speaking peoples. Thus it was that in the early Christian centuries they were famous missionaries who evangelized the entire East as far as China, Burma, and India as testified to by the Nestorian Monument in China and by the Nestorian Tablet in Madras.

Prior to 1914, they lived as hardy Highland clansmen in the Mountains of Hakkiari, Kurdistan, in the north of what is now Iraq and in the southeast of Turkey but within the Turkish Empire. Here they led an autonomous existence from time immemorial as a *millet* or nation under the supreme rule of their Prince-Patriarch, *the Mar Shimun*,² who was recognized as both the temporal and spiritual head of his Christian *Millet* by the Persian Emperors, by the Arab Khalifs, by the Mogul Khans, and by the Ottoman Sultans.³

1. Feb. 20, 1936, p. 266

"A magnificent stock"—*The Fortnightly Review*, Feb. 1932, p. 226
"The finest race in the Middle East"—*The Spectator* (London), August 25, 1933, p. 243

2. See Dr. William A. Wigram's *The Cradle of Mankind*, London: A. & C. Black, 1922, pp. 265-277.

3. The present Patriarch, Mar Eshai Shimun, was born on Feb. 26, 1908, and became Patriarch on June 20, 1920. He is the 23rd from his Family and the 119th in the direct Apostolic Succession.

When World War I broke out, the Assyrians joined the Allies after the Patriarch had been urged to declare war upon the Turks by the Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet, in view of the magnificent fighting qualities of the Assyrians as well as the extremely important strategic position of their homeland in the neighborhood of Turkish, Persian, and Russian frontiers. Mr. J. S. Ward stated in the *London Daily Telegraph* of Nov. 10, 1933: "It was we who invited them to rise against the Turks, and promised them their independence if they would do so."

Believing in the promises made to them by the British, the Assyrians poured every man into the ranks of the new armies. The British Government generously recognized the great contribution made by the Assyrians to the Allied cause, but the plan ended in disaster for the Assyrians; for by the end of 1915 they were totally driven out of their hills and forced to flee into Persia. And by the time they made contact with the British troops in Mesopotamia, they had lost two-thirds of their numbers. As soon as the war was ended, all the promises to the Assyrians were forgotten, and to the utter amazement of all the non-Arab population in the Middle East, a new Arab state was erected in Mesopotamia under the name of *Iraq*. The Assyrians were then left in *refugee camps* in the land and told that the problem of their settlement must await the making of peace with Turkey. That peace took four long years, and when it was finally made, the question of Hakkari (the former home of the Assyrians) was left open and referred to the League. The League sent a Commission to study the problem, and, accepting the report of that Commission, it gave Hakkari to Turkey, but made Turkey surrender important territory north of Mosul with the understanding that it was to be an autonomous home for the Assyrians who were to retain all their ancient rights under their Patriarch, subject to a mandate to Great Britain to administer the whole for a period of twenty-five years dating from 1923.⁵

THE Mosul Controversy presents an excellent example of the sordid game of Power Politics in the Middle East. Kemalist Turkey argued before the League that geographically Mosul was an indivisible part of Turkey. Britain alleged, on the other hand, that it belonged to Iraq and fortified its claim by the moral force of the plausible argument that the Assyrians, as Christians, need protection from the Turks, as if Oil Politics could be satisfied with a partial violation of moral and humane sentiments! At any rate, the argument helped the greatest

4. *London Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 10, 1933

See *The English Review*, Oct., 1925, p. 409-1

5. *The Letters of Gertrude Bell*, N. Y. Horace Liveright, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 532

See Wirsan Teleki Report: *Turko-Iraq Frontier* (C. 400, M. 147, 1925, VII, p. 490)

Christian Empire to be victorious in her struggle for oil.

An exceedingly curious situation arose on May 21, 1924 at the Conference of Constantinople which dealt with the preliminaries of the contest over the Vilayet of Mosul. It was the contention of Fethi Bey of Turkey that no cession of land to the Assyrian Territory was a necessity as the Assyrians could still find in Turkey the tranquility and prosperity which they had enjoyed for centuries. To this, Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner for Iraq, replied that Fethi Bey's assertion did not square with the Assyrians' own views and that they had the most vivid memory of the treatment they had suffered in the past at the hands of the Turks which they could neither forget nor ever forgive—as if Sir Percy was authorized to speak for the Assyrians—and as if these “refugees” had an invincible army and navy!

Now all this may sound very unimportant in these tremendously important days. The fate of a little people is of small moment in view of the greater injustices which have been done to people everywhere. But curiously enough, the treatment of the Assyrians has done more to undermine people's trust in British promises and justice (and that of the entire West for that matter) than any other single incident since 1914. The Assyrians stand out, and are constantly quoted, as perfect examples of British diplomacy and commercial greed by most of the leaders and agitators in the Middle East. Who has not heard Arab, Kurd, Lebanese, Hebrew, and Druze leaders murmur in bitter sarcasm whenever British good-faith is in question, the words: “Remember the Assyrians”? *Remember the Assyrians* is both a watchword and a reproach. The Arab world believes that Britain is concerned only with commercial greed and all illusions as to the selflessness of the West have long since departed in the face of the proof of usury and double-dealing that the West has given so often, and in no case more callously than in that of the Assyrians.

IN 1920 there was insurrection in Iraq. Britain again organized the Assyrians into what is known as the *Assyrian Levies* to police the troublesome, turbulent Moslems. But this very task was bound to foment bitter hatred against the unfortunate Assyrians. Nevertheless, the Assyrians, firmly believing that the power of Britain would never desert them, proved loyal soldiers of Britain. In the words of Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, the then Civil Commissioner:⁶ “They saved the British Army from utter disaster in 1920. . . . It was the Assyrian Force that saved the swamping of the British rule in the Arab revolt of 1920.”

6. Arnold T. Wilson's *Mesopotamia: A Clash of Loyalties* London: Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 291

7. See fn. 5
A. Haldane, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1922, p. 247

After negotiating (in 1930) the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance and the Financial Agreement which placed the main oil-fields and railways in the control of the British, Britain decided to terminate the Mandate without proviso or qualification. The Permanent Mandates Commission was very apprehensive about the future of the racial and religious minorities in Iraq, but Britain urged the unconditional entry of Iraq into the League upon the following undertaking (June 19, 1931) :

His Majesty's Government realize the responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League—should Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government which would not attempt to transfer it to the Mandates Commission.⁸

The statesmen (Sir Francis Humphrys, the High Commissioner for Iraq, and Lord Cecil, His Majesty's delegate to the League's Council), who issued this undertaking forgot the most common rule of International Law that no state can interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

That is a perfect example of the verbal claptrap which has made Britain a laughing-stock and scorn through the Moslem lands. The Assumption of *Moral Responsibility* sounds magnificent, but the Arab question was—what does it mean? Nothing at all. And its evil lies in the pompous self-deception of its phrasing, as much as in the desire to deceive others. Gibbon rightly laughed at the statesmen of rotting Byzantium for their high sounding titles and phrases. They are symptoms of national decay.

That Declaration was written in Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Hebrew, Druze, and Armenian characters on every market-place wall throughout the Middle East. It would scarcely be exaggerating to say that many of the British troops who fell in the Iraq rebellion of 1941, in the invasion of Syria or who died on the road to Palestine would never have perished if the sorry farce of the abandonment of the Assyrians had not been clothed in such high-sounding and pompous hypocrisy of self-justification. The Arab understands force. He even appreciates slick double-dealing. But he despises the weakness of hypocrisy.

Influenced by this absurd but solemn Declaration and after carefully emulating Pilate's washing of his hands, the Commission reluctantly recommended Iraq's admission in 1932, whereupon the Iraqis immediately celebrated their independence by a massacre⁹ of the Assyrian Christians. A British eye-witness exclaimed⁹: "I saw and heard many

8. A. T. Wilson's *The Crisis in Iraq in The Nineteenth Century and After*, (London) Oct. 1933, p. 417
9. Wilson's *Crisis*, p. 422, Sir Arnold lamented in resounding accent: "But the position in which the British Government has placed itself today in Iraq is as intolerable as it is unparalleled. British advisers, whose advice is not asked; a British Military Mission forced to be silent spectators of foul deeds; four squadrons of the British Air Force, whose intervention has been confined of recent months to dropping leaflets on the Assyrians telling them to surrender. They did so, and were massacred a day or two later in cold blood."
See *The Queen*, "Our Smallest Ally," March 9, 1944, p. 11

terrible things in the War, but what I saw in Simel was beyond human imagination!"

In the House of Commons the Government admitted some *moral responsibility* but claimed that it was only *moral*¹⁰ not *financial*—so that no one need really mind!

And on the record, Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Minister, shook hands with murder, when he stated in Geneva: "Apportionment of blame is a barren proceeding." Some 12,000 of the victims of that massacre were moved from Iraq to stagnate in a pestiferous valley in Syria immediately after these massacres.¹¹

IN 1941, as the Nazi-inspired Iraqi Army rose in revolt against the British Forces stationed in Habbaniyah at the time when the Nazis had seized Syria, it was again the Assyrian Levies that saved the situation for the British and the Allies; for, had Iraq's rebellion succeeded, the British flank would have been completely turned in the Middle East. Capt. A. M. Hamilton¹² stated in May 1945:

The British Empire, and indeed all the Allied nations, owe the Assyrians a heavy debt following their key-victory at Habbaniyah in 1941, which checked German expansion to Asia Minor and stopped a rapidly growing danger of linkage in force with Japan via the Persian Gulf at a time when the latter was poised for attack. But for the Assyrians' historic stand at Habbaniyah, Rashid Ali and Nazism would certainly have controlled Iraq; the Allies would thus have been split at a critical phase of affairs before they had mustered their strength, and the vital oil region would have been lost—as probably would have been the war itself—for both India and Russia would have been isolated and the Mediterranean outflanked.

In *The Queen* magazine of London, March 9, 1944, the British Air Commodore J. L. Vachell declared:

10. "One could hardly conceive a situation more calculated to damage this country (England) at the bar of world opinion as a betrayer of its friends. As such we have been held up to scorn in the press of other nations."—The Right Rev. E. A. Burroughs in *Towards a Christian Statesmanship*, pp. 13-16
My motion "deals with a matter which very directly affects the chivalry and honour of this country."—His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury in *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, 11/28, 1933, vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 127-28.
"A stain in our national shield."—Dr. William A. Wigram in the *Near East and India*, 11/23, 1933; p. 969
"A tale of a smirch upon our national honour."—Douglas V. Duff in the *Catholic-Herald* (London), 4/16, 1937
"We are eternally blackened as foresworn and callous traitors throughout the Middle East. Those Assyrians died because they were the troops we employed to control the Arabs, and when we evacuated, we left our discharged servants to pay with their blood and in the blood of their women and children, for the magnificent loyalty and courage they had displayed in our cause."—Lt-Commander Duff in the *Dublin Review*, 1/1937 writing on *The Future of Palestine*
11. "The Assyrians are left on the Khabour, poor, diseased, and ill-equipped."—F. S. Temple in the *London National Review*, 11/1945, pp. 416-18
12. Capt. A. M. Hamilton in the *Royal Central Asian Journal*, May 1945, vol. 32, part 2, p. 216, being a review of my *Whither Christian Missions?* See *Our Smallest Ally in the Queen* (London) March 9, 1944, pp. 10-11. Capt. Somerset De Chair (M.F.), *The Golden Carpet*. London: Faber and Faber 1944, p. 59 the author stated: ". . . the Iraqis were beaten back, the Assyrians tearing open the tanks with their bare hands. . . . The Iraqis, when retreating turned from Khaki into white under your very eyes—each soldier discarding his martial covering in order to be mistaken for a civilian."

In the period between the two wars, the Assyrians were primarily responsible for safeguarding our airfields in Iraq and for providing the ground forces which are an essential complement to air control. Not only air control in Iraq saved this country many millions of pounds, but it served as a model which was extended to several parts of the Empire. What is generally not appreciated is that after severe disillusionment during that period, the services of the Assyrians during the present war have exceeded anything they did before. Had it not been for their loyalty at the time of Rashid Ali's German-inspired revolution in Iraq in May of 1941, our position in the Middle East might have become most precarious.

The late Philip Guedalla,¹³ who was commissioned by the British Air Ministry to write the story of the air war in the Middle East, declared:

They (the Assyrians) have saved Iraq and the whole position in the Middle East. Indeed, they had saved something more. For three weeks later the Germans went to war with Russia, and they had saved the road through Persia, which was now vital for the transit of Allied aid to the U.S.S.R. If that was to be safeguarded, Iraq must be in sure hands; and by strange conjunction of events, Habbaniah had helped to save the Kremlin.

But what is the condition of the Assyrians today? Worse than before the massacres of 1933. Listen to Mr. Guedalla:¹⁴ "Few communities have shown more courage than the Assyrians . . . and their gallantry was duly rewarded by a long alternation of massacres and migrations." And this, despite the fact that they were Allies in two World Wars.

A summary of the view of the Assyrian Settlement Committee (a London voluntary committee composed of some noble Englishmen) stated on July, 1945:

1. The Assyrian question is of deeper significance than just a chivalrous and Utopian ideal—major questions of honor and of policy being involved.

2. The Empire must become thoroughly conscious of its obligations to the Assyrians, to whom we owe a debt which must be paid in full. There is also a League of Nations responsibility, and indebtedness from the U.N., as a result of their loyalty and courage at Habbaniah. But the British liability towards them is the greatest.

3. To allow the East to be a prey to periodic rebellion and massacres involving Kurd and Assyrian . . . is to allow it to be ruled by gangster laws.

4. In view of the Assyrians' acknowledged military efficiency and long service to the British Crown, the present policy of discharging them from the RAF regiment guarding British air bases in Iraq is not only unwise but dishonorable. There is today a more anxious feeling

13. *Middle East 1910-1942: A Study in Air Power*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1944, p. 148
14. Guedalla, p. 145.

among the Assyrians than has prevailed for a good many years past.

To the Committee's alarming report must be added the report that only a few months ago some British officers were again in the north to enlist Assyrians as levies. When the latter refused to enlist at the proposed rates of pay, one of the officers declared: "They will be made to enlist at one dinar (one pound or \$4.03) per month." If this is not the imposition of involuntary servitude, what is it? This servitude is not a matter of novel impression. It has been in practice since 1918. See p. 262 of Yusuf Malek's *British Betrayal of the Assyrians*, 1935.

WILL America unjustly enrich herself, as the British, at the expense of this "Forgotten Ally" by allowing them to find their abject and ignoble defeat in their glorious victory of 1941? This anomalous situation constitutes the greatest challenge to the Atlantic Charter and to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. The racial and religious minorities in the Middle East are starving for decent, free existence. Here there is no racial problem between the Assyrian, the Kurd, the Hebrew, the Yazidi, and the Arab. Nor is there any deep-seated conception of democracy or communism. *The problem is solely one of Power-Politics, and unless that problem is controlled, the issue will become one of ideology—and this, to the discomfiture of democracy.*

The Middle East was the home of civilization. It is now the nerve center of our problem. We dare not permit it to become a hell of power politics. Another massacre of the Assyrians took place only last December-February in the Iranian Azerbaijan during which time some twenty-four Assyrian towns were completely annihilated.¹⁵

There is but one solution to this explosive political situation—the realization of the natural aspirations of all the native elements. If a federated independent community, comprising all the racial and religious minorities were to exist, like the Swiss Cantons, it would act as a great stabilizing influence in the Middle East. With such an organization, the majority states would find it easy to collaborate, forming an eventual great Semitic Federation. They have lived together since the beginning of time; and before the advent of alien agencies, each has respected the culture and the aspirations of the other.

15. This massacre took place after the departure of the Russian Army from the scene. Not a single line was permitted to appear in the British press concerning it for reasons too obvious to mention.

Oil Resources

THE OIL FIELDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By E. DeGolyer

*Oil geologist, head of the United States Wartime
Oil Mission to the Middle East*

PETROLEUM has been found in commercial quantities in the Middle East in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Sheikdoms of Bahrein, Kuwait and Qatar and in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and perhaps parts of Turkey, Trans-Jordania, Afghanistan and the sheikdoms along the Arabian coast represent, in part at least, additional prospective territory.

Geography and Geology:

With the exception of Egypt, the Middle Eastern fields thus far discovered lie in the flanks of a deep structural trough formed by the overthrusting of the Alps-Himalayas system against a thick series of sediments dipping gently away from the positive element of the so called Arabian shield. The axis of this trough lies near the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf and parallel to it. It strikes northwest across Iraq and at a point south of Mosul the strike changes to east-west and, further into Syria, to southwest-northeast. The structural strikes continue through Palestine on the same strike and in the Peninsula of Sinai the strike veers somewhat more to the southwest. This trough is asymmetrical. The shorter and more steeply folded flank is that of the outside limb.

The so called Arabian shield appears to be an uplifted lobe of the African shield separated from the continent of Africa by the deep rift valley of the Red Sea. Presumably this lobe as expressed by the outcrop of metamorphosed and crystalline rock and its apparent northernmost expression in the Qa'ara depression of western Iraq, is the result of uplift. The rift valley of the Red Sea appears to be a graben resulting from volumetric adjustment to such uplift and similar to the smaller grabens which are found over the uplifts formed by deeply buried salt domes.

The oil fields of Iran, Lali, Masjid-I-Sulaiman, White Oil Springs,

Haft Kel, Agha Jari, Pazanun and Gach Saran, as well as those of Iraq, Kirkuk, Ain Zalah, Qaiyarah and the field of Naft Khaneh and Naft-I-Shah, which lies astride the boundary of Iraq and Iran, are all found within the closely folded foothill belt striking northwest and southeast which forms a band lying immediately southwest of the thrusts of the great mountain ranges.

The oil fields of Egypt, Hurghada and Ras Gharib, lie within the rift valley of the Gulf of Suez and near the western shore of the Gulf.

The oil field of Kuwait, Burgan, those of Saudi Arabia, Abu Hydriya, Qatif, Dammam, Abqaiq, of the Sheikdom of Bahrein, and the Sheikdom of Qatar, Dukhan, lie on the gently folded and more extensive inner limb of this trough and while exploration has not yet progressed far enough to reveal the structural grain definitely, it seems probable that it will be more of a north-south strike and not conformable to the general structure just described.

This deep geosynclinal trough contains a great thickness of sediments. Geologists with Arabian experience estimate a thickness of 50 to 60 thousand feet in the deepest part of the trough. Those acquainted with the Iranian and Iraq areas estimate the thickness to be somewhat less. The most remarkable stratigraphic feature of this great trough is a thick series composed almost entirely of limestones which in Iran is recognized as extending from the base of the Permian through the Triassic, Jurassic, Cretaceous, Eocene, Oligocene and Lower Miocene rocks, and in Arabia as extending from the base of the Jurassic, which overlaps the older formations, through the intervening rocks into the Eocene. In the Arabian section overlap unconformities have been recognized at the base of the Middle Jurassic, at the base of the Middle Cretaceous and at the base of the Upper Cretaceous. This limestone sequence also contains much anhydrite, particularly in the Arabian oil field sections.

The uppermost member of this thick limestone section on the Iraq-Iranian side is the Asmari limestone, the reservoir rock of the oil fields of Iran and, for the most part, of those of Iraq. The rocks outcropping at the surface on the Arabian side are older than the Asmari and the reservoir rock of the Arabian fields are for the most part of the Arab zone of Jurassic age. The oil bearing formations of the Burgan field in Kuwait consist of a number of extremely thick sandstones, one of which is almost 300 feet thick, which are of Middle Cretaceous age and are stratigraphically approximately the equivalent of the producing formations in the Bahrein field. These sandstones are relatively clean sandstones of rounded quartz grains and are of high porosity and high permeability. The Burgan field is unique in being the only Middle

Eastern field, except for those of Egypt, in which the reservoir rock is a sandstone, all other important fields having limestone reservoirs.

History:

Oil seepages are of very common occurrence in southwestern Iran and northeastern Iraq and their existence has been recorded by various writers from the time of Herodotus. Archaeologists have found that asphalt was used for various purposes, notably as a cement or binder, in the masonry of buildings constructed at Ur, probably easily as early as 4,000 B.C. and it was likewise so used in the construction of Nineveh and Babylon. It is probable that the asphalt came from the great seepages lying just to the south of the town of Hit on the Euphrates River. Apparently primitive uses of oil or its products gathered from the seepages have been made in this area since time immemorial. More recently, a native industry is said to have been in operation for three centuries, near Kasr-I-Shirin in Iran. The oil was collected from shallow pits, transported to the town, where it was subjected to primitive refining, and the product sold to the surrounding villages and along the main caravan routes. Oil seepages are extremely scarce on the Arabian side, the most notable being a large seepage at Burgan in southern Kuwait, and a small seepage on the Island of Bahrein.

Concessions covering broad areas and many privileges were sought and granted early in Iran. Baron Julius de Reuter in 1872 secured a concession and others were granted to the Anglo Asiatic Syndicate and the Persian Investment Syndicate, Ltd., in 1881; to Firma Hotz in Bushire in 1884; to the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889 and to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation, Ltd. (Persian Mining Company), in 1890. The last named company drilled at least two wells in the early nineties, one at Daliki, where asphalt and oil in small quantities were encountered, and the other on the Island of Quishm.

Serious efforts to prospect this area, however, dates from the beginning of the present century. William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman who had become quite wealthy as an original member of the syndicate which developed the famous Mount Morgan gold mine in Queensland, lunched one day with a friend who observed, as the story goes, that the new-fangled device, the motor car, could be pretty important. The thing to do was to go in for oil. On this slender basis D'Arcy is said to have told his business manager, H. E. Nichols, to look for promising oil properties. About this time a certain Kitabishi had secured a concession, or promise of a concession, from the Persian Government and was hawking it about Paris. Nichols got in touch with him and made

a deal, out of which, by renegotiation in Persia, came the original D'Arcy concession of May 28, 1901, which gave exclusive rights to produce and transport oil from the southwestern provinces of Persia having an aggregate area of approximately half a million square miles.

George B. Reynolds took charge of D'Arcy's field operations and drilled at Kasr-I-Shirin, where a flowing well of heavy oil was encountered at a depth of a little more than 800 feet. This did not seem to be attractive and operations were moved to Mamitain, where operations were unsuccessful, and finally moved to Masjid-I-Sulaiman.

D'Arcy, after securing his Persian concession, still had a taste for more and opened negotiations with the Turkish Government for an oil concession in Mesopotamia. Protracted negotiations secured the promise of a concession. Meanwhile, in 1904 the Deutsche Bank interests secured permission to examine the Mesopotamian fields and in the following year a technical mission made the examination and its report is said to be moderately favorable to unfavorable. At the end of 1904 the D'Arcy group were still trying to reduce the promise to a concession and, somewhat later, succeeded in getting the German concession cancelled "because of non-performance."

Apparently about this time the cost of the fruitless operations in Persia was becoming burdensome to D'Arcy. In early 1905, First Sea Lord Fisher, known to his associates at Admiralty as "the oil maniac," and E. T. Pretyman urged upon the Burmah Oil Company, Ltd. and Lord Strathcona the support of the Persian operations. The result was that Burmah and Strathcona formed Concessions Syndicate, Ltd., through which Burmah secured a 38 per cent interest in the concession. The chairman of Burmah in 1909 told his shareholders that such a recommendation had been made, that reports by geologists and experts were favorable and also that there was risk of the concessions falling into other hands and possibly foreign hands. Moreover, he stated, "The risk of having a great oil field developed by opponents at the very door of India . . . was too grave." Burmah held a virtual monopoly of oil marketing in India.

Drilling at Masjid-I-Sulaiman commenced early in 1908. It must have been about this time that there was some doubt as to whether or not operations would continue. Cunningham Craig refers darkly to such doubt in saying, "It would surprise many people to know how very nearly there was no Anglo-Persian Oil Company at all," etc. The young lieutenant of Indian cavalry in charge of the consular guards detailed to the protection of drilling operations, afterwards famous as Sir Arnold Wilson, queried sarcastically in his diary, "Cannot Government be moved to prevent these fainthearted merchants, masquerading

in top hats as pioneers of Empire, from losing what may be a great asset?" Happily his fears were unfounded. Drilling continued and on May 26, 1908, the discovery well was completed at a depth of 1,179 feet and with an initial production of some 230 barrels. Further drilling showed this to be an important field and it was the first field to yield commercial production in the Middle East.

Burmah and Strathcona purchased the remaining interest of D'Arcy and his associates for Burmah shares, plus reimbursement for out of pocket expenses and the Anglo Persian (now Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, Ltd. was registered April 14, 1909 to acquire the Persian concession and shares in subsidiary companies from Concessions Syndicate, Ltd., The Burmah Oil Company, Ltd., and Lord Strathcona. The capital of Anglo-Persian consisted of 2 million pounds in 1,000 cumulative 6 per cent preference shares and 1,000 ordinary shares of 1 pound each. Shares were offered to the public with great success.

In 1910 Strathcona, who had become chairman of the new company, reported that a pipe line was being pushed to completion and, in 1911, that it had been completed and was being tested but that the refinery was still under construction. Two years later the report was still unfavorable. The refinery was finally brought into full working order in early 1914. On May 29, 1914, an agreement was made with His Majesty's Government by which the Government acquired control of the company, a position which it maintains to this day.

MEANWHILE negotiations for a concession covering Mesopotamia were still unsatisfactory. About 1911 the Royal Dutch Shell group came into the picture as partners of the Deutsche Bank and in 1912 Sir Ernest Cassel organized the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. This company acquired all of the German claims, good, bad and indifferent, and an effort was made to revive the grant of 1904 to the Deutsche Bank group. Cassel was an English banker of German birth and an intimate friend of King Edward VII.

In 1913 the D'Arcy interest nearly succeeded in securing the concession but was stopped by the German Ambassador. This same year the British and German Governments made a general effort to put at least their economic houses in order in the Near and Middle East. Neither the Strathcona-British group represented by Anglo-Persian, who had succeeded to the D'Arcy position, nor the German-British-Dutch Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. had been able to secure the desired concession. Each of them had been able to block the other. The Governments intervened and by an agreement of March 19, 1914, the conflicting interests were consolidated into Turkish Petroleum Com-

pany, Ltd., owned 50 per cent by Anglo-Persian and 25 per cent each by the Deutsche Bank and the Royal Dutch Shell groups. The British and German Ambassadors simultaneously made representations to the Porte seeking the grant to Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. of oil concession in the Vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad. The Grand Vizier agreed to grant the concession but with certain provisos which brought vehement protests and negotiations were not completed before the outbreak of World War I on August 1, 1914. Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. "had been granted *not a concession, but the promise of a concession.*"

The British declared war on Turkey November 5, 1914 and the Indian Expeditionary Force, already on the move, occupied Abadan two days later. The advance, punctuated by long halts, continued and by November 19 of the following year, the three day battle of Ctesiphon commenced. This was won and lost and the British retreated to Kut, where they stood siege and finally surrendered to the Turks.

Control of operations had been transferred in February 1916 from the Government of India to the War Office. By February 25, 1917 the British were back at Kut and on March 11 entered Bagdad. They were at Kirkuk, May 7, 1918, but evacuated it and did not reoccupy it until the end of October. The Armistice of Mudros was supposed to terminate hostilities between the British and Turks and it was signed October 30, 1918, but the British eagerly pushed on for six or seven days beyond that time and finally occupied Mosul.

Meantime, on the diplomatic front the British had enmeshed themselves in a series of conflicting obligations. By letters exchanged during late 1915 and early 1916 between Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the British were committed to the support of the latter and an Arab Kingdom. Almost without pause, by a series of diplomatic notes exchanged between April 26 and May 17, 1916, the so called Sykes-Picot agreement with France and Russia was made. By this at least a part of the same lands were to be partitioned between the British and French and Russia was to share in the control of Palestine. This agreement was secret until December, 1917 when it was published and denounced by the Bolsheviks, who had come into power in Russia. There were other conflicting declarations and agreements but these were the principal ones.

By the end of the war conditions had changed substantially. The territories under consideration had been conquered and occupied by British arms and lost to Turkey. Skirmishing still continued along the diplomatic front. The British wanted to disregard the Sykes-Picot

agreement, holding that it was no longer valid because Russia, one of the parties to it, had denounced it. The French held that it was still binding on the remaining partners. Clemenceau visited London in early 1918 and Lloyd George asked France specifically, among other things, to agree to the transfer of the Vilayet of Mosul to the British sphere. The French finally agreed to the transfer in a note dated February 5, 1919.

In the San Remo conference, April 1920, and even before the conclusion of peace with Turkey, to the negotiation of which the United States was not a party, not having declared war on Turkey, mandates over Syria and Lebanon were assigned to France and over Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain. At the same time France and Britain concluded the oil portion of their trade by an agreement signed on April 24, 1920 by P. Berthelot for France and Sir John Cadman for Britain and confirmed by the British and French prime ministers, respectively, on the following day.

By this agreement France got "25 per cent of the net output of crude oil at the current market rates which His Majesty's Government may secure from the Mesopotamian oil fields in the event of their being developed by government action" or a 25 per cent share participation at a price no more than that paid by any other participant in the event they should be developed by a private company. There were other grants and exchanges. Lord Curzon summarized the Mesopotamian part of the agreement by stating that it "represents the allotment to the French Government of the former German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company for facilities by which Mesopotamian oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean."

As a trade this may have been satisfactory, though to an outsider the French would appear to have been considerably outraded. As a division of booty, perhaps the French got as much as or even more than they had earned, although the silent partner, the United States, would appear to have been entirely overlooked. As the first step in the exercise of that newly invented, perhaps too idealistic and certainly much abused instrument of government, the mandate, it was hardly satisfactory. Curzon argued that, "It may therefore be said to be the adaptation of prewar arrangements to existing conditions, and in this respect His Majesty's Government, far from acting in a selfish and monopolistic spirit, may reasonably claim to have sought the best interests of the future Arab state. Neither the rise of the Turkish Petroleum Company nor the provisions of the San Remo agreement will preclude the Arab state from enjoying the full benefits of ownership

nor from prescribing the conditions on which the oil field shall be developed."

One is reminded of the not too cynical definition by Count Carlos Sforza, "Spheres of influence or of mandates are all bashful formulae used to make more decent our old colonial appetites." One might even recall Cecil Rhodes' statement that he considered the basis of empire to be "philanthropy plus fifty per cent."

THE San Remo oil agreement had hardly been made before the United States addressed Lord Curzon on the matter of equal opportunity in the mandated areas in general and, more specifically, with regard to Mesopotamian oil. Finally, on November 20, 1920 Mr. Bainbridge Colby, the American Secretary of State, addressed a rather tart note to the Foreign Office and the issue was joined.

Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce in President Harding's cabinet, early in 1921 called a general meeting of oil companies and urged them to expand their foreign operations. One of the results of this meeting was that on November 3, seven companies, Jersey, Texas, Gulf, Atlantic, New York, Sinclair and Mexican Petroleum, addressed the then Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, stating that they desired to conduct petroleum investigations in Mesopotamia. They were informed that it was the position of the British Government that during the period of military operations, "No permission is being granted to the nationals of any country to conduct geological investigations in Mesopotamia."

On this point it may be noted that the British had occupied Kirkuk finally on October 26, 1918. Hot on the heels of this event with due regard to the seasons, came a government oil geologist, E. H. Pascoe, geologist and specialist on oil occurrence to the Geological Survey of India, who "was deputed to make a geological reconnaissance of Mesopotamia" and spent the winter of 1918-1919 at that task. He reports that "This resolved itself into survey of as many of the important oil indications as it was possible to include in a five months tour." Pascoe had been one of the two geologists who had been members of the Admiralty Commission which had spent the winter of 1913-1914 in the examination of the Persian oil fields, preliminary to the Government's purchase of the Anglo-Persian shares. He afterward became director of the Indian Geological Survey and was subsequently knighted. Not to be outdone by the India Office, in 1921 or perhaps somewhat earlier, the Admiralty published a hand book, "Geology of Mesopotamia and its Border Lands," and pages 72-88 consist of a report on the Persian-Mesopotamian oil fields.

The British Foreign Office and American State Department continued to exchange notes and the American companies continued their meetings. Sir John Cadman, formerly director in charge of His Majesty's petroleum department and successively technical advisor, director and chairman of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., but, above all, trouble shooter extraordinary whenever British oil interests were involved, had visited the United States in the early winter of 1921. Ostensibly he came to ascertain the latest oil developments in the United States preparatory to his acceptance of his new position as technical advisor to the Anglo-Persian, an appointment which was announced during his journey. Actually he seems to have come to suggest to American oil interests a solution of the trouble which had arisen over Mesopotamian oil.

The American group met on June 20, 1922 and four days later one of its members called at the State Department to inquire what position it would take if American and British interests should enter upon private negotiation to settle the Mesopotamian matter. The Department had no objection, "provided that no reputable American company which is willing and ready to participate will be excluded by the arrangement decided upon and (2) that the legal validity of the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company will not be recognized except after an impartial and appropriate determination of the matter." The American group cabled the British group stating the position of the State Department and concluding, "If on the foregoing information you feel that representative of American group should now visit London to discuss details with Turkish Petroleum Company, such a representative will be selected and will probably be able to sail not later than July 8." Apparently the reply was favorable and Walter C. Teagle as representative proceeded to London and between July 15 and August 5, negotiated with the British-French-Royal Dutch Shell group. Upon his return he submitted a *Confidential Memorandum of Negotiations with the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd.*

It had been impressed upon Mr. Teagle that the areas covered by the company's operations were not to be confined to Iraq but included all of what was formerly Turkey in Asia, that the owners had agreed to be interested in the area only through Turkish Petroleum Company and that any American interest coming into the company would have to undertake to be interested only as a stockholder. This condition was apparently the statement of what was afterward accepted amongst the partners of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd., as the so called Red Line Agreement of July 3, 1928. The history of the claim of Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. was reviewed and all of the partners frankly

admitted the necessity of confirmation of title by Iraq before actual development could be undertaken. Probable expenditures and prospects were reviewed. It was noted that Anglo-Persian geologists had conducted surveys along the Persian border in 1918 and 1920. "There is little reason to doubt that these geologists did not confine their investigations solely to the districts which were known to be in Persia." It was also known that "The Shell group had geologists in Iraq during the same period." From this information, Teagle wisely concluded that Turkish Petroleum was already possessed of geological data "which would probably take the American group at least two to three years to acquire."

Much attention was devoted to an attempt to find a formula which would give effect to the State Department's views as to the Open Door and which would be acceptable to Turkish Petroleum. A plan had been drafted, largely by Teagle, which was acceptable to the partners in Turkish Petroleum and which he hoped might be acceptable also to the State Department. This plan provided essentially that within two years of ratification of the concession by Iraq, Turkish Petroleum should select for their own exploitation not more than twelve blocks, each block not to exceed 16 square miles, and that the remaining lands be subleased at auction, Turkish Petroleum not to be a bidder. The memorandum goes into further detail on this point but the use of the term "sublease" makes it clear enough that these sales were intended to be farm-outs by Turkish Petroleum. The matter of participation was not agreed.

Copy of this memorandum was left with Secretary Hughes and in reply to an inquiry as to whether or not the plan outlined was in conformity with the Open Door principle, the Secretary replied, "If, as you have indicated to me, all interested American oil companies have been invited to participate and those companies which have expressed a wish to share in the development of Mesopotamian oil resources are represented in the proposed agreement, if a fair and equitable share in this development is accorded to American interests and if there is no attempt to establish a monopoly in favor of the Turkish Petroleum Company or any other interests, the Department would not consider that the arrangement . . . is contrary to the spirit of the Open Door policy."

The trade was finally made, the American group by this time consisting of Jersey, New York, Gulf, Atlantic and Mexican Petroleum. It was held up for some years by the necessity of trading out with the famous Gulbenkian, who finally got a 5 per cent interest. The American

group got a 23 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent and a 10 per cent royalty was to be paid to Anglo-Persian.

Throughout the negotiations the State Department had insisted upon the two chief points raised in Secretary Colby's note of November 20, 1920, the wedge through which the American group came into the picture. The promise of a concession was not a concession and therefore Turkish Petroleum had no valid title to Mesopotamian oil. Any solution acceptable to the State Department would have to be in accordance with the doctrine of the Open Door—all American citizens were entitled to commercial opportunities equal to those had by any other nationals not citizens of the country.

The old claims of the Turkish Petroleum group constituted a cloud on title which served its purpose by blocking any other disposition of the oil rights until after the Government of Iraq could be constituted with the promulgation of a constitution and crowning of the British candidate, Feisal, as its king on August 23, 1921, and until after the extinguishment of Turkish title by the Lausanne treaty of July 24, 1923.

A new concession was negotiated and signed March 14, 1925. The old claims were discarded and the position of Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd. rested squarely on this concession. The American group, by now potential participants, hailed the signing of this concession as "The first step toward possible development of oil in Mesopotamia." The State Department apparently was relieved to see the vexed title question settled "so that presumably the present claims are based not on the prewar claims of Turkish Petroleum Company, but upon the recent alleged concessionary grant."

MAJOR Frank Holmes, formerly of the British Army, gentleman farmer, driller of water wells and trader on the Arabian coast, first appeared as agent for the Eastern and General Syndicate, Ltd., in attempting to secure oil concessions on the Island of Bahrein, in Kuwait, and the Hasa coast of Arabia about 1925. After securing concessions or promises of concessions from the rulers of these various states, he offered his rights to the Anglo-Persian interests. In March 1926 they were disposed to consider accepting the entire group of concessions but in April they advised that in view of the opinion of their local geologist, they were unfavorable to the proposal. Eastern and General Syndicate obtained the Bahrein concession, December 2, 1925.

In the autumn of 1926 Eastern and General approached Gulf Oil Corporation through its New York office and as the result of negotiations, options to a subsidiary, Eastern Gulf Oil Corporation, were signed

on November 30, 1927. The option ran until January 1, 1929 and on May 28, 1928 another option running until January 1, 1929 was granted Gulf covering any additional areas beyond the original 100,000 acres.

Gulf found itself in difficulties because of the Red Line Agreement and offered its contracts to Turkish Petroleum, but the board of that company was not interested and refused either to buy the contracts or to allow the Gulf to keep them. Eastern Gulf thereupon, with the consent of Eastern and General Syndicate, assigned its options to the Standard Oil Company of California on December 27, 1928 and on the following day California exercised its options and nominated Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, to receive the property. Gulf was not in position to take a profit and the sale was made for cost including geological work.

A month before Gulf had desired an extension of the period of exploration and Eastern and General had applied to Colonial Office, who agreed to recommend it to the Sheik only if the syndicate would give an undertaking providing for British control of the concession. This proposal was never agreed to and it required a year and a half of negotiation to come to an agreement. A formal agreement between the Sheik and Eastern and General was signed on June 12, 1930 and Eastern and General transferred to Bahrein Petroleum, August 1, the same year.

The outstanding points of this agreement were as follows :

1. Bahrein Petroleum Company must remain a British company registered in Canada, etc.
2. One of the directors must be a British subject and *persona grata* to the British government.
3. Company must maintain a Chief Local Representative in Bahrein approved by the British government and all communications with the Sheik must be through him and the Political Agent.
4. As many of the employees as is consistent with efficiency must be subjects of Britain and Bahrein.

The discovery well, Jebul Dukhan No. 1, was started in October 1931 and completed in early June 1932 with an initial production of 800 to 1,000 barrels a day from a depth of approximately 2,000 feet.

Major Frank Holmes was the first agreed Chief Local Representative but after the India Office took over the administration of affairs on August 1, 1933, he resigned at the insistence of the British Government in September 1933. He was employed by Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., I.P.C., with the approval of the British Government and appeared in Bahrein in March 1926, stating he was going to seek concessions along the coast from Qatar to Muscat. It transpired later that he was also trying to get a concession on the Additional Area in Bahrein. He

apparently so muddied the water that the Sheik in the spring of 1937 postponed all negotiations for the Additional Area for one year. He finally granted it to Bahrein Petroleum Company on June 19, 1940, but the British officials, distilling the last drop of advantage that could be obtained, hooked on a Political Agreement of June 29, 1940.

The India Office refused to permit Americans to negotiate for concessions in Qatar, Trucial Oman coast, and these sheikdoms fell like ripe fruit into the lap of Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., who also got the Hadramaut and Muscat.

The Gulf retired from Near East Development Corporation, the American group of Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd., and thus escaped the toils of the Red Line Agreement. There began long and tedious attempts to secure a concession in Kuwait. The British Political Agent insisted upon the so called "Nationality Clause" by which any operating company to receive a concession must be and remain British as to registration, chairman, managing director, majority of board, etc. After it became apparent, in the spring of 1929, that the Colonial Office was using every possible means to obstruct Gulf's entry, the latter took the matter up with the State Department. Representations were made to the Foreign Office and negotiations continued. The State Department was constantly met with the declaration that the retention of the "Nationality Clause" was upon the insistence of the Sheik. Major Holmes continued to negotiate and by early 1931 had reached a serious draft stage. In 1932 the Anglo-Persian group again began to show active interest and in the autumn of that year, a geological party was sent to Kuwait and in early 1932 commenced core drilling operations near the seepages in southern Kuwait and later in the year negotiators came to Kuwait and began an active campaign for an exclusive concession. The Foreign Office having advised the State Department in April that it would not insist upon the "Nationality Clause," Major Holmes returned to Kuwait and asked the Political Agent for permission to reopen negotiations. During the almost a month that he awaited this permission, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and an important official of the Anglo-Persian appeared before the Sheik and presented a proposed concession to be granted to the Anglo-Persian. Rivalry between the two companies was particularly keen during the late spring and summer of 1932.

Sir John Cadman visited the United States in late 1933. Gulf representatives visited London in early 1933. A compromise was effected. Gulf bought a release from Eastern and General and on December 14, 1933 the companies had agreed to try for a joint concession. Kuwait

Oil Company, Ltd., owned jointly by Anglo-Persian and Gulf, was incorporated February 2, 1934 and on December 23, 1934 the company was granted an exclusive concession for a period of 75 years. Drilling operations were commenced and the discovery well, with an initial production of 7 to 10 thousand barrels a day, was completed in February 1938.

K. S. TWITCHELL, who had been busy looking for water in Arabia under a grant from the philanthropist Crane, rather suggests that by agreement with King Ibn Saud he had visited the various American companies in an effort to interest some of them in an oil concession in Saudi Arabia. He says that the California Standard finally decided to try for the concession and that he met M. E. Lombardi in New York, got a power of attorney from him, and sailed on January 13, 1933 for London where he was to meet Mr. and Mrs. Lombardi and Mr. and Mrs. Hamilton. H. St. John Philby also helped to negotiate the concession. After discussions extending from late February between Lloyd M. Hamilton and his advisers and the King and his officials, the original concession was signed on May 29, 1933. It was ratified by the California directors on July 5 and by a royal decree in July. Publication of the agreement making it legal and establishing its effective date was made on July 14, 1933. The area of this first concession is estimated at 160,000 square miles.

The first well at Dammam was spudded on April 30, 1935. The well was finally completed as a small flowing well and the No. 2 well, which had been started in 1935, was completed in 1936 at a depth of 2,175 feet with an initial production of 3,840 barrels.

A supplemental agreement was signed at Riyadh, May 31, 1931, ratified by the California board on June 29 and by royal decree, published on July 7, the agreement was officially published, July 21, 1939. By this agreement the Arabian American Oil Company secured an additional area estimated at 89,000 square miles. Further agreements by 1942 had increased the area controlled by the Company to approximately 440,000 square miles.

Meanwhile, continued exploration has resulted in the fairly complete development of the Dammam field, in the discovery of the Abu Hydriya and Abqaiq fields in 1940, in the discovery of the Qatif field in 1945 and in notable extensions to the Abqaiq field in 1946; recent operations in an area lying between Abqaiq and Qatif have resulted either in the discovery of a new field or in a very considerable extension to the Abqaiq field.

Continued exploration in Iran has resulted in the discovery of the notable Haft Kel and Gach Saran fields in 1928, in the discovery of Pazanun in 1936 and of Agha Jari and White Oil Springs in 1937 and finally in the recent discovery of production in the Lali field.

One of the most notable events in Iran was the cancellation in 1932 of the original D'Arcy concession. This concession provided an annual payment to the government of 16 per cent of the net profit. The provision was loosely defined and a constant source of misunderstanding. During 1932 the Company offered to the Government the sum of 306,872 pounds as payment of its share of profits for the year 1931. Since there had been no notable drop in production from the preceding year and since the Government's income for 1930 had amounted to 1,288,312 pounds, the decrease came as a shock to the Government. On November 27, 1932, through the Finance Minister, the Government informed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., that the concession was cancelled, at the same time expressing a willingness to negotiate with the Company for a new concession based "on the rights of both parties" and stating that for the present the Company's activities were to be permitted to continue unaltered. There was considerable marching and counter marching in the diplomatic field but finally, on April 29, 1933, a revised concession was signed by the Company and the Government. It provided for substantial progressive reduction in the area held by the Company, eliminated the exclusive feature of transportation, provided for a royalty of 4 shillings a ton for oil sold or exported plus 20 per cent of the net profits whenever earned after the payment of 671,000 pounds to the shareholders, provided for the progressive replacement of foreign employees by Persians, for the education of Persians in Britain and provided for sale of oil products to the general public at 10 per cent less and to the Government at 25 per cent less than the basic Rumanian or Gulf of Mexico prices, whichever was lower.

The name of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd., was changed to Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., in 1929, and that of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., in June 1935.

Such in brief are the outstanding points with regard to the history of Middle Eastern oil. It could be extended considerably. There was the old concession in northern Persia obtained by Mr. Sapkdar in 1895-1896 and transferred to A. M. Koshtari in March 1916. It was cancelled in the Russian-Persian Treaty of Friendship of February 26, 1921 but Persia agreed not to grant concessions on the same area to any third state or its citizens without the approval of the Soviet Government.

In the early twenties W. Morgan Schuster enlisted the interest of

the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey in an attempt to secure concessions in northern Persia. The Persian Parliament passed a grant, November 22, 1921, but the Anglo-Persian group, supported by the British Government, interfered and finally the two companies reached an agreement by which they would operate in the area on a partnership basis.

Meanwhile, Harry F. Sinclair had sent a representative to Teheran during the summer of 1922 and he was in competition for the grant. On June 14, 1923 the Parliament authorized the offering of the concession to an American company, conditional upon the arrangement of a loan for \$10 million. Finally the concession to Sinclair Exploration Company was signed on December 20, 1923. It was ratified by Parliament on February 24, 1924 but was never made effective.

After several years of negotiation carried on chiefly through Charles C. Hart, formerly American Minister to Iran, a concession covering most of Afghanistan was granted on November 19, 1936 to Inland Exploration Company. On January 3, 1937 a concession for northern Iran was granted to Amiranian Oil Company. At the same time Iranian Pipe Line Company secured non-exclusive pipe line rights in both countries. After a year of geological work and prolonged negotiation for the ratification of the contract in Iran, Seaboard Oil Company, who with Case Pomeroy and Company were the chief owners of this group of enterprises, announced on July 28, 1938 that the concessions would be surrendered. This effort was entirely of a speculative nature and the very substantial discoveries of oil almost on the shores of the Persian Gulf during the period of negotiation for ratification of contract considerably diminished the apparent attractiveness of the concessions.

The more recent moves in this general area have been attempts to secure concessions in southern Persia by representatives of the Royal Dutch Shell group, Standard and Sinclair. These efforts were being made at least as early as 1944 and in the late summer of that year a bid for concessions was made by a Soviet mission headed by Sergi I. Karitaradze, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and had been refused by mid-October, 1944. Soviet pressure and an Azerbaijan revolution resulted in an agreement in late 1945 for the formation of an Iranian-Soviet company and actual operations in the area. Subsequently, the Iranian parliament refused to ratify the agreement.

Production:

Production for the last year, cumulative production to the end of that year and percentage ratios to world production are shown in the follow-

ing table. The data is taken from the *Oil Weekly* of February 10, 1947 and the figures are expressed in thousands of barrels and percentages.

	Total	Cumulative			
		1946 Daily Average	% World Production	To End 1946	% World Production
Egypt	9,200	25	0.33	98,610	0.19
Iran	146,500	401	5.25	1,589,846	3.06
Iraq	35,000	96	1.25	345,355	0.67
Saudi Arabia.....	60,500	166	2.17	112,902	0.22
Bahrein	8,000	22	0.29	78,597	0.15
Kuwait	6,900	19	0.25	6,900	0.01
Total	266,100	729	9.54	2,232,210	4.30

Current information regarding production is not available. It is not believed that the rate of production has changed substantially in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Bahrein. Production from Saudi Arabia is currently at the rate of 240,000 barrels daily, a substantial increase over the 1946 average, and that of Kuwait is believed to be at the rate of approximately 40,000 barrels daily.

Reserves:

The Technical Oil Mission to the Middle East made the following report on the reserves of the area, except Egypt, as of January 1, 1944:

6. In discussing the reserves of this area it is extremely difficult to find a common denominator by which to express them. Our preliminary estimate of reserves actually proved is approximately 5 to 6 billion barrels in Iran, 4 billion barrels each in Iraq and Kuwait, 2 billion barrels in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein, and less than one-half billion barrels in Qatar. If one considers reserves as proved by developed fields and indicated by fields discovered but not yet fully explored, the proved and indicated reserves in Kuwait appear to be approximately 9 billion barrels, those in Iran 6 to 7 billion barrels, Iraq 5 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia 4 to 5 billion barrels and Qatar 1 billion barrels.

These estimates, except for production and except for notable additions, are believed to be fair estimates at the present time.

The most notable additions have been in Saudi Arabia. The Qatif field was discovered in 1945 and notable extensions to the Abqaiq field have been made with its continued development. The extensions of the Abqaiq field made in 1946 and further extension or the discovery of a new field north of Abqaiq in 1947 are ample basis for substantial additions to estimates of Saudi Arabian reserves. Likewise the discovery during the present year of an important producer in the Lali field of Iran indicates substantial additions to Iranian reserves. For the present I would suggest that Iranian reserves might be set at 6 to 8 billion barrels and those

of Saudi Arabia at 5 to 7 billion barrels. For Egypt no definite estimate is available but the proved reserves appear to be of the order of magnitude of 100 to 200 million barrels.

Transportation:

The oil of the Middle East, except for the production of Iraq and Egypt, goes to market through the Persian Gulf. Oil from Iraq, except for a small amount refined and consumed locally, goes by a dual pipe line system from the point of origin, Kirkuk, to the eastern Mediterranean seaboard. One of the lines terminates at Haifa in Palestine and the other at Tripoli in the Lebanon. Egyptian production comes from fields on the Gulf of Suez and is refined in a nearby refinery at Suez or shipped by tanker through the Suez Canal.

Obviously, oil which originates in the Persian Gulf area and goes to Western markets is at a competitive disadvantage of about a 2,600 mile tanker haul around the Arabian Peninsula and some 15 cents per barrel canal tolls before it reaches the eastern Mediterranean. In order to overcome this disadvantage, the capacity of the existing lines from Iraq is being substantially increased and two new big-inch lines are projected or under construction; one from the Iranian terminals and the other from the Arabian fields, both to the eastern Mediterranean seaboard. These lines should be completed within the next two or three years and upon their completion, pipe line capacity from the fields in the Persian Gulf area should be increased from 750,000 to 1,000,000 barrels a day over its present capacity of 80 to 90 thousand barrels a day.

Refineries:

Current information regarding the refining capacity of the Middle East is not available. In the report of the Mission referred to, the capacity of the refineries, upon the completion of facilities then authorized or in construction, was estimated as follows: Abadan, 362,000 barrels a day. The Haifa plant of Consolidated Refineries, Ltd., 80,000 barrels a day and the refinery on Bahrein Island, 58,000 barrels a day. Since that report was submitted, a refinery has been erected at Ras Tanura. It is said at present to be running 115,000 barrels a day and the Bahrein plant is reported to be running 130,000 barrels a day. It is also reported that the capacity of the Haifa plant has been increased to 114,000 barrels a day. The Suez plant is reported to have a charging capacity of 28,000 barrels a day. In addition there are small plants at Tripoli, Kirkuk, Kanaquin and Kermanshaw. There is also a topping plant at Masjid-I-Sulaiman which according to the last available estimate had a capacity of some 77,000 barrels a day.

DEPOSITS AND DEVELOPMENT

By F. Julius Fohs

Oil geologist, author of studies of Middle East mineral resources

THE oil deposits of the Middle East are among the world's greatest; hence we must expect the struggle for control, by nations and corporations, of this most immediate and cheapest source of mobile power both industrial and military.

I give you the results of my personal studies, though De Golyer, as you have just heard, has studied the developed pools in detail and Gester has given a map of world reserve areas, expressing his viewpoint. The oil maps herewith were prepared for my paper now in course of publication by the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, and show three classes of oil reserve areas. I shall also compare Soviet Russia's oil position. More than this I shall outline relationships of other phases of Middle East development, of Arab and Jew and of security positions of Russia, Britain and the United States.

To understand something of the conditions of the occurrence of these oil deposits I shall outline as simply as possible something of the geology of the region. The principal elements that control are (1) The Arabian foreland, a stable block of granite and ancient sedimentaries; (2) the Asiatic Alpine mountain uplift of the Zagros-Taurus Mountains and Oman Mountains; (3) a great downwarp or sedimentary basin in which great thicknesses of shales, sands and limestones have been deposited with sediments 20,000 to 30,000 feet in thickness, which create source beds for oil and gas, and cover to prevent escape. The shifting of the Alpine Arc southwest toward the rigid Arabian foreland created anticlinal folds of the sedimentary beds, the folds and particularly domal portions, becoming loci of the oil deposits. Such folds occur, paralleling the mountain axis, both west of the mountains and in the great synclinal or downwarp basin or valley in which the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers flow, and which is similar to the Mississippi River Valley embayment, but is three times as large. The sedimentary beds range in age from recent to Cretaceous or below. Most of the oil production, as you have already been told, is in Tertiary (Eocene-Miocene) and Cretaceous limestones and some sandstones. In the deeper portions of the basin, in southwest Iran and in the Persian Gulf, many salt domes have been found. On the west side of the Oman range a series of anticlines are worthy of development in line with Abqaaq.

The important oil deposits occur in northeast Iraq, extreme western

Iran and eastern Arabia, and will extend slightly into Turkey and Syria. The anticlinal folds further west in Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine are principally in limestone beds which lack the sealing cover necessary to retain important oil accumulations, though some development is being done in Palestine where near Gaza and in the south there is somewhat more cover. A separate mountain system in southern Arabia because of igneous intrusions has probably little or no value for oil prospecting.

In the primary oil reserve area of Saudi Arabia, I estimate 221,000 square miles with a westward secondary area of 100,000 almost unexplored. Another 90,000 square miles having much lower oil possibilities lie to the west; this zone flanks and overlaps the Arabian foreland on the east with beds dipping eastward. However, the primary area is so great and will require such large capital and so much time to develop that it will be some time before remainder is prospected.

Between the Zagros and Elburz Mountains to the northeast we find sedimentary basins of lesser value for oil-gas. The best of these is in Northern Iran and southwest Afghanistan, and covers an area of 175,000 square miles, having domes with Cretaceous beds at the surface—some less apparent than others, with occasional igneous flows. This basin is of uneven value and almost wholly unexplored, as well as difficult of access, both for exploration and pipelines. That it will ultimately yield pools of the Rocky Mountain type, I have no doubt. A small portion of it is included in the Russian concession that extends south and east of Teheran. It was studied by the late Dr. Frederick Clapp and others.

Southward in Iran, of less importance, are the Kerman and South Iranian basins, and to the east the Central Baluchistan basin, totaling 97,500 square miles. All three basins are almost unexplored but have oil possibilities.

Along the Oman Gulf shore of Iran and the Arabian Gulf shore of Baluchistan, is the eastward continuation of the Persian Gulf basin with 52,000 square miles of primary possibilities.

Reserve values of the primary Persian Gulf province vary greatly in different parts of the area; thus the northern two-thirds of the British area in Iran, and a strip fifty miles wide in eastern Iraq are ultra-rich, as is the strip in Saudi Arabia, etc., on the west coast of the Persian Gulf from Trucial Oman north. From 250 to 2500 feet of oil saturated limestones have been penetrated in the Iraq-Iran fields.

Turkey's oil territory is small, chiefly in the Ardahan province which Russia claims.

The proven reserves of the Middle East are only a fraction of those to

be developed. DeGolyer reported that there is proven in the Persian Gulf basin 16 billion barrels and there is an indicated reserve of 26½ billion barrels. It is not unreasonable to expect 100 billion barrels ultimate; both Pogue and McCollum estimate 150 billion. The fuel oil and/or gasoline equivalent of natural gas is not included, and will add 50 per cent additional to this overall fuel-power reserve.

On the north flank of the Elburz Mountains are promising folds; it is probably these that Russia sought in her recent Iranian concession. While the land area covered is only a narrow strip on its south shore, it does spread to the west at Resht and to the east, south of the Soviet oil field, Chikishliar, and into the Caspian, and forms part of the Baku sedimentary basin.

Ownership of Middle East primary exploitable reserve areas is divided in square miles approximately as follows: American companies 292,000, British-Dutch 233,000, French 37,500, Gulbenkian and associates 7,900, Turkey 21,500, and a small area in Northern Iran controlled by Soviet Russia. On basis of control, however, Britain has 318,500 as against 252,000 square miles under American control. In addition there are sizable second and third class areas.

Summarizing, the Middle East has primary reserve areas totaling 649,000 square miles, secondary areas of 131,000 square miles, and tertiary grade areas of 195,000 square miles, a total of 975,000 square miles.

THERE are twenty Middle East oil-gas pools with only 150 completed wells, plus three pools in Egypt. Sometimes only one dome on an anticline is developed, where as many as three may exist, as at Kirkuk. Because of the considerable number of structures and the great productivity of those already developed, only the most promising, obvious and easily accessible will be exploited soon. The developed pools are in eastern Iraq, in northwest Iran, and close to the Persian Gulf coast from Kuwait through Saudi Arabia, Bahrein Island and Qatar. The daily production in 1946 was 729,041 barrels, and it is estimated that this will be increased to 1,600,000 as soon as pipelines are completed in 1951; present wells can readily produce this.

To the north and contrasted with the Middle East, important oil reserves lie in three great east-west sedimentary basins in the Caspian Sea province covering 946,000 square miles in Southern U.S.S.R. Still further northwest in the Moscow-West Ural basin are still other great oil and gas reserves, while east of the Urals large, almost unexplored basins, particularly those of the Ob-Irkutsh and lower Kolima and Lena Rivers give promise.

Additionally, Russia has under her control 99,000 square miles in the Balkans, including the rich Rumanian fields, but most of large portion undeveloped. The Russian-dominated Balkans include Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, plus Poland. The new boundary which gave Russia eastern Poland, practically denuded Poland of oil reserves, and added its sub-Carpathian deposits directly into the Russian column.

Likewise in Soviet Russia, development has been restricted principally to a few areas, and only those of Baku, Grozny and Maikop have yielded oil in quantity, but now the prolific Devonian pools on the southwest flank of the Urals must be added. Russian production in 1946 inclusive of Sakhalin was estimated at 454,794 bbls. daily but may have been greater; additional Russian controlled production is about 120,298 bbls., giving Russia a total of 575,085 barrels daily.

Both the Middle East and Soviet Russia will require large capital for extensive oil development together with much well equipment and pipe. For the Middle East, American and British-Dutch, to some extent French, but principally American capital, will be available—and both huge sums of money and large amounts of equipment will be required from the U. S. A. for many years to come.

The present proven oil reserves of the United States are 22 billion, those of U.S.S.R. possibly 10 billion, and those of the Middle East 16.5 billion barrels. Of greater significance however is what each of these can ultimately be expected to produce. United States 50 billion, against U.S.S.R. and the Middle East each 100 billion barrels, and for both the latter, the figure will probably be much greater. If allowance is made for natural gas conversion, 50 per cent must be added to these figures. It follows that it is unnecessary for Russia to annex or obtain control of additional territory, but on the other hand it is imperative that both the United States and the British Empire maintain their position in the Middle East. While Britain has coal, both the United States and Soviet Russia possess exceptionally large coal deposits which can later be converted to oil and oil products.

OIL development should mean much to the Arab lands. A wise application of the royalty moneys received by the rulers of these states would go far toward raising the living standard of these peoples, and it is by such application that the rulers can best insure their tenure, and exclude the infiltration and ultimate successful capture of these lands by Communism. Such moneys can be used both directly and as a basis of financing. The harnessing of rivers for hydroelectric power for industry and pumping, and even more for irrigation, so that the irrigable lands may be put to full use, would have the effect of creating that higher

standard of living necessary to raise the masses from their present position. Elsewhere, I have outlined the details of such development for Palestine, Transjordan, the Levant States and Iraq, and have demonstrated that with full use of arable lands, one-third of which would be irrigated, and simultaneous industrial development, there is possible an overall absorptive capacity of five times the present population. In Palestine it would permit threefold the present population, and in Iraq (at a cost one-fifth as much per acre as in Palestine), because of the large area of unused fertile valley available, 30,000,000 instead of the present 3,750,000 could live comfortably.

It is here in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers that I visualize a renaissance for the Arab peoples. Mr. Herbert Hoover and Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk agree with me on Iraq's advantages as a new and better homeland for millions of Arabs. Such great irrigation engineers as Sir William Willcox and A. Burton Buckley have long ago planned the necessary works, some of which have been built, but, as in the case of the Koot Dam (built with oil royalties), the follow-up work of building the necessary distribution canals, etc., remains undone. Another factor is absence of trained Arabs to till the land (such as have been trained in Palestine in the wake of Jewish irrigation and development of citrus groves and vegetables), and the necessity of immigration of Arab workers from Palestine and Egypt to fill this need.

Likewise, K. S. Twitchell, author of a new book on Saudi Arabia, has recently told of a start toward irrigation that has been made by Prince Feisal in one valley. A study of other portions of Saudi Arabia shows that this method can be greatly and beneficially extended to other fertile valleys to improve the lot of the 4½ million people of the land. Contrary to general belief, its great desert covers only 150,000 out of its 700,000 square miles.

ONLY three small hydroelectric plants, one each at Beirut, at Damascus, and below Tiberias on the Jordan, are in operation, although plans have been made which would yield 150,000 kw. from the Upper Jordan and Litani rivers and an additional 130,000 kw. from the Lowdermilk Mediterranean-Dead Sea project. In the building of these river dams it is important that Lebanon and Syria cooperate with Palestine where industries are already well established, to the benefit of all. Likewise, other good power sites exist in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and also in Turkey and Iran; 750,000 kw. all told. At present the bulk of the power in Palestine is diesel-engine produced. The lowering of the price of oil and oil products in Palestine where three times U. S. prices are charged, and a similar treatment for Arab lands, would be a great and

important factor in making oil competitive with hydro-electric power, and in facilitating the agricultural and industrial developments of these lands. It would greatly hasten such development by reducing plant investment for power.

The oil development will all be done by others at no cost, but at great benefit, to the Arabs. The present attitude of both operating oil companies and great powers, such as the United States and Britain, is primarily to humor and appease the Arab leaders and pay them tribute. Actually, the development is of such importance to these Arab countries that with the fair royalties already assured by the operators, it is good business for both Arab leaders and the Arab fellaheen to realize the benefits bestowed, realizing their proper use as a heaven-sent boon. Since all of the important deposits are in Arab and Iranian lands, there can be no reason for these people to raise a cry against others, such as the Jews in Palestine, where the land itself is insignificant, less than seven-tenths of one percent of Arab lands, and the oil chances are slight. The oil companies will employ many Arabs in their development, and the setting up of training schools by the companies would be a worthwhile undertaking.

Syria and Transjordan, and partly Palestine, will primarily be lands for oil transit by the pipe lines. Palestine and Lebanon as terminals of these lines at Haifa, Beirut, and Tripoli have refineries, a 90,000 barrel plant at Haifa to be increased to 155,000 barrels, and new ones to be built at Beirut and south of Haifa. In Palestine, the Jew can be of considerable help, both with his machine shops at Haifa and a considerable body of technical and scientific personnel, and can be especially depended upon to give loyal service to the companies as they did to the Allies during both World War I and II. Cooperation with the oil companies by the Jews to the advantage of both and with full recognition of Arab rights, can be fully assured.

WE have shown clearly that Russia has ample oil reserves for development within her borders or under her control to make Middle East oil unnecessary. What Russia lacks principally is an ample supply of immediately available capital, machinery and machine tools. With the North Iranian concession she is in a position not only to complete her hold on Baku basin reserves, but also to use this as a strategic base to protect the Caspian Sea with its great oil-gas reserves. Her attempt to obtain the mineral resources of the Kars area of Armenian Turkey is part of her imperialistic expansion program, as is her interest in the Ardahan Province with its small share of the Persian Gulf oil. Her desire to reach the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles, and the Persian

Gulf via overland rail routes from the Caspian, is understandable, and doubtless under treaty or U. N. arrangements might be granted for peace use with proper guarantees and proofs that military purposes and measures are not involved. Except for imperialistic reasons there can be little excuse for tying together the Moslem Arabs with U.S.S.R.'s large Moslem populations in Turkmenistan and Kazakistan.

Britain has long been in the Middle East and while security of the Empire lifeline has been important, her early relinquishment of a major position in India has considerably changed the necessity for it, except for her concern with Middle East oil. This is the most important oil reserve to which Britain can claim control, and I believe it important to her future. Because of the costs of pipelines and development, her position here is necessarily tied to the United States, whose nationals must provide most of the funds. Similarly, because of lack of finances, Britain must partly look to the United States for military protection, a fact which the Greek and Turkish moves have made clear. The British navy still far outranks any but ours, and Britain claims Haifa Harbor as a necessary base. For an army base she has laid claim to the Negev or southern Palestine, where the building of harbors at Akaba and Rafa would be helpful. There appears no good reason why she should not be permitted these naval and military bases, provided she does not insist on exclusive use and is willing to maintain them at her own cost instead of at the expense of Palestine and of the Jews as now. The excuse of the tie of the Arabs to the Moslems of India no longer is valid.

The position of the United States in the Middle East is relatively new. Prior to World War II, our nationals interested in Iraq Petroleum could depend on Britain with its controlling interest, to safeguard it. With the weakening of Britain and the rise of the United States as the first world power, with Russia a close second ; with the American development of Arabian oil fields, and the huge capital investments required for them and for refineries and pipelines, it now becomes economically necessary for America to strengthen its position. Another major factor is the declining position of United States oil reserves, with the Middle East offering a cheap source to supplement them. The attempted imperialistic expansion of Russia into this region requires immediate cognizance and vigilance on our part.

The UN and the Middle East

TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE DEMOCRACY

By Eliahu Ben-Horin

Author of "The Middle East; Crossroads of History"

THROUGHOUT the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire stood in the very center of European politics, which at that time was synonymous with world politics. Internally corrupt, morally and politically deteriorating, but still overwhelmingly large in its territorial possessions and strong because of its control of strategic heights and crossroads, the Ottoman Empire was the one objective on which the aspirations of the rival imperialisms of Europe were centered. Turkey was aptly nicknamed "the sick man of Europe." But whenever this sick man showed signs of dying, either Great Britain from the west or Russia from the east would hasten to prop him up, for each of the rivals did not wish him to die before making sure who would inherit his worldly goods.

The First World War, too, was mainly fought over the Ottoman Empire and especially its domains in Asia Minor, which are now known as the Middle East. When the war was over, it was the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor that offered the victors the only spoils of real value. The former German territories in the Pacific and in Africa were of decidedly secondary importance as compared with the Middle Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Since then, in the interval between the two World Wars, during the Second World War and in the period that has passed since the end of that war, the crucial significance of the Middle East in peace and war alike, has become increasingly clear.

We all know that the Middle East is the indispensable three-way bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa; that it is the guardian of the Eastern Mediterranean, of the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, which together form the most vital sea route in world trade and communications; that the land and air routes from the west to the east cross the Middle East; and that it contains one of the richest petroleum reservoirs in the world.

Long ago, the Middle East made unparalleled contributions to world

civilization. It gave us the three monotheistic religions and the very foundations of our civilization. In our time, however, it has become one of the main hothouses for breeding trouble, unending revolts, clashes, terroristic acts and miniature wars in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and the Arab Peninsula. What is it likely to be in the future: a constantly growing irritant or a constructive collaborator in a peaceful world?

This will depend on us, on organized and civilized mankind. If the Middle East becomes the "Balkans" of the future world, the powder-keg which explodes into wars, the blame will be ours. If, on the other hand, the Middle East resumes its place as a positive contributor to world peace, civilization and progress—the credit will also be largely ours. For obviously the lands and peoples of the Middle East are as yet in no position to determine and shape their own destinies in a real, rather than a formal way.

SHOULD the purely formal approach be adopted, there is not much that humanity has to do in the Middle East. Most of the countries in this region are now nominally independent states with kings or presidents at their head, with Parliaments in some cases, and with all the usual paraphernalia of sovereign statehood. Except for the following three exceptions—(1) Palestine, still held in the grip of conflicting Jewish-Arabs claims and still administered under a League of Nations Mandate; (2) Cyprus, which continues to possess the status of a British crown colony; and (3) the Sudan which is at the moment the object of a passionate controversy between Egypt and Great Britain over the future of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium administration—all the other countries in that area (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Transjordan, and, of course, Turkey) are today sovereign nations.

If we follow the formal approach, we can let matters rest there, concentrating on the solution of the Palestine problem, the Sudan controversy and any other conflict that may arise, and generally acting on what is supposed to be a wise principle: "Let's cross the bridges when we come to them." I question the wisdom of this principle, especially in application to the Middle East.

If we dig below the superficialities, we shall discover a very different picture. We shall not have to go very far down to discover that most of these states—with the exception of Turkey and possibly Iran—are far from sovereign in the real sense of the word; that in actual fact they are puppets to a larger or smaller degree, of certain great powers; that neither politically, nor economically, nor financially, nor strategically are they truly independent; that on the contrary, they are very much "de-

pendent" on the political and military protection, economic assistance, financial aid of the great powers.

One may argue that there is nothing wrong in being dependent on the great powers, and that practically every country on earth, including such long established and sizeable states as France and Italy, must time and again appeal for help and protection to the great powers. Indeed, even Great Britain, in the past the greatest empire on earth and still one of the leading nations in the world, now looks to the United States not only for economic and financial help but also for long-range political and strategic protection. Why then, one may ask, single out the Arab States of the Middle East on the ground that they are dependent on the great powers?

THERE are various degrees of dependency. Up to a certain degree dependency is legitimate, even inevitable, for our entire world order rests on the inter-dependence of the various nations in every sphere of human endeavor. Beyond that degree, inter-dependence stops and total dependence begins. The truth is that the Middle Eastern States are today beyond that degree; that the Arab States lack the very foundations of nationhood.

Let us take Transjordan as an example. One year ago Great Britain granted "sovereignty" to that eastern part of Palestine. Emir Abdullah was made "King," and Transjordan was proclaimed an independent kingdom. At this stage, we shall not raise the question whether Britain had the right unilaterally to transform this land, which formed an integral part of the Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations, into a sovereign state entity. We shall merely examine how sovereign this new kingdom is, if at all.

Actually, one year ago, when the independence of Transjordan was officially proclaimed, no change took place in that country except for that in nomenclature, so pleasing to Abdullah Ibn Hussein. The realities of Transjordan's life remained the same: the vastly underpopulated 35,000 square miles of territory; the approximately 300,000 Bedouins roaming the land; no industry; no communications; very little trade; no culture; no system of medical help; widespread illiteracy. As "King," no less than as "Emir," Transjordan's ruler remains totally dependent on the British Exchequer for his personal salary and for the support of his army, "The Arab Legion."

Nevertheless, Transjordan was proclaimed an independent kingdom. Great Britain even tried to have this new kingdom admitted into the United Nations. She has failed thus far, but mainly because of antagonism between the Great Powers. If matters proceed in their usual course,

before long Transjordan will become a member of the United Nations. This development, when it comes, will change the realities of that country as little as the transformation of the Emirate into a kingdom.

Essentially, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen belong to the same category as Transjordan. They represent one of the last leftovers of medieval feudalism. Ruled by little cliques of Pashas and Clergy, in complete disregard of the most elementary interests of the masses of the population, the Arab lands, if left to themselves, hold out no promise either for the advancement of their peoples or for positive participation in world civilization.

Some of these Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia and Yemen, have enjoyed independence for many decades. Iraq has been nominally independent for fifteen years. What have they done with their independence? Have they in any way elevated the masses of the people, spread literacy and culture, introduced proper medical care, or maternity hospitals, improved sanitary conditions, built proper dwellings for the working man, fought infant mortality, improved social conditions, and in general promoted progress in their respective countries? Unfortunately, one must admit that the opposite is true. In none of the Arab lands has any progressive movement in the political field, in economics, or in social conditions, materialized. Independence was made an instrument for more shameless exploitation of the masses of the people, for further enrichment of the few and for further degradation of the poor. The rate of illiteracy remained as high as ever, 90 per cent and above. Infant mortality in some of the Middle Eastern countries reaches as high as 50 per cent. Poverty among the fellaheen of Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and their counter-parts in Iran is beyond description. In all these countries the peasant and the worker live far below the human level of existence. In all these countries the Pashas and the ruling cliques live in oriental splendor.

We know, of course, that all over the world we find both rich and poor. Once again, one may ask, "Why single out the lands of the Middle East"? The answer is that there is a marked difference in this respect, too, between the situation in the world in general and in the lands under discussion. In the United States or in England, one cannot any longer find such pitiful and degrading poverty as in the Arab lands. In the West, moreover, the rich are taxed by the State. In the Middle East the rich are actually free from taxes. They are the government, free of any control by the masses of the people, and they manipulate matters in such a manner as to have the peasant carry the whole burden of the State budget. Corruption is rampant, freedom nonexistent, except for the freedom of the rulers to exercise their absolute power over their peoples and States.

Some of these lands possess sources of great natural wealth, such as oil

in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq; or cotton in Egypt. Hundreds of millions of dollars flow into these lands in the form of oil royalties and the like. A great deal of good could have been done with this revenue in countries with so primitive an economy, but all the money goes into the pockets of the few, providing them with every luxury they can think of. The masses do not benefit from the flow of wealth from the West.

WE have heard here about the plight of the national and religious minorities in the Middle East and the insecurity of their life under Arab-Moslem majorities. This is hardly surprising. In a society of such political, social and cultural standards as those just described no underdog can feel safe. Iraq "celebrated" its independence with a massacre of the Assyrian Christian minority. Iran massacred its Assyrians only last year. The members of the Arab League have indulged, since the end of World War II, in a number of reactionary discriminations and oppressions. They officially proclaimed a boycott on goods produced by the Jews in Palestine, and the various Arab countries, members of the League, passed legislation providing the most severe punishment, including death penalty, for any of their citizens who would dare to break the boycott and buy goods manufactured in Palestine. In Egypt, the Christian Copts are badly discriminated against on every level of daily life. Saudi Arabia officially refused an entry visa to an American Jewish technician only because he was a Jew. Egypt and Syria are constantly discriminating against American citizens of Jewish faith who are not granted transit visas if their destination is Palestine. The Jewish minorities living in these lands are terrorized in a manner reminiscent of Czarist Russia and Hitler Germany, and forced to disavow their sympathies with Zionism or otherwise face persecution and physical violence. In Egypt, anti-Semitism and xenophobia are openly promoted by the Pashas and the Clergy.

Undoubtedly, the Arab kings and politicians were greatly encouraged in these practices by the fact that their pro-Axis stand in the Second World War was completely and willingly forgotten by the Allies; and that they were allowed to jump on the bandwagon of the democratic powers and thus get representation in the United Nations. They were further encouraged by the fact that the Western world and the United Nations, as the symbol of organized mankind, have constantly turned a deaf ear to the complaints and cries of the minorities in the Middle East.

The United Nations are being led thus far by Great Britain and the United States, and one is entitled to ask what lies behind these anti-democratic policies of the Western democracies? And where will these policies lead us, if they are not revised and radically changed in good time?

The foreign policies of the Western democracies, the U.S.A. and Great Britain, are now mainly based on a negative factor: fear of Russia, or of Bolshevik expansion. Accordingly, a "magic formula" has been evolved to promote any project or plan on the world scene: ". . . If we don't get there first, the Kremlin will grab it." As an immediate expedient, the magic formula works wonders: even yesterday's super-isolationists and apostles of stringent economy jump into involvements in foreign lands and endorse huge loans and grants. Nothing seems too difficult or too expensive, if it promises to help in "Blocking Russia."

But how magic is the magic formula? How durable is it likely to prove? What is the positive pattern, if any, behind this openly stated overall aim of blocking Soviet expansion? On behalf of what world order is this "blocking" to be achieved? What attractions, ideological, moral, economic and social do the Western Powers offer to the multitudes of suffering humanity as an alternative to Sovietization?

The genesis of British-American post-war policies is this. As early as 1943, the military experts in London and Washington calculated that by 1970 Russia would be able to put an army of up to 45 million in the field. Europe could not possibly produce an effective counter-balance to the excessive might of the Soviet colossus. But if Britain and the U.S.A. combined forces, retained control over the sea and the air, and succeeded in keeping Russia a land-locked empire, then the British-American alliance would continue to have the upper hand in world affairs. Since then, fear of Russia and determination to prevent the emergence of Russia from her land boundaries has become the guiding motive, or rather the overwhelming obsession, behind all British-American policies.

Such is the genesis of the negative foundation of our democratic policies. It reflects the General's way of thinking and not the Statesman's. It presupposes the inevitability of a new world conflagration. It "plans" a new world on the old pattern of two armed camps. In this way of thinking, there is no room for ideas or ideals, for public sentiments and opinion, for rivalry of ideologies to be ended in the victory of the one which offers more happiness and a better way of life to the multitudes of the human race. In these "plans" for the future world, only guns, planes, battleships, atom bombs, economic might, industrial potential and logistics count.

How many times do we have to suffer disaster before we learn the lessons written clearly in our past experience? Three decades ago, the democracies won one war and made a mess of their victory. We can recall the general disillusionment in the democratic idea in the twenties. Only the extremists of the Left (The Russian Revolution) and of the Right (Italian Fascism, to be followed by German Nazism) could boast of an

enthusiastic following. The middle of the way course, as represented by democracy, was condemned to a defensive struggle for its very right to exist and for the preservation of the capitalist world and democratic freedoms. "Democracy on the defensive" soon became "Defeatist democracy," thinking and acting in terms similar to those which inspire the present-day British-American policies. The result was that the youth of Europe came to endorse Hitler's conception of democracy (shared to a considerable extent by Bolshevik philosophy) as a demoralized, spineless and outlived form of society, with no ideal to offer the world and with no faith in its own way of life.

"Aid to Greece and Turkey" may seem a very effective method of blocking Russia. But for how long? Today's expedients may turn out to be tomorrow's illusions. The same applies to bolstering reactionary kings and pashas in the Middle East and elsewhere, in disregard of all democratic principles and of the basic interests of the multitudes of people. Who is going to defend the democratic way of life in peace and war? Neither the kings and the ruling classes (whose vested interests are opposed to true democracy), nor the peoples themselves, condemned by the democracies to poverty, sickness, a sub-human level of existence, lack of all individual freedoms and all-round hopelessness. In fact, disillusionment in democracy and in what it has to offer to the world at large is already evident. First it effects the underdogs, then it will spread among the younger generation and men of conscience throughout the world.

The problem as seen by the human masses in the underprivileged areas can be summed up in a phrase coined by David L. Cohn, "You Can't Eat Democracy." The American aspect has been formulated by Walter Lippmann, who wrote that "Rich as we are, and powerful as we are capable of being, we are not rich enough to subsidize reaction all over the world or strong enough to maintain it in power."

The only real magic formula conceivable is that of "Constructive Democracy" as a basis for world reconstruction and reorganization. Communism and Fascism were used not only for domestic consumption but for export, while the democracies have thus far exported only imperialism, exploitation, power politics, superiority and utter indifference to the fate of colonial peoples and "natives" of all kinds. "Constructive Democracy" means generous export of the benefits of democracy to all peoples on earth.

Can such a fundamental change in the approach of the U.N. to world problems be expected from the Western Powers? Not from Britain, but possibly from America. The politico-economic thought of Britain is confused and uncertain because of the conflicting stresses of an impoverished national economy, a Labor Cabinet committed to nationalization,

a Tory opposition out of power at home but bent on clinging to imperial power which is lost beyond repair, fear of Russia and resentment of American wealth. If Britain is on the way out, America is on the way in. Free from the handicaps of tradition, the U.S.A. is in a perfect position to offer the world a plan of constructive democracy.

American capital, technical know-how, industrial skill and largess in planning and construction could become the most powerful lever of democracy in the world. Not politico-military loans but large-scale developments would block Soviet expansion. An irrigation project in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates which would reclaim new land for agricultural settlement in Iraq, increase its productive agricultural population and better the lot of the fellaheen; a Jordan Valley Authority in Palestine; T.V.A. projects in every land in need of irrigation and electrical power; communications, industrial development, land reclamation, modernization of agriculture, proper medical care, a crusade against illiteracy, better housing, maternity care, fair standards of existence for the peasant and the worker, a minimum of civil and human liberties in Iran, Iraq, China, Turkey, Egypt, Greece and in all the other countries—all this together forms a plan for constructive democracy. Only such a plan offered to the world could form an effective and lasting barrier to Bolshevik expansion.

It is also the only way to open the Middle East to the march of civilization, to bring it progress, sound reconstruction, stability, and peace. This is the alternative to the purely formal approach exercised thus far by the Western world in its treatment of the Middle East. If the essence of Middle Eastern realities, political, economic, cultural and social, is taken as a basis for the formulation of our policies in that area, there should be little doubt as to what the world can and should do in the Middle East.

As matters stand today, there is enough dynamite amassed in the Middle East to explode into a world-wide conflagration. On the other hand, wise statesmanship could use the dynamite as a lever in a great constructive effort on behalf of humanity. Oil moves tanks and bombers, but it also feeds tractors and diesels. A diversity of national and religious groups can easily breed trouble. But it can also produce a more colorful civilization.

FACTORS IN THE PROBLEM

By Edgar Ansel Mowrer

Newspaper Columnist, Foreign Correspondent, Lecturer

THE United Nations has been in existence less than two years. But already it has so often been coupled with the names of Arab and other Middle Eastern countries that ordinary citizens are justified in suspecting some special affinity between the two. As I write, a UN Commission is getting ready to make a new investigation—historically, the nineteenth—of the Palestine problem. At all UN meetings, Middle Eastern representatives play a larger and noisier part than they do in any other sector of world affairs.

This is not fortuitous. To most countries, the UN—regarded here as a prolongation of the League of Nations—is a useful diplomatic organ, one of many conceivable instruments for trying to keep the peace. To the Arabs and Zionists of the Middle East it is more than that. It is the midwife that assisted at their national rebirth. What more natural than that the UN should continue to watch over its growing children with particular care, seeking to guide them toward firm and effective citizenship in the coming world?

In another sense, admittedly, linking the future of the Middle East with the UN is probably no more appropriate than say, linking the Middle East with the atom. We suspect that the atom is going to say something decisive about almost everything. Whether it is going to issue an invitation to a more glorious life or an abrupt summons to meet our Maker, remains unknown. In the same way, most of us are pretty sure that the UN has not spoken its final word. Either it will develop into a controlling agency in world affairs or lapse into relative insignificance.

As I write, the UN is an unreliable guarantor of peace, a promising international lubricant, a good agent for carrying out world tasks and a really first-class loud speaker for what you may call the Conscience of Mankind—if you are lucky enough to discover any.

Necessary, too, is a definition of the term, Middle East. As I use these words, they mean an area and a group of peoples bounded on the *west* by the western border of Egypt, the Mediterranean and the Dardanelles; on the *south* by the Sudan, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; on the *east* by the Indian Ocean and the eastern frontiers of Iran; and on the *north* by the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea.

Excepting the Egyptians, the peoples of North Africa are excluded. Also Afghans and Indians.

So defined, the Middle East appears as the only land bridge between

three continents, the most vital water communication in the world, and the richest petroleum field known to exist. It is also a group of re-awakening peoples, the seat of the Moslem religion and the center of a worldwide Jewish movement known as political Zionism.

Finally, though the Middle East is a borderland between the two great competitive centers of post World-War-Two mankind—the Soviet Union and the Occidental democracies, it still lies within the Occidental “orbit.”

One of the most valuable and important strategic and economic areas of the planet, it is almost entirely inhabited by peoples who, though superficially united, are intrinsically too weak to protect themselves and the area.

If only for this reason, the Middle East would be one of the most likely starting places for a new world conflict.

Actually there are many other reasons. From time immemorial, the Middle East has been blessed not only with great civilizations but with great wars—particularly that part of it northeast of the land-bridge of Sinai. In his fascinating *Outline of History*, H. G. Wells referred to the ancient Jews as a peculiarly stubborn little people who persisted in living in the middle of an international highway and were continually getting run over. Think back and you will see what he means. One after another, the great conquering states of antiquity—Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Macedonia, Rome, the Eastern Empire—irresistably flowed into this region. Nor was the later pattern different—Islam, the crusading Franks, the conquering Turks, the French under Bonaparte, the Germans under Kaiser Wilhelm and again under Hitler—each group in its moment of unlimited ambition has headed for Palestine and Egypt as though drawn by a magnet.

The cutting of the Suez Canal magnified but did not by any means cause the Middle Eastern Problem. The discovery of oil in abundance merely increased the deadly importance of an area that for five thousand years had been vital to contending empires.

THE Middle Eastern Problem is as old as human civilization. Yet its present crisis started during World War One.

At the close of that war, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers liberated a vast Arab region from a Turkish yoke its inhabitants were far too weak to have thrown off themselves. Thereby these Powers started the Middle Eastern peoples on the road to that full independence they have now nearly all achieved.

Why this happened just at this point is outside my scope. I have my own reason for thinking that the urge for Middle Eastern liberation is just one phase of a vaster movement for general liberation that may give

the world no relief until it is satisfied. Here I must be satisfied with listing nationalism—Arab, Egyptian, Iranian, Turkish and Jewish—as the FIRST of the series of new local factors—some of which are special problems, as we shall see later—that are shaping the Middle Eastern Problem of tomorrow and the day after.

The SECOND is the grudging realization by all these peoples except the Jews that their unquestioned backwardness can be overcome only by accepting the mechanical aspects of Occidental civilization. Partly under the influence of western Europe, notably of France and England, partly under that of devoted American educators, partly through the example of the Palestinian Jews, the lazy Middle Eastern peoples are coming to see that if they wish to cease being objects of other peoples' policies, they must modernize. Vocal, savage xenophobia is not enough in the Atomic Age.

The THIRD new factor is the arrival in Palestine of the Zionist Jews. This is not the place to consider whether the Balfour Declaration and the League Mandate that were intended to make of Palestine a Jewish National Homeland and eventually a Jewish-controlled state were right or wrong, just or unjust. The fact is, Palestine was so marked out by the victors of World War One. Since the end of that war, over half a million Jews from various parts of the world have immigrated into little Palestine.

In roughly twenty-five years they now have transformed a semi-desert into one of the garden spots of the world. They have established the only industrial center in a thousand mile radius. Their success stimulated no less an authority than Walter Lowdermilk of the U. S. Soil Conservation Service to state that, in Jewish hands and properly irrigated, little Palestine can become the asylum for all of the remaining million and a half of Europe's Jews.

The Jews of Palestine are backed by most of the Jews of the world. They dispose of that incredible mixture of persistence, brains and money that has made the Jews a great productive and civilizing people.

Regardless of our attitude to Zionism, objective observers agree that while politically the Zionist Jews have become a bone of bitter contention, economically they have been a stimulant and socially an example to the entire Middle East. Welcome or unwelcome, it is the Jews who, more even than French or British, have goaded Egyptians and Arabs into making the effort that alone may one day enable them to sit among the great peoples—as their ancestors did.

A FOURTH vital fact that is shaping the Middle East is the decline of French and British power in this area. France, a primary influence here since the Crusades, was finally pushed out during World War Two

by a British-American-Arab combination—and the door was shut to the United Nations.

Britain—increasingly unwanted in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Arabia proper—is trying desperately to maintain a last military stronghold close to Suez in Palestine and Transjordan, even though this means a breach of former solemn promises to World Jewry.

Were the Middle East situated on some world backwater, decline of French and British power would have no consequence. But with this area practically in the middle between two mighty rival power blocs, French and British decline has created a vacuum which the local peoples are far from able to fill.

Here enters the FIFTH new factor—pressure from Russia. Explain it as you may—offensive or defensive, political or economical, traditional or strictly bolshevik, oppressive or liberating, revolutionary or reactionary—*this pressure is a fact*. Fear of the Soviet Union is behind the systematic courting of the Middle Eastern peoples and their Moslem brothers elsewhere by the Occidental democracies—their appeasement both without and within the United Nations. Were it not for the Soviet Union, Egypt would be proceeding far more warily in its negotiations with Britain for the evacuation of British troops and the future of the Sudan. King Farouk would never have dared “rescue” the great Abd el-Krim from a French ship at Suez. Haj Amin el Husseini, one-time mufti of Jerusalem and war criminal surpassed only by Hitler and Himmler, would be explaining his many murders to Allah rather than living on the fat of Egypt under the protection of the Arab League. The League spokesmen’s voice would be far less harshly falsetto.

Soviet pressure has given new life to a traditional British policy of favoring Moslems. It has induced a number of Americans—officers, diplomats, businessmen—to condone a policy of appeasing Arabs even if this means American breach of faith to the Jews.

The FINAL novelty in the Middle Eastern picture is the emergence of the United States as one of two dominant powers, the only rival of the Soviet Union and the biggest oil holder in the Middle East. In the giant tug-of-war between east and west that threatens to pull the earth asunder, Middle Eastern oil is such a power factor that almost no responsible American or British statesmen dare risk seeing this reservoir fall into Russian hands. Discussion of Occidental policy, notably of the Truman Doctrine—except among communists and “fellow wanderers”—mostly does not turn on whether we are *going* to protect the Middle East for our own sake—but how best to do it.

One way is through the United Nations. And here—after a long detour—I come back to my title.

THERE are many opinions about the old League of Nations. To some peoples, the Chinese, the Ethiopians, the Czechs, the Spaniards, that international organization was a rickety ladder that collapsed and let them down in time of need.

Not to the Middle Eastern peoples. Almost every one of them has in some ways benefitted directly by the existence of this internationally organized, cooperative body. It brought several of the Arab peoples through the Mandate school to full independence. It made the defense of Egyptian and Saudi Arabian independence easier. Recently, the U.N. protected the integrity of Iran. The League gave Palestine to the Jews and—at least as long as the Permanent Mandates Commission existed—protected the Jews against the Mandatory Power. Eventually, it may give international baptism to new independent peoples like the Yemenites or even to the peoples of Italian and French North Africa.

Tomorrow the UN might be the chosen instrument for a concerted world effort raising the educational and living standards throughout this entire once prosperous area.

There are however certain special problems which, separately or together, could effectively cancel out any UN attempt to hasten the development of this area or even, if the worst came to the worst, make the Middle East the center of a world catastrophe.

1. The most pressing of these is the PALESTINE PROBLEM.

At the present time an “impartial” UN Commission of eleven members is starting to “investigate” this problem and bring one or more recommendations before the regular UN Assembly next Fall.

On its face, this would seem to be a very reasonable procedure. A cynic might, to be sure, ask just what this present investigation can expect to turn up that had not already been revealed in the eighteen previous investigations that have been made. But if the UN is to take a decision there is a case for insisting that this be based exclusively on information gathered—or re-gathered—by the UN all by itself.

The trick in the present appeal to the UN is that essentially it amounts to a British-Arab plot to persuade the UN to unmake an international decision taken at the end of World War One—and make a new decision.

In 1917-18, it was decided by the victorious Allied and Associated Powers of World War One that Palestine should be given to the Jews. That the expression “Jewish National Homeland in Palestine” used in the Balfour Declaration and again in the Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations did mean an eventual Jewish-dominated state in Palestine has been attested to by the heads of the states involved. I refer to Woodrow Wilson and to David Lloyd George—as well as to Leopold

Amery who personally wrote the Balfour Declaration at Mr. Balfour's request.

No legal attempt to challenge this interpretation has been, or in my judgment, can be made with success. Palestine was unquestionably promised to the Jews.

The Arabs, who at the time gladly accepted a Jewish Palestine provided they got ultimate independence for more than a million square miles and half a dozen Arab states—something that has since been realized—started opposing the Jews when they found British Colonial officials tacitly doing the same thing.

The British were brought into Palestine solely for carrying out the League Mandate. Fulfilling the League Mandate is their only legitimate reason for remaining there. But by 1939 their reluctance had grown to the point where His Majesty's Government (and probably illegally) announced that the Jews would never become a majority, that immigration would be limited and land-purchase by the Jews stopped. This was the Chamberlain-MacDonald White Paper.

At the time, and as late as 1945, the British Labor Party condemned the White Paper as dishonorable and wrong. Imposing it has since become part of British official policy. London now oscillates between saying that the Balfour Declaration "has been carried out" and that it is "unworkable." Behind the request to the UN Assembly for a recommendation is clearly a desire for a new mandate that will permit Palestine to remain in majority Arab under permanent British military control—as in that part of Palestine now called Trans-jordan.

Over a million Jews—survivors of Hitler's massacres—are waiting to go to Palestine. Britain's backing of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate has badly divided the American people. On the one hand are those officials and others who for various motives go along with the British thought that appeasement of Middle Eastern Arabs is essential to our holding the Middle East against Soviet pressure.

On the other are that growing body of citizens, Jews and Christians, who take Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt seriously. They hold a) that double-crossing the Jews whose relatives we might perhaps have saved is unworthy of America; b) that the pro-Zionist pledges of all American Presidents and both political parties have to be meticulously carried out; and c) that the Jews can speed the modernization of the Middle East; and d) that the presence of a large body of Occidental-minded, technically competent, democratically inclined Jews in the lazy camel-and-scimitar civilization of the Middle East is greatly to the advantage of the United States.

Nearly all observers admit that after twenty-five years to go back on

pledges to the Jews and attempt to choke off further Jewish colonization means a desperate Jewish revolt.

Pro-Zionist Americans believe that Americans will refuse any part in repressing such a revolt. Repression by the British would, in their judgment, cause such a revulsion of anti-British feeling in the United States as to endanger further Anglo-American cooperation in many places where it is desperately needed.

Already anti-British Jewish terrorism is receiving increasing support in the United States.

Therefore they consider that the UN treatment of the Palestine issue is going to be a test case of the honesty, equity and political insight of that body, thereby determining its future.

2. The second Middle Eastern problem is ARAB NATIONALISM.

Big talk is a Middle Eastern form of poetry and not to be taken too literally. But the nascent Arab nationalism, as revealed by the unanimous endorsement given the murderous Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, threatens to stop at nothing. Egyptians who looked forward pleasantly to being "liberated" by Marshal Rommel have now defied France by hauling off a French ship at Suez the conquered Berber champion and French prisoner, Abd el-Krim.

Spokesmen of the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee—largely recruited from the pro-Axis families of Palestine and subservient to the Nazi mufti—are threatening the massacre of all Palestinian Jews if more are permitted to arrive.

Here is a terrific danger. For the Arabs are boasting out of weakness. In a legitimate effort to secure full control of their own domestic affairs (and illegitimately to bring about the elimination of Zionism) they are seeking the complete elimination of foreign influence from their countries. But—as stated before—nothing is more likely to cause trouble than great wealth in feeble hands. It is an invitation to aggression. Except for the American-backed Turks and the Palestine Jews, there is nothing in the Middle East that could resist a Soviet cavalry raid, still less a tank column. The Arab rulers are hopeful that they may talk big and feel safe behind the UN without accepting the protection of specific powerful nations.

The UN protected Iran. Why should it not protect Iraq or Syria or Saudi Arabia equally well?

This is an extremely dangerous frame of mind. Analysis of the means through which the United Nations was effective so far in protecting Iran's integrity would show that it took the full weight of the U. S. plus Britain plus evidence of a broken treaty to persuade the Russians to withdraw. Whether this could happen a second time remains to be seen.

The answer is, the UN will work only so long as the U.S. desires it. Were Arab reactionary nationalism and xenophobia to alienate any part of the American people, they might change or limit their Middle Eastern commitments. Then it would be only a matter of time before, after a period of carefully fomented local rebellions and external pressure of the kind to which we are getting accustomed, the young Arab states would find themselves sitting in Mother Russia's lap.

Inexperienced and conceited Arab leaders have been so assiduously courted and flattered by certain Occidental diplomats and officials that they have come to feel important. They know we desire to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East oil fields. Therefore they reason that they can have Occidental protection on their own terms.

This is not the case. It would be the case only if the present Arab rulers a) possessed enough armed strength to oppose a Soviet attack; b) possessed enough ideological cohesion to resist Soviet propaganda; or c) could easily shift to the Soviet side.

All of these three things are impossible for the present Arab rulers.

Lacking technical capacity, they lack military prowess. Their undemocratic societies are seedbeds wherein skillfully propagated communism can be made to flourish like poison ivy. And their petty despots cannot make friends with Stalin without ultimately being eliminated by him.

It is for this reason that the western democracies can extend protection to the Middle East virtually on their own terms and probably will. It is for the same reason that very experienced Americans like Sumner Welles are urging the consolidation of a strong Jewish Palestine, not only as fulfillment of a moral pledge to the Jews, but as creating an element in the Middle East upon which the Occident can depend for complete strategical and ideological support.

Such an attitude can and will be called imperialism by Middle Easterners disgusted with what they call capitalist exploitation. There is indeed a danger that it may become imperialist. Traces of imperialism are still evident in the United States and Labor Britain. For that reason, the more America and Britain can manage to work through the UN and the less through direct pressure methods, the better for all concerned. For countries brought to birth by an international organization can hardly complain against its future influence.

THIS brings us to the third great Middle Eastern problem. This is the problem of the UN itself. At the beginning of this paper, I registered the common belief that the UN actually is in a state of unstable internal equilibrium. Either it will have to become stronger or it is bound to lapse into relative insignificance.

To date neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has shown willingness to yield that portion of national sovereignty that must be yielded if the UN is ever to have a corporate existence of its own. Without such corporate existence it cannot begin to substitute law for international violence and power politics.

Which brings me to the final problem—the problem of a world united by technology but cleft in two by the rival aims of its most powerful component parts. There are, strictly speaking, no longer any purely Middle Eastern problems. Every Middle Eastern conflict is inevitably part of a greater conflict.

In such a world, political decisions are no longer being taken on the merits of the case, still less in deference to lofty aims. They are being taken on a tug-of-war basis—does it help them or does it help us?

One thing can be said with reasonable certainty. If this tug-of-war continues, war should logically ensue. In such a war the Middle East as a “frontier area” might conceivably catch it even worse than other continents. It might be obliterated. This is a mean world for great states. For weak ones it looks simply catastrophic. The larger states might just conceivably emerge, battered and bleeding, from an atomic hell. It is questionable whether the little countries would emerge at all. If they did, it could be only as the puppets of some stronger survivor.

For this reason, as for many others, the Middle East has a particular interest not only in helping to bridge the great cleavage that now divides the world, but in maintaining and developing the United Nations so that it may give us at least a prolonged truce in which basic problems can perhaps be worked out without atomic arguments.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By Dean Ernest O. Melby

THERE are some lessons that man seems to learn only with the greatest of difficulty. One that is particularly hard for mankind to learn is the fact of the humanity of all men, the worth and dignity of all men. It is hard for man to learn that oppression of humans in one part of the globe is in reality oppression of all humans. It is hard for humanity to learn that injustice to one race is injustice to all races. It is hard for mankind to learn that failure to adopt the principles of freedom in one area of the globe will ultimately threaten the freedom of all areas of the globe. Our failure to learn that lesson is responsible for our indifference to what happens in the Balkans, for example. It is responsible for our indifference today to what is happening in Palestine. It is responsible for our indifference to injustice and anti-democratic movements in various parts of the world. We have failed to learn that humanity has integrity; that it must be treated as a whole; that we must recognize the worth and dignity of all men; and that only by preserving freedom for all men can we preserve freedom for ourselves. That is a hard lesson to learn. It is our hope that a conference of this kind will help to burn that lesson a little more deeply into our consciousness.

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